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ABSTRACT
Supply Chain Contract Design in Supplier- versus Buyer-Driven
Channels. (May 2005)
Xingchu Liu, B.En.; M.S., Tsinghua University, P.R.China
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Sıla C¸etinkaya
In the context of supply contract design, the more powerful party has the lib-
erty of withholding private information which also improves its bargaining power.
Traditionally, the supplier (e.g., manufacturer) has been more powerful, and, hence,
the existing literature in the area emphasizes supplier-driven contracts. However, in
some current markets, such as the grocery channel, the bargaining power has shifted
to the buyer (e.g., retailer). For example, in the United States, large retailers, such
as Wal-Mart, exert tremendous market power over their suppliers. Also, with the
advent of the Internet, buyers have gained access to much more information about
multiple potential suppliers. Hence, this dissertation takes into account the recent
trends in power shifting between suppliers and buyers, and it attempts to provide a
comparison of optimal supply contract designs in supplier- versus buyer-driven chan-
nels. This research is unique in that we explore the impact of both power shifting
and information asymmetry while designing optimal supply chain contracts under
supply uncertainty and competition. Placing an emphasis on the cases of stochastic
and/or price-sensitive demand, we work on several novel problems in stochastic mod-
eling, nonlinear and dynamic optimization, and game theory. Hence, this research
has roots in applied probability, optimization, inventory theory, game theory, and eco-
nomics. The goal is to advance our practical knowledge of designing implementable
contracts because such knowledge is crucial for optimizing supply chain performance
iv
in the real world. This dissertation provides insights about
• the individual and joint impacts of the power structure and information asym-
metry on supply chain performance,
• the value of information for contract design in supplier- versus buyer-driven
channels,
• the impact of supply uncertainty and supplier competition on contract design
in supplier- versus buyer-driven channels.
vTo my Parents and my Fiance´ Xin Zhang
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Interest in the field of supply chain management has grown tremendously during
the past decade among both academics and practitioners. With that interest has
come a growing body of work on supply chain contracts. Since few firms are large
enough and few products are simple enough for one organization to manage the entire
provision of goods, most supply chains require the coordination of independently
managed entities who seek to maximize their own profits. For this reason, contractual
arrangements have been used as an efficient means to coordinate entities within the
supply chain to improve system-wide efficiency. This approach is called “channel
coordination,” a term adopted from the marketing literature. Channel coordination
may be achieved by first identifying the intra-chain dynamics which cause inefficiency
and then modifying the structure of these relationships contractually in order to more
closely align individual incentives with global optimization. Supply chain contracts
also help to divide the profits and to distribute the costs and risks arising from
various sources of uncertainty, e.g. market demand, selling price, product quality,
and delivery time, between the entities in the supply chain. Another important
rationale for contracts is that they facilitate long-term partnerships by delineating
mutual concessions that favor the persistence of the business relationship and make
its terms more explicit.
The volume of work on contracts is enormous in the economics and operations
management literature. Tirole (1988) and Tsay et al. (1999) provide excellent
overviews. While the work in economics contributes a deeper understanding of the
This dissertation follows the style and format of Management Science.
2basic issues of motivation for a broad variety of contractual structures, the work in
operations management focuses more explicitly on the modeling of material flows and
their complicating factors, such as the impact of demand uncertainty, forecasting, and
production capacity (Tsay et al. 1999).
A supply chain contract taxonomy provided by Tsay et al. (1999) classifies
contracts into eight categories based on the types of clauses they contain. These
are specification of decision rights, quality, pricing, minimum purchase commitments,
quantity flexibility, buy-back or return policies, allocation rules, and lead time. We
observe that the last six of these contract types approach the problem from the
supplier’s (e.g., manufacturer’s or distributor’s) perspective. These studies assume
that buyers (e.g., retailers or customers) are passive decision makers in the sense that,
for example, manufacturers can influence their retailers’ decisions through various
incentives, price schedules, and cooperation. This dissertation will concentrate on
supply contract design issues where this assumption is violated so that the buyers act
as the channel leaders. Such channels are called buyer-driven channels whereas the
traditional work in supply contracts concentrates on supplier-driven channels.
The suppliers in monopolistic markets are able to charge above-competitive
prices and, thereby, establish supplier-driven channels. However, as Messinger and
Narasimhan (1995) point out, in some markets such as the grocery channel, the bar-
gaining power has shifted to the buyer (e.g., retailer). For example, in the United
States, large retailers such as Wal-mart exert tremendous market power over their
suppliers. Also, with the advent of the Internet, buyers have access to much more in-
formation about multiple potential suppliers. Ertek and Griffin (2002) quote a recent
survey by Forrester, which indicates that manufacturers of standard products expect
approximately one-third of their sales to occur on-line within the next two years and
that 40% of producers expect the Internet to squeeze prices. Thus far, however, only
3a limited number of research papers have analyzed this shift in the power structure,
which is one of the important motivations of the dissertation.
Another deficiency in the current literature pertains to information asymmetry.
Information asymmetry usually occurs in a supply chain when some entities in the
chain are better informed than the others. Despite recent advances in information
technology and the trend towards sharing information among supply chain partners,
information asymmetry remains a key feature of real supply relationships. Since the
entities in a supply chain may belong to different firms that have conflicting objec-
tives, and/or they may not have access to private information, a system-wide optimal
solution may not be implementable unless it can fully resolve any incentive alignment
problems caused by asymmetric information in the system. This observation provides
another important motivation for the dissertation in which we will develop optimal
supply chain contracts via exploring the impact of both the power structure and
information asymmetry. More specifically, our goal is to develop a supply contract
design framework that considers decision power and information asymmetry issues in
supplier- and buyer-driven channels. In order to achieve this goal, we attempt to
• generalize existing channel coordination mechanisms, such as price protection
and return policies, which provide benchmarks for supply contracts,
• analyze optimal supply contract design mechanisms in buyer-driven channels,
• examine the impact of the power structure on supply contract design,
• evaluate the value of information in supply contract design for supplier- and
buyer-driven channels, and
• provide practical solutions and insights to improve system-wide efficiency in
supplier- and buyer-driven channels.
4While focusing on these objectives, we also investigate the impact of supply
uncertainty and supplier competition. Throughout this dissertation, we will refer to
the supplier as he and the buyer as she.
I.1. Scope of the Dissertation
In order to develop a supply contract design framework that considers power struc-
ture and information asymmetry issues in supplier- and buyer-driven channels, this
dissertation investigates the following four sets of problems.
I.1.1. Buyer’s Impact
Recent work provides insight into several contract-based channel coordination mech-
anisms commonly used in practice, such as price protection and returns agreements
(Lee et al. 2000, Taylor 2001), revenue sharing contracts (Cachon and Lariviere 2002),
and supply contracts with options (Barnes-Schuster et al. 2002). By considering a
two-period stochastic demand model and ignoring the possibility of returns or the dis-
posal of unsold inventory, Lee et al. (2000) show that price protection policies provide
a basis for channel coordination, i.e., a win-win contract. Taylor (2001) examines the
use of three different channel policies that are used in declining price environments:
price protection (P), midlife returns (M) and end-of-life returns (E). He shows that
PEM guarantees channel coordination, i.e., again, a win-win solution.
However, these two papers, by Lee et al. (2000) and Taylor (2001), assume that
the supplier (manufacturer) provides the contract and the buyer responds by passively
choosing the order quantity. In practice, the buyer has impact on the retail market
with pricing decisions (Emmons and Gilbert 1998) and sales efforts (Taylor 2002).
Furthermore, the buyer has the liberty of withholding private information (Corbett
5and Tang 1999) which also improves her bargaining power. Therefore, there is a need
to revisit and analyze price protection and returns agreements to consider the buyer’s
impact more explicitly. In this dissertation, we investigate the following problems in
this area:
• The design of optimal price protection contracts with retail-pricing decisions.
• The design of optimal price protection contracts with buyer’s sales effort con-
siderations.
• The design of optimal price protection contracts with incomplete information
about the buyer’s cost structure.
• The design of optimal return policies with incomplete information about the
buyer’s cost structure.
I.1.2. Information Asymmetry
The effect of bargaining power on supply chain performance is an interesting issue that
has arisen in recent years. Ertek and Griffin (2002) explore the impact of the power
structure on a two-stage supply chain and develop pricing contracts in a case where
the supplier has dominant bargaining power and a case where the buyer has dominant
bargaining power. They consider a pricing scheme for the buyer that involves both a
multiplier and a constant mark up and show that it is optimal for the buyer to set
the mark-up to zero and use only a multiplier. The analysis in this paper is based
on the assumption that each party in the supply chain has full information of the
channel. However, private information usually exists in a supply chain, and it is often
associated with the bargaining power. Therefore, the contract provider has to take
information asymmetry into account.
6Corbett and Groote (2000) derive an optimal quantity discount policy under
asymmetric information about the buyer’s holding costs. Corbett and Tang (1999)
analyze three types of contracts from the supplier’s point of view with information
asymmetry considerations about the buyer’s cost structure: the one-part linear con-
tract, the two-part linear contract, and the two-part nonlinear contract. Under the
one-part linear contract, the supplier charges a constant unit wholesale price. Under
the two-part linear contract, the supplier charges a constant unit wholesale price but
offers a fixed lump side payment to the buyer. Under a two-part nonlinear contract,
the supplier offers a menu of contracts where each item on the menu consists of a
pairing of a unit wholesale price and lump sum side payment. Corbett and Tang
find that the value of information is higher under two-part contracts and that the
value of offering two-part contracts is higher under full information. Also, they point
out that more flexible contracts allow the supplier to trade with buyers with higher
costs. Ha (2001) considers designing a contract to maximize the supplier’s profit in
the newsboy problem when demand is stochastic and price-sensitive and the supplier
has incomplete information on the marginal costs of the buyer. He shows that the
supplier’s profit is lower than in the complete information case while the buyer’s is
improved.
As we have mentioned earlier, we seek to extend the current literature by explor-
ing the impact of the power structure and information asymmetry simultaneously.
In this dissertation, we explore the impact of the power structure and the value of
information on designing contracts in a two-stage supply chain with a single-product
where the product is shipped from a supplier to a buyer at a wholesale price and
then sold to a price-sensitive market. Concentrating on a buyer-driven channel, we
consider three types of contracts with and without information asymmetry consider-
ations. These are i) one-part linear contracts, ii) two-part linear contracts, and iii)
7two-part nonlinear contracts. Under the one-part linear contract, the buyer declares
a non-negative price multiplier, denoted by α, and states that she will set the retail
price equal to the product of α and the wholesale price. Under the two-part linear
contract, the buyer declares an α and charges a slotting fee to the supplier. Under the
two-part nonlinear contract, the buyer offers a menu of contracts, where each item
on the menu consists of a pair of α and a slotting fee, leaving it up to the supplier
to select the pair of his choice. We compute the parameters of optimal supply con-
tracts with information asymmetry considerations in buyer-driven channels for these
three types of contracts. Utilizing our own and Corbett and Tang’s (1999) results, we
compare the performances of the supply chains (e.g., expected profits) under optimal
buyer- and supplier-driven contracts. Hence, we explore the impact of the power
structure on supply chain performance with, and without, information asymmetry
considerations. Our investigations are highlighted below:
• The design of different types of optimal contracts for a buyer-driven channel
with full information sharing.
• The design of different types of optimal contracts for a buyer-driven channel
with incomplete information of the cost structure.
• The analysis of the impact of the power structure and information asymmetry
on supply chain performance under different types of contracts.
I.1.3. Supply Uncertainty
The existing supply contract design literature ignores supply uncertainty issues. That
is, this literature assumes that when an order is placed, it is either filled immediately
(the case of zero lead time) or after a deterministic, or perhaps random, lead time. In
8reality, the supply of a product may sometimes be interrupted due to suppliers’ ran-
dom equipment breakdowns, maintenance durations, delays in raw material supply,
etc. Hence, supply availability remains an important, but overlooked, issue. Another
reason for unpredictability in the supply process is uncertainty in the yield quantity
due to the random proportion of defective items received.
A properly designed supply contract provides an opportunity to improve system-
wide profits under supply uncertainty by explicitly defining how to share the cost and
risk caused by this uncertainty, i.e., how to coordinate the channel. With cost-sharing,
the buyer can order more in each period so as to achieve optimal system-wide profits
(therefore, the supplier and the buyer have a bigger pie to share) without increasing
her cost. This is the main idea that we will implement in designing an optimal
contract with supply uncertainty considerations.
When the supplier and the buyer are two independent entities with incentive con-
flicts, the buyer may not have access to complete information about the supplier’s cost
structure (such as setup cost) or supply uncertainty. To provide more implementable
supply chain contracts, we further develop optimal contracts with information asym-
metry considerations under conditions of supply uncertainty. Based on our results on
contract design addressing the above issues, we explore further the value of supply
uncertainty information.
Previous work on the value of flow uncertainty information focuses on demand
uncertainty. For example, Cachon and Fisher (2000) find that the value of sharing
demand information is very limited under stationary demand. Lee et al. (2000), by
contrast, suggest that the value of demand information sharing can be quite high,
especially when demands are significantly correlated over time. However, to the best
of our knowledge, there is no work on the value of supply uncertainty information in
the literature, which is an important motivation of the dissertation. The problems
9investigated in this area are summarized below:
• The design of optimal cost-sharing contracts under supply uncertainty with full
information.
• The design of optimal cost-sharing contracts under supply uncertainty with
incomplete information about supplier’s costs.
• The design of optimal cost-sharing contracts with incomplete information about
supply quality/yield/availability.
• Exploration of the value of supply uncertainty information and the impact of
the power structure.
I.1.4. Supplier Competition
Most studies to date have focused on markets consisting of exclusive dealers that
sell only one producer’s brand; little attention has been given to the larger segment
of most consumer goods markets in which retailers sell multiple (often highly sub-
stitutable) brands at the same location. This latter channel structure represents
numerous markets including those consisting of specialty stores, such as consumer
electronics, sporting goods, and automobile parts, etc. As Tsay et al. (1999) point
out, “another deficiency in the current literature is the lack of attention to com-
petition, either between multiple buyers or multiple suppliers. Buyers that share a
common supplier and compete in the same consumer market might behave in a way
that obstructs their competitors’ access to suppliers ... Multiple suppliers to a com-
mon buyer might need to alter their price, service, lead time, or flexibility offerings
in light of the competitive environment.”
Although the consideration of competition is rare in the operations management
10
literature, there is substantial coverage in the economics literature. For example,
Choi (1991) analyzes a channel structure with two competing manufactures and a
common retailer and studies three different power structures, i.e., supplier dominant,
balanced power, and buyer dominant structures. He shows that all channel members
are better off when no one dominates the structure. His work is followed by Trivedi
(1998), who models a channel structure in which there are duopoly manufacturers
and duopoly common retailers. Trivedi shows that the presence of competitive effects
at both the retail and manufacturer levels of distribution has a significant impact on
profits and prices.
Our research is based on the above work in the economics literature, but it focuses
on designing effective contracts to improve supply chain performance. In particular,
we investigate the following problems:
• The design of supply contracts under supply uncertainty and supplier competi-
tion.
• The design of supply contracts under power structure, supply uncertainty, and
supplier competition considerations.
• Exploration of the impact of power structure.
This research has roots in applied probability, optimization, inventory theory,
game theory, and economics. We intend to develop optimization models aimed at
minimizing entity/system costs or maximizing entity/system profits for the purpose of
optimal contract design. Our focus will be on probabilistic demand problems. From
the methodology perspective, our optimization models are all stochastic modeling
problems that require unconstrained/constrained dynamic or nonlinear optimization
techniques, depending on the factors considered.
11
As previously indicated, current supply chain contract practices and the liter-
ature will be enriched by more research on power shifting, information asymmetry,
supply uncertainty, and competition considerations. This dissertation is unique in
that we explore the impact of both power shifting and information asymmetry while
designing optimal supply chain contracts under supply uncertainty and competition.
Hence, this research will advance our practical knowledge of designing implementable
contracts, and such knowledge is crucial for optimizing supply chain performance in
the real world. This dissertation will also shed light on the value of supply uncertainty
information and the role of suppliers’ and buyer’s competition in the design of supply
chain contracts. These are two important practical issues neglected in the existing
literature.
In the next section, we present a classification of the supply chain contracts
literature, which helps demonstrate the importance of our research and how our work
will fit in with current academic interest and recent trends in supply chain practice.
I.2. Related Literature
Contracts are, of course, a major consideration in law, and the literature in this area
is enormous. There is also a substantial literature on contracts in the economics
literature. To distinguish our supply chain contract study, we will define a supply
chain contract as follows: a supply chain contract is a mutual commitment between
supplier(s) and buyer(s) on operational details including funds, goods, and informa-
tion flow to improve the individual and/or joint entities’ performances. By defining
the purpose as “to improve the individual and/or joint entities’ performances,” we
distinguish our concentration from the work in law which focuses on the legality of
contracts. Also, our concentration is different from the work in economics since our
12
emphasis is on operational details.
In supply contract design, the issues of who controls what decisions and how
entities will be compensated are critical. An understanding of contractual forms and
their economic implications is, therefore, an important part of evaluating supply chain
performance. Due to the importance of supply contracts, the field has developed in
many directions. A taxonomy of work in this area would be very helpful for under-
standing supply chain contracts. However, we still need to define what constitutes a
supply contract paper even after we restrict our search by the above definition. As
Tsay et al. (1999) point out , “the challenge arises because, broadly speaking, all
literature on inventory theory could qualify.” Therefore, we will further narrow our
search to those works in which the analysis explicitly offers guidance for negotiating
the terms of the relationship between the suppliers and buyers. Thus, we review
in depth only those papers which treat the terms of the contractual relationship as
decision variables.
Tsay et al. (1999) provide a good taxonomy based on contract clauses. In their
work, supply contracts are classified into eight categories: specification of decision
rights, pricing, minimum purchase commitments, quantity flexibility, buyback or re-
turns policies, allocation rules, lead time, and quality. Because several novel works
on supply contracts, such as price protection, revenue-sharing, etc., have appeared in
the last few years, the above taxonomy needs to be extended to include more cat-
egories. Expanding this taxonomy will be necessary as long as innovative work on
new contract clauses continues to appear in the future. In other words, the major
shortcoming of this taxonomy is that it does not provide a stable structural clas-
sification that allows for the incorporation of new specific clauses. To address this
shortcoming, in the following section, we present a three-level classification, which
is further narrowed down to the one-supplier-one-buyer supply chain structure. The
13
reason for focusing on the one-supplier-one-buyer structure, rather than including
multiple-buyer and multiple-supplier structures, is that the work on supply chain
contract design based on the one-supplier-one-buyer structure is ample and more in
depth, which provides an insightful understanding of intra-chain dynamics under ex-
citing contractual arrangements. The work on multiple-buyer and multiple-supplier
structures, on the other hand, is relatively scarce and rarely offers optimal policies.
I.2.1. A Classification of the Supply Chain Contract Literature
It is worth noting that although a supply contract is a mutual commitment, the final
terms reached by both parties depend on their bargaining power. Usually one of the
entities initiates the contract. For example, a returns policy is initiated by a supplier
who takes responsibility for unsold inventory; a lead time quotation policy is provided
by a buyer to reduce the risk of supply uncertainty. As the leader of the channel, one
party initiates a contract and thus has the flexibility to adjust the contract and the
opportunity to gain more profit than the follower. The bargaining power structure is a
key issue in supply contract design, no matter what clauses are considered. Therefore,
as the top level of the taxonomy, we classify the supply contract design literature into
two categories: supplier-driven and buyer-driven channels.
The second level of the taxonomy has four categories under the supplier-driven
channel: decision right allocation, pricing alignment, quantity flexibility, and revenue
reallocation. Classification on the second level is based on the location of the main
thrust in the contract through the time-line of the supply chain. That is, after the
decision right is specified, the pricing scheme is determined, and then a certain order
quantity is shipped, and, finally, the revenue is realized. Similarly, the second level has
two categories under the buyer-driven channel: decision right allocation and pricing
alignment. Although we expect more categories will be added under the buyer-driven
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Figure 1 A Classification of the Supply Chain Contract Literature
channel in the future, currently only a limited number of papers analyze the buyer-
driven channel. The third level of the taxonomy is based on the contract clauses.
Figure 1 summarizes the classification.
Below, we briefly describe the concept represented by each category at the second
level as well as which category the clauses of the third level fit into.
• Decision Right Allocation in supplier-driven and buyer-driven channels: Each
party’s decision rights are specified and a way is provided to adjust the cost
structure and reallocate the risk so that the entities’ information and incentives
are more aligned with the system-wide optimum. Resale Price Maintenance
(RPM) and Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) fit in this category.
• Pricing Alignment in supplier-driven channel: The supplier specifies a pricing
scheme that favors the buyer in exchange for her additional commitment or
responsibility. The category includes Two-Part Tariff, Quantity Discount, and
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Revenue-Sharing.
• Pricing Alignment in the buyer-driven channel: The buyer aligns her payment
with the supplier’s commitment or realized service level. Lead Time Quotation
and Quality Commitment belong in this category.
• Quantity Flexibility in the supplier-driven channel: The supplier provides the
buyer with flexibility against demand uncertainty. The quantity the buyer ul-
timately purchases may deviate from a previous planning estimate, subject to
certain constraints and/or financial consequences. The category includes Quan-
tity Flexibility and Minimum Purchase Commitment.
• Revenue Reallocation in the supplier-driven channel: The supplier is willing to
share the cost and partially return his revenue to the buyer after the demand
is realized so that the buyer’s behavior is better aligned with the system-wide
optimum. Returns Policy, Price Protection, and Rebate fit here.
We note that several papers are candidates for more than one of the above
categories. For example, the work of Wang et al. (2004) combines RPM, VMI, and
revenue sharing. This phenomenon is normal since a proper combination of different
types of contracts provides an opportunity to capitalize on their merits simultaneously
and improve the system efficiency. In fact, we expect many more such combinations
to appear in the future. The purpose of our classification is to help explain the intra-
chain dynamics under different contractual schemes. We do not intend to tear the
literature into isolated pieces. The way that we fit a paper into a category is based
on which category the paper fits first based on the time-line of the supply chain.
Therefore, we place the work of Wang et al. (2004) into the decision right allocation
category.
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In the next section, we will review the supply chain contract literature based on
our third level of classification.
I.2.2. A Review of the Supply Chain Contract Literature
Since Tsay et al. (1999) provide an excellent review of supply contracts, here we try
to avoid overlap by focusing on more recent work. However, since we also attempt
to provide a complete picture of the supply chain contract literature, we must review
some of the classical work to demonstrate the roots of certain important ideas.
I.2.2.1. Resale Price Maintenance and Vendor Managed Inventory
We note that the economics literature has contributed a great deal to Resale Price
Maintenance, in which the supplier is allowed to dictate the conditions of the retail
price that the buyer may charge. Rather than summarize this vast literature, we refer
the reader to Katz (1989) for a review. In this section, we concentrate on reviewing
three recent papers on VMI, in which the supplier assumes the management of the
buyer’s inventory, making such decisions as when and how much inventory to ship
to the buyer. The first paper focuses on the consignment stock which could be part
of a VMI scheme to offer superior customer service under competitive pressure. The
second paper considers a (z, Z) VMI contract, while the last paper designs a contract
that includes both RPM and VMI.
Corbett (2001) considers consignment stock to help reduce cycle stock by pro-
viding the supplier with an additional incentive to decrease batch size. Under con-
signment stock, the supplier owns the inventory held at the buyer’s site until it is
consumed. Corbett analyzes both supplier-driven and buyer-driven channels. First,
the optimal menu of contracts is derived in a buyer-driven channel when the supplier
has private information about the setup cost. He shows how consignment stock can
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help reduce the impact of this information asymmetry. Then, he studies consignment
under the assumption that the supplier cannot observe the buyer’s backorder cost.
The optimal menu of contracts on a consigned stock level is derived, and he shows
that the supplier effectively has to overcompensate the buyer for the cost of each
stockout.
Fry et al. (2001) model a type of vendor-managed inventory (VMI) agreement
that occurs in practice called a (z, Z) contract. They investigate the savings due to
better coordination of production and delivery that is facilitated by such an agreement
in a buyer-driven channel. The optimal replenishment and production policies for a
supplier are found to be up-to policies. Numerical analysis is conducted to compare
the performance of a single supplier and a single retailer operating under a (z, Z)
VMI contract with the performance of those operating under a traditional retailer-
managed inventory (RMI) with information sharing. They show that the (z, Z) type
of VMI agreement performs significantly better than the RMI in many settings but
worse in others.
Wang et al. (2004) consider a consignment contract with revenue sharing where
a supplier decides on the retail price and delivery quantity for his product and retains
ownership of the goods. For each item sold, the retailer deducts a percentage from
the selling price and remits the balance to the supplier. They assume that the retailer
is the leader and the supplier is the follower. They show that, under such a contract,
both the overall channel performance and the performance of individual firms depend
critically on the demand price elasticity and on the retailer’s share of the channel cost.
In particular, the (expected) channel profit loss, compared with that of a centralized
system, increases with demand price elasticity and decreases with retailer’s cost share,
while the profit share extracted by the retailer decreases with price elasticity and
increases with retailer’s cost share.
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I.2.2.2. Two-Part Tariff, Quantity Discount, and Revenue-Sharing
Monahan (1984) first considers the economic implications, from the supplier’s point of
view, of offering quantity discounts to the buyer. Assuming that the supplier follows
a lot-for-lot policy, he shows that a supplier may adjust his present pricing schedule
to entice his buyer to increase the present order size by a factor of “k” and increase
his profit as a result. Banerjee (1986a) incorporates supplier’s inventory carrying
costs and develops a generalized version of Monahan’s model and demonstrates its
equivalence with the joint economic lot size approach suggested by Banerjee (1986b).
Lee and Rosenblatt (1986) extend Monahan’s model by explicitly incorporating con-
straints imposed on the amount of discount that can be offered and relaxing the
implicit assumption of the lot-for-lot policy adopted by the supplier.
Moorthy (1987) argues that a two-part tariff is superior to quantity discounting
because it is simpler; it separates the coordination problem from the profit-sharing
problem (coordination is achieved by setting the wholesale price equal to the supplier’s
production cost, and a lump-sum transfer allows the profits to be split arbitrarily),
and leads to fewer legal problems (charging all retailers the same wholesale cost is
more consistent with the Robinson-Patman Act). Many subsequent papers in the
marketing literature have considered variants of this model.
Weng (1995) studies a policy coordinated through quantity discounts and fran-
chise fees. He shows that the optimal all-unit quantity discount policy is equivalent
to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy for achieving channel coordina-
tion. Hofmann (2000) analyzes the impact of all-units quantity discounts on channel
coordination in a system consisting of one supplier and a group of heterogeneous
buyers with a cash-flow-oriented lot-sizing model. His work provides insight into the
efficiency of channel coordination through quantity discounts, as well as the influence
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of the number of price breaks and the heterogeneity of the system. Khouja (2000)
extends to the case in which demand is price-dependent, and multiple discounts with
prices under the control of the supplier are used to sell excess inventory. Two algo-
rithms for determining the optimal number of discounts under fixed discounting costs
for a given order quantity and realization of demand are developed.
Corbett and Groote (1999) derive the optimal quantity discount policy under
asymmetric information of the buyer’s holding cost. Corbett et al. (2004) analyze
three types of contracts: the one-part linear contract, the two-part linear contract
and the two-part nonlinear contract with information asymmetry consideration of
the buyer’s cost structure. They find that the value of information is higher under
two-part contracts and the value of offering two-part contracts is higher under full
information. Also, they point out that more flexible contracts allow the supplier
to trade with buyers with higher costs. Ha (2001) designs a contract to maximize
the supplier’s profit in the newsboy problem when demand is stochastic and price-
sensitive and the supplier has incomplete information about the marginal cost of the
buyer. He shows that the supplier’s profit is lower than in the complete information
case while that of the buyer is improved.
Cachon and Lariviere (2002) study revenue-sharing contracts in a supplier-driven
channel with revenues determined by each retailer’s purchase quantity and/or price.
They demonstrate that revenue-sharing does coordinate a supply chain with a single
retailer. Also, they find that a number of other supply chain contracts (e.g., returns
policy, quantity discount, quantity-flexibility, rebate) do not effectively coordinate all
of the supply chains that they consider. However, they acknowledge several limita-
tions of revenue-sharing contracts. Revenue sharing does not coordinate competing
retailers when each retailer’s revenue depends on its order quantity and the vector of
the retail price. In addition, revenue sharing does not coordinate a supply chain with
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retail effort dependent demand.
I.2.2.3. Lead Time Quotation and Quality Commitment
Grout and Christy (1993) discuss the incentives faced by a supplier when quoting a
delivery time to a buyer. During the contracting process associated with the one-time
purchase of some item, the buyer offers a lump-sum bonus of B for on-time delivery,
and the supplier in turn specifies a delivery time A. The supplier’s risk is due to
uncertainty in the production time. If the supplier completes production prior to
time A, he collects B but incurs a cost of α per unit of time for holding the item until
delivery. If instead, a production delay causes tardiness, the supplier incurs a cost
of β per unit of time late. The authors show that a first-best outcome exists under
certain pairings of (A,B).
Reyniers and Tapiero (1995) use a simple game-theoretic formulation of a supplier-
producer channel to examine the impact of the contract structure on the supplier’s
quality and the producer’s inspection practices as well as its implications for the qual-
ity of the end product. Since suppliers often have more information about the quality
of the parts than the producer, Lim (2001) investigates contract design when there
is incomplete information regarding the quality of the parts. He shows that when
the supplier and the producer have to share damage costs, an optimal contract is
one where the supplier compensates the producer by the same amount, regardless of
his quality type. However, a supplier with low quality is more likely to be offered a
contract with an inspection scheme, while a supplier with high quality is likely to be
constrained with a warranty scheme.
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I.2.2.4. Quantity Flexibility and Minimum Purchase Commitment
Traditional inventory theory generally assumes that the buyer can order any quantity
from the supplier at any time. Certainly the buyer prefers to avoid any constraints
on her ability to meet her own customers’ demand. However, this may be undesirable
from the supplier’s point of view for a variety of reasons, such as the amplification of
demand variance, referred to as “bullwhip effect” (see Lee et al 1997). When signing
a contract, since the buyer prefers no quantity commitment while the supplier prefers
a fixed quantity commitment for the whole horizon, a compromised contract is finally
reached.
One type of these contracts is where the buyer agrees in advance to accept
delivery of at least a certain quantity of stock, either in each individual order or
cumulatively over some period of time. The supplier may offer the buyer a lower
unit cost on items purchased under the contract. Anupindi and Akella (1993) study
a class of contracts that require the buyer to commit to purchase a certain minimum
quantity in every period of the horizon. Orders for each period are permitted to be
adjusted upwards at a price premium. Bassok and Anupindi (1997) analyze a supply
contract for a single product that specifies that the cumulative orders placed by the
buyer over a finite horizon be at least as large as a given quantity. The demand for
the product is uncertain, and the buyer places orders periodically.
Another type of these contracts is when the buyer agrees in advance to accept
delivery of a fixed quantity of stock in each period and may adjust the quantity
(after obtaining further information such as realized market demand), which is called
quantity flexibility. When a buyer’s estimate does not entail enforceable commitment,
buyers commonly overstate their intended purchase, only to refuse undesired product
later on. Quantity flexibility is a way to encourage the buyer to forecast and plan more
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deliberately and honestly. In exchange, the supplier might need to provide a price
break to give the buyer an incentive to participate. Li and Kouvelis (1999) develop
valuation methodologies for different types of supply contracts. A “time-inflexible
contract” requires the buyer to specify not only how many units she will purchase,
but also the timing of her purchases. A “time-flexible contract” allows the buyer
to specify the purchase amount over a given period of time without specifying the
exact time of purchase. Other than time flexibility, the supplier may offer “quantity
flexibility” to the buyer as well, i.e., purchase quantities could be within a pre-specified
quantity window. The objective is to minimize the net present value of the purchase
cost plus inventory holding costs. Milner and Rosenblatt (2002) analyze a two-period
supply contract which allows the buyer to adjust her order after observing the initial
demand and demonstrates that flexible contracts can reduce the potentially negative
effect of correlation of demand between two periods. Barnes-Schuster, Bassok and
Anupindi (2002) investigate the role of options in providing flexibility to a buyer to
respond to market changes. They show that, in general, channel coordination can be
achieved only if the exercise price is allowed to be piecewise linear.
I.2.2.5. Returns Policy, Price Protection, and Rebate
The supplier often uses returns policies to encourage retailers to stock and price items
more aggressively. Pasternack (1985) models a returns policy in a single period set-
ting in which demand is uncertain. He assumes that the retail price is determined
exogenously. Pasternack’s results indicate that global optimization, i.e., channel co-
ordination, can be achieved with either of the following forms of returns policy: (1)
the buyer receives a partial credit for all unsold units, or (2) the buyer gets a full
credit for the return of only up to a certain portion of her original order. Emmons
and Gilbert (1998) demonstrate the need to incorporate the self-interested behavior
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of buyers into decisions relating to the establishment of a supplier’s pricing policy.
They show that uncertainty tends to increase the retail price and under certain con-
ditions, a supplier can increase his own profit by offering to repurchase excess stock
from the retailer at the conclusion of the period.
Price protection is a commonly used practice between manufacturers and retailers
in the personal computer industry, motivated by the drastic declines in product value
during the product life cycle. It is a form of rebate given by the supplier to the buyer
for units unsold at the retailer when the price drops during the product life cycle.
Lee et al. (2000) show that a properly chosen price protection credit coordinates the
channel when the buyer has a single buying opportunity. They also show that when
the buyer has two buying opportunities, channel coordination is achieved when the
price protection is set endogenously together with the wholesale prices. Taylor (2001)
further examines three channel policies that are used in declining price environments:
price protection, midlife returns and end-of-life returns, and he shows that the three
policies together guarantee both coordination and a win-win outcome.
A rebate is a payment from a supplier to a retailer based on buyer sales to the
end consumers. Two common forms of channel rebates are linear rebates, in which a
rebate is paid for each unit sold, and target rebates, in which the rebate is paid for
each unit sold beyond a specified target level. Taylor (2002) shows that when demand
is not influenced by the sales effort, a properly designed target rebate achieves channel
coordination and a win-win outcome but that coordination cannot be achieved by a
linear rebate in a way that is implementable. When demand is influenced by the sales
effort, a properly designed target rebate and returns contract achieves coordination
and a win-win outcome.
Through the above supply chain contract literature review, we can confirm that
the buyer’s impact (in a supplier-driven channel) is rarely examined and the number
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of papers investigating the buyer-driven channel is limited. Thus, our first and second
sets of problems “Buyer’s Impact” and “Information Asymmetry” enrich the literature
on both supplier- and buyer-driven channels. In addition, the literature reveals that
there is little contract design work on “Supply Uncertainty”; therefore, we must carry
out our investigation from the ground level. Fortunately, substantial work has been
done on supply uncertainty in inventory theory, and we will review that relevant
literature in the next section.
I.2.3. A Review of the Supply Uncertainty Literature
Substantial work has been done on supply uncertainty in inventory theory. Silver
(1976) initiates a main stream of literature on supply uncertainty which assumes that
the quantity of (good) products received by the buyer is (stochastically) proportional
to his/her order quantity. That is, Silver extends the classical economic order quantity
model by considering the possibility that the quantity received may be a random
variable whose expected value is proportional to the original order quantity. He shows
that the optimal order quantity depends on the mean and standard deviation of the
amount received. Kalro and Gohil (1982) extend Silver’s model to include complete
and partial backlogging of demands. Mak (1985) extends this model even further by
assuming that the fraction of demand lost during a stockout period is itself a random
variable. Gerchak and Parlar (1990) consider the problem of jointly determining yield
variability and lot sizes when yield variability can be reduced through appropriate
investments. Another stream of literature considers supply uncertainty issues as a
consequence of random capacity. Parlar and Berkin (1991) consider a generalization
of Silver’s model in which supply is not always available. That is, the supplier has
periods of supply availability and unavailability with random durations. Wang and
Gerchak (1996) study the effect of random supply capacity on optimal lot sizing in a
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continuous review environment.
Some recent research concentrates on the impact of the production process by
which defective products are delivered. Porteus (1986) and Rosenblatt and Lee (1986)
incorporate the effects of imperfect production processes into the classical economic
order quantity model with a deterministic and constant demand rate. Porteus as-
sumes that there is a constant probability that the process goes out of control while
producing each unit whereas Rosenblatt and Lee assume that the time-to-failure is
exponentially distributed. Kim and Hong (1999) extend Rosenblatt and Lee’s model
by considering a general time-to-failure distribution. Chung and Hou (2003) provide
a more generalized model by allowing shortages. In the above models with imperfect
yields, the yield distribution itself is assumed to be known and given. However, in-
vestments to improve the production process can have an impact on this distribution.
Cheng (1991) considers a constant yield rate and assumes that the unit production
cost of the item increases with the yield rate. Cheng shows that for a specific form of
the relationship between yield rate and unit production cost, a closed-form expression
for the economic production quantity can be obtained. Tripathy et al. (2003) extend
Cheng’s model by assuming that demand exceeds supply and that the unit cost of
production is directly related to reliability and inversely related to the demand rate.
While the above papers focus on continuous-time models, Henig and Gerchak
(1990) analyze the structure of inventory policies in the presence of stochastically
proportional yield in a periodic review setting with random demand. Erdem and
O¨zekici (2002) consider a periodic-review single item inventory model in a randomly
changing environment where all model parameters are specified by the state of the
environment. They also consider random yield specified by the random capacity of
the vendor, and they show that the optimal policy is a state-dependent-base-stock
policy. Yano and Lee (1995) provide a comprehensive review of lot sizing models with
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random yields that summarizes both continuous-time and discrete-time models.
Since the above papers concentrate on minimizing the cost of a specific entity
in the supply chain, they offer only a sub-optimal solution when used for decision
making without coordination in a supplier-buyer system. Some recent work highlights
the importance of supply uncertainty for effective supply chain coordination. For
example, Affisco et al. (2002) propose a quality-adjusted joint economic lot size model,
and they study the effect of quality improvement and setup reduction on system-wide
cost. Khouja (2003) formulates two-stage models in which the proportion of defective
products increases with increased production lot sizes, and he shows that quality
considerations can lead to significant reductions in optimal production lot sizes. A
basic assumption underlined in these papers is that the system has a single decision
maker, and, therefore, the system-wide optimal solution can be easily implemented.
However, effective supply chain coordination practices actually require resolving the
entities incentive alignment conflicts.
A properly designed supply contract should provide an opportunity to improve
system-wide profits under supply uncertainty by explicitly defining how to share the
cost and risks caused by this uncertainty, i.e., by addressing the question of how to
coordinate the channel. The difficulty in analysis is that placing emphasis on the
operational-level details of incentive alignment obstructs the simultaneous analysis
of supply uncertainty information. Starbird (2001) examines the effect of rewards,
penalties, and inspection policies on the behavior of an expected cost minimizing
supplier. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no previous work on supply
contracts under supply uncertainty considerations. Our work seeks to fill this gap.
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I.3. Organization of the Dissertation
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II examines the buyer’s impact
explicitly under price protection and returns policies. In Chapter III, we study three
types of contracts in a buyer-driven channel with information asymmetry considera-
tions, and we explore the impact of the power structure. In Chapter IV, we develop
supply contracts under supply uncertainty. Supplier competition issues are addressed
in Chapter V. The contributions of the dissertation are summarized in Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER II
BUYER’S IMPACT
Recent work provides insight into several contract-based channel coordination mech-
anisms commonly used in practice, such as price protection and returns agreements
(Lee et al. 2000, Taylor 2001, Lu et al. 2002), revenue sharing contracts (Cachon and
Lariviere 2002), and supply contracts with options (Barnes-Schuster et al. 2002). Lee
et al. (2000) explore the use of price protection with a two-period model, ignoring
the possibility of returns or the disposal of unsold inventory. They show that price
protection is an instrument for channel coordination. If products have long manu-
facturing lead times so that the retailer has a single buying opportunity, a properly
chosen price protection credit coordinates the channel. If, contrarily, products have
shorter manufacturing lead times so that the retailer has multiple buying opportu-
nities, price protection alone cannot guarantee channel coordination when wholesale
prices are exogenous. However, when the price protection credit is set endogenously
together with the wholesale prices, channel coordination is restored. Taylor (2001)
examines three channel policies that are used in declining price environments: price
protection (P), midlife returns (M) and end-of-life returns (E). He shows that EM
(i.e., midlife and end-of-life returns) achieves channel coordination if the wholesale
prices and the return rebates are set properly. However, such a policy may not be
implementable because it may require the manufacturer to be worse off as a result
of coordination. If P is used in addition to EM and the terms are set properly, then
PEM guarantees both coordination and a win-win outcome. Lu et al. (2002) further
identify protection policies and/or conditions under which the supply chain can be
coordinated and a win-win situation can be guaranteed. They also provide algorithms
to determine win-win policy parameters.
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However, these three papers, by Lee et al. (2000), Taylor (2001), and Lu et al.
(2002), assume that the supplier (manufacturer) provides the contract and the buyer
responds by passively choosing the order quantity. In practice, the buyer has impact
on the retail market with pricing decisions (Emmons and Gilbert 1998) and sales
efforts (Taylor 2002). Furthermore, the buyer has the liberty of withholding private
information (Corbett and Tang 1999) which also improves the buyer’s bargaining
power. Therefore, there is a need to revisit and analyze price protection and returns
agreements to consider the buyer’s impact more explicitly.
Emmons and Gilbert (1998) study the role of returns policies and the impact of
pricing on market demand. They model the relationship between a manufacturer and
a retailer in a single period setting with price dependent demand uncertainty. Using
a multiplicative model of demand uncertainty, they demonstrate that uncertainty
tends to increase the retail price and that under certain conditions, a manufacturer
can increase his own profit by offering to repurchase excess stock from the retailer at
the conclusion of the period.
Retailers can also influence demand by merchandising, doing point-of-sale or
other advertising, providing attractive shelf space, and guiding consumer purchases
with sales personnel. Taylor (2002) shows that when demand is influenced by retailer
sales effort, a properly designed target rebate and returns contract achieves coordi-
nation and a win-win outcome. Other contracts, such as linear rebate and returns or
target rebate alone, cannot achieve coordination in a way that is implementable.
In this chapter, we generalize existing channel coordination mechanisms policies,
such as price protection and return policies and explicitly examine the buyer’s impact.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, the impact
of the pricing decision on price protection design is examined and four demand-curves
are carefully explored. In section II.2, the impact of sales efforts is investigated. We
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further examine the impact of information asymmetry on price protection and returns
policiy design in section II.3 and section II.4, respectively. Section II.5 provides
concluding remarks.
II.1. Impact of Pricing Decisions
In this section, we examine the impact of pricing decisions on price protection designs
under both deterministic and stochastic demand cases. We start with the price-
sensitive deterministic demand case to investigate the dynamics of an optimal price
protection design, and then we study the stochastic price-sensitive demand case which
provides a better representation of real life applications.
II.1.1. Deterministic Demand Case
Consider a two-period model with deterministic price-sensitive demand. We assume
that products have long lead times, so the buyer has a single buying opportunity
at the beginning of the product life cycle. The buyer chooses an order quantity at
the beginning of period 1, and the units are delivered ready for sale in period 1 at
full price. At the beginning of period 2, another new product is introduced to the
market. The launch of the new product reduces the attractiveness of the existing
product. Consumers react to the introduction of the new product in one of two
ways. Some consumers prefer to purchase the existing product at a discount; other
consumers prefer to buy the new product. The buyer can adjust the retail price to
influence the demand. Since the demand is deterministic, the buyer knows exactly
how much the demand will be in the two periods at certain prices.
Assume the demand di in period i satisfies di = ai− bipi where ai, bi are positive
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constants; pi is the retail price in period i, i = 1, 2 satisfying
pi ≤ ai
bi
so the demand is always positive. The notation is summarized below:
pi: selling price per unit at the market in period i,
di: market demand in period i,
w: supplier’s wholesale price per unit to the buyer,
s: supplier’s cost per unit,
ci: buyer’s handling cost per unit in period i,
hi: holding cost per unit in period i,
gi: loss of goodwill cost per unit in period i,
Q: order quantity from the buyer at the beginning of period 1,
β¯: price protection factor (the supplier offers β¯(p1 − p2) for each unsold unit at
the end of period 1 to the buyer).
Also, we make the following assumptions.
ASSUMPTION 1 0 < s < w ≤ p1, 0 ≤ g2 ≤ g1.
ASSUMPTION 2 s, ci, hi, gi, are exogenous; w, pi, β¯ and Q are endogenous.
We begin our analysis by considering the integrated channel. Let x be the leftover
stock at the end of period 1. The channel’s total profit in period 2, denoted by piJ2(x),
is given by
piJ2(x) = −c2x+ p2x− 1
2
h2x.
Since the buyer knows exactly how much the demand is for a given retail price,
it is always true that x = Q− d1 = d2 = a2 − b2p2. Therefore, the total profit of the
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channel when Q units are ordered at the beginning of period 1, denoted by piJ(Q, p1),
is
piJ(Q, p1) = −(s+ c1)Q+ p1d1 − 1
2
h1(Q+ d2) + piJ2(Q− d1).
Since Q = d1 + d2, the total profit can be expressed as a function of p1 and p2 as
follows:
piJ(p1, p2) = −b1p21 +
[
b1(s+ c1) + a1 +
1
2
h1b1
]
p1 + [b2(s+ c1) + h1b2 + a2 + b2c2
+
1
2
h2b2]p2 − b2p22 − (s+ c1)(a1 + a2)−
1
2
a1h1 − a2h1 − c2a2 − 1
2
h2a2.
The first-order conditions of the total profit function are given by
∂piJ(p1, p2)
∂p1
= −2b1p1 + b1(s+ c1) + a1 + 1
2
h1b1 = 0,
∂piJ(p1, p2)
∂p2
= −2b2p2 + b2(s+ c1) + h1b2 + a2 + b2c2 + 1
2
h2b2 = 0.
Further, we have
∂pi2J(p1, p2)
∂p21
= −2b1 < 0,
∂pi2J(p1, p2)
∂p22
= −2b2 < 0,
∂pi2J(p1, p2)
∂p1∂p2
=
∂pi2J(p1, p2)
∂p2∂p1
= 0.
Thus, the total profit function is strictly concave in p1 and p2. The optimal retail
prices and order quantity are unique as follows
p∗1 =
1
2
[
a1
b1
+ (s+ c1) +
1
2
h1
]
, (2.1)
p∗2 =
1
2
[
a2
b2
+ (s+ c1 + c2) + h1 +
1
2
h2
]
, (2.2)
Q∗ = a1 − b1p∗1 + a2 − b2p∗2. (2.3)
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Next we consider the situation in which the supplier offers no price protection
to the independent buyer. The buyer orders Q and receives the amount in time for
sales in period 1. The buyer’s optimal retail prices can be achieved by replacing the
s with w in (2.1) and (2.2) as follows
pˆ1 =
1
2
[
a1
b1
+ (w + c1) +
1
2
h1
]
, (2.4)
pˆ2 =
1
2
[
a2
b2
+ (w + c1 + c2) + h1 +
1
2
h2
]
, (2.5)
Qˆ = a1 − b1pˆ1 + a2 − b2pˆ2. (2.6)
Comparing (2.1–2.3) with (2.4–2.6), we have the following observation.
PROPOSITION 1 pˆ1 > p
∗
1, pˆ2 > p
∗
2, Qˆ < Q
∗.
Proof: Since w > s, it is easy to verify by comparison. ¥
Proposition 1 shows that, without price protection, the independent buyer’s opti-
mal retail prices are strictly higher than the optimal prices of the integrated channel,
while the optimal quantity is strictly less than the integrated channel. Note that this
is a form of quantity distortion driven by double marginalization (Spengler 1950).
Now, we consider a price protection to align the buyer’s incentive with the channel
optimum. The price protection allows the supplier to offer to the buyer β¯(p1 − p2)
(0 ≤ β¯ ≤ 1) for each unit unsold at the end of period 1. Then the total profit to the
buyer, denoted by piB(p1, p2), is given by
piB(p1, p2) = −b1p21 +
[
b1(w + c1) + a1 +
1
2
h1b1
]
p1 + [b2(w + c1) + h1b2 + a2
+ b2c2 +
1
2
h2b2]p2 − b2p22 − (w + c1)(a1 + a2)−
1
2
a1h1 − c2a2
+
1
2
h2a2 + β¯(p1 − p2)(a2 − b2p2). (2.7)
When the retail prices are exogenous, Lee et al. (2000) show that price protec-
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tion is able to achieve the channel coordination. However, price protection fails to
coordinate the channel when the buyer’s pricing decision is considered explicitly, as
shown in the following theorem.
THEOREM 1 Under price protection, the buyer’s optimal retail prices are unique.
Let p˜1, p˜2 represent the optimal retail prices in period 1 and 2, respectively. Then,
p˜1 > pˆ1 > p
∗
1. Price Protection alone can NOT achieve channel coordination.
Proof: The first-order conditions of the total profit function (2.7) are given by
∂piB(p1, p2)
∂p1
= −2b1p1 + b1(w + c1) + a1 + 1
2
h1b1 + β¯(a2 − b2p2) = 0, (2.8)
∂piB(p1, p2)
∂p2
= −2b2p2 + b2(w + c1) + h1b2 + a2 + b2c2 + 1
2
h2b2 − β¯(a2 + b2p1)
+ 2b2β¯p2 = 0. (2.9)
Note that the determinant of the Hessian matrix (4(1 − β¯)b1b2 − β¯2b2) is not
always positive; thus the total profit function is not necessarily concave.
For a given p2, the optimal value of p˜1 is unique and can be achieved from (2.8)
such that
p˜1 =
1
2
(
a1
b1
+ (w + c1) +
1
2
h1 +
β¯
b1
(a2 − b2p2)
)
. (2.10)
Substituting (2.10) into (2.9), we can verify the uniqueness of the optimal value
of p2 with the second-order condition given by
∂2piB(p2)
∂p22
= − β¯
2b22
4b1
− (1− β¯)2b2. (2.11)
Thus, the buyer’s optimal retail prices are unique.
It can be easily verified that p˜1 > pˆ1 by comparing (2.10) with (2.4). Thus,
p˜1 > p
∗
1 from Proposition 1. Since in the integrated channel, the optimal retail prices
are unique, the retail price in period 1 under price protection is always higher than
the optimal retail price in the integrated channel. Thus, price protection alone can
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not induce the buyer to set p˜1 = p
∗
1. Therefore, the channel can not be coordinated
by price protection alone. ¥
To provide a contract to coordinate the channel, we introduce the following term
into the contract:
DEFINITION 1 The recommended retail price, represented by T , is a retail price
upper-bound in period 1 recommended by the supplier. The supplier will provide price
protection to the buyer only if the buyer sets her retail price p1 satisfying p1 ≤ T .
To achieve channel coordination, the following theorem specifies the contract
terms.
THEOREM 2 Let
T =
1
2
[
a1
b1
+ (s+ c1) +
1
2
h1
]
, and
β¯ =
w − s
a1
2b1
− s
2
− c1
2
− c2 − 34h1 − 12h2
. (2.12)
Under the contract pair (T, β¯), channel coordination is achieved.
Proof: From Theorem 1, we know that p˜1 > p
∗
1, so the supplier needs a way to force
the buyer to reduce her retail price in period 1. By recommending a retail price upper
bound T , now the supplier offers price protection only when p1 ≤ T .
To achieve channel coordination, let T = p∗1. Since
∂piB(p1, p2)
∂p1
> 0
when p1 ≤ T , the buyer will set p1 = T to receive the price protection and maximize
her profit at the same time.
After p1 is determined, the buyer will adjust p2 to maximize her total profit as
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follows
p2 =
1
2(1− β¯)
[
w + c1 + c2 + h1 +
1
2
h2 +
a2
b2
− 1
2
β¯(
a1
b1
+ s+ c1 +
1
2
h1 +
a2
b2
)
]
.
To induce the buyer to set p2 = p
∗
2, we obtain (2.12). ¥
From the above analysis, we can see that price protection itself can not achieve
channel coordination in the models when the buyer’s pricing decision is considered
explicitly. The supplier has to specify additional terms in the contract to align
the buyer’s incentive with the system-wide optimal solution. Thus, considering the
buyer’s pricing decision is important for the design of implementable contracts.
Lau and Lau (2002) point out that when a price-demand relationship is needed
in inventory/pricing models, very often a convenient (typically linear) function is
arbitrarily chosen. The common-wisdom implication is that any downward-sloping
demand curve will lead to similar conclusions. They show that while the common-
wisdom implication is valid for a single-echelon system, assuming different demand-
curve functions can lead to very different results in a multi-echelon system. In
some situations, a very small change in the demand-curve appearance leads to very
large changes in the models optimal solutions. They put forward four representative
demand-curves: linear, exponential, iso-elastic, and algebraic.
Note that for ease of analysis we assume a linear demand-curve throughout the
above analysis. To thoroughly explore the impact of the buyer’s pricing decision, we
further design a pair of recommended retail prices and price protections under three
other demand curves: iso-elastic, exponential, and algebraic. The optimal retail prices
and contracts are summarized in Table I.
From Table I, we see that the price protection factor is always in the format
(w−s)/L where L depends on the demand curves. β¯ always increases as w1 increases.
That is, to coordinate the channel, the higher the wholesale price charged by the
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supplier, the more protection he must provide to the buyer. Additionally, different
demand-curves result in distinct retail prices. Obviously, the retial price p1 under the
iso-elastic demand-curve is always lower than the one under the algebraic demand-
curve. Therefore, the supplier needs to consider the impact of market demand and
the buyer’s pricing decision explicitly to precisely decide the order quantity and the
recommended retail price, which in turn determines his own profit.
Table I Price Protection Contracts with Four Demand Curves
Linear d = a− bp Iso-elastic d = Kp−α
p1 =
1
2 (
a1
b1
+ (s+ c1) +
1
2h1) p1 =
α1
α1−1
(s+ c1 +
1
2h1)
p2 =
1
2 (
a2
b2
+ (s+ c1 + c2) + h1 +
1
2h2) p2 =
α2
α2−2
(s+ c1 + c2 + h1 +
1
2h2)
T = 12 (
a1
b1
+ (s+ c1) +
1
2h1) T =
α1
α1−1
(s+ c1 +
1
2h1)
β¯ = w−sa1
2b1
−
s
2−
c1
2 −c2−
3
4h1−
1
2h2
β¯ = w−sα1
α1−1
(s+c1+
1
2h1)−(s+c1+h1+c2+
1
2h2)
Exponential d = γe−αp Algebraic d = (Kp+ b)−α
p1 =
1
α1
+ s+ c1 +
1
2h1 p1 =
α1
α1−1
(s+ c1 +
1
2h1 +
b1
α1K1
)
p2 =
1
α2
+ s+ c1 + h1 + c2 +
1
2h2 p2 =
α2
α2−1
(s+ c1 + c2 + h1 +
1
2h2 +
b2
α2K2
)
T = 1
α1
+ s+ c1 +
1
2h1 T =
α1
α1−1
(s+ c1 +
1
2h1 +
b1
α1K1
)
β¯ = w−s1
α1
−
1
2h1−c2−
1
2h2
β¯ = w−sα1
α1−1
(s+c1+
1
2h1+
b1
α1K1
)−(s+c1+h1+c2+
1
2h2)
Note that the implementation of price protection is based on an implicit assump-
tion that the retail price will drop. That is, p1 > p2. To verify this condition under
the different demand-curves, we compare the value of p1 and p2 in Table I which re-
sults in some interesting insights. If the demand-curve is linear, the condition p1 > p2
depends on the ratio of ai and bi, not on the individual value of a or b. That is, it
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depends on the maximal possible retail price, not the maximal possible demand or the
price-sensitivity of the demand. When demand curves are iso-elastic or exponential,
it depends on the shape of the curve (α), not the scale of the curve K or γ. When
the demand curve is algebraic, all of the parameters affect condition satisfaction.
To demonstrate the above insights more clearly, we assume h1 = h2 = c1 = c2 = 0
and summarize the results in Table II.
Table II Price Protection with Neglectable Holding Cost and Handling Cost
Linear Iso-elastic Exponential Algebraic
d = a− bp d = Kp−α d = γe−αp d = (Kp+ b)−α
Optimal Price p∗1 =
1
2 (
a1
b1
+ s) p∗1 =
α1
α1−1
s p∗1 =
1
α1
+ s p∗1 =
α1
α1−1
(s+ b1
α1K1
)
p∗2 =
1
2 (
a2
b2
+ s) p∗2 =
α2
α2−1
s p∗2 =
1
α2
+ s p∗1 =
α2
α2−1
(s+ b2
α2K2
)
p∗1 > p
∗
2
a1
b1
> a2
b2
α1 < α2 α1 < α2 (α1 − α2)s+ (α1 − 1) b2K2
−(α2 − 1) b1K1 < 0
Rec. Price T = 12 (
a1
b1
+ s) T = α1
α1−1
s T = 1
α1
+ s T = α1
α1−1
(s+ b1
α1K1
)
Protection β¯ = w−s1
2 (
a1
b1
−s)
β¯ = w−s1
α1−1
−s
β¯ = w−s1
α1
β¯ = w−s
1
α1−1
s+
b1
(α1−1)K1
Since we assume that demand is price-sensitive deterministic, in the next sec-
tion we study the stochastic price-sensitive demand case in order to provide better
representation of real life applications.
II.1.2. Stochastic Demand Case
Consider a two-period model with stochastic price-sensitive demand. Again, we as-
sume that products have long lead times, so the buyer has a single buying opportunity
at the beginning of the product life cycle. The buyer chooses an order quantity and a
retail price at the beginning of period 1, and the units are delivered ready for sale in
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period 1 at full price. Unmet demand is lost. At the beginning of period 2, another
new product is introduced to the market. Assume the expected demand Di in period
i is Di = ai − bipi where pi is the retail price in period i, i = 1, 2. Along with the
idea in Table II, we assume
a2 < a1 and
a2
b2
<
a1
b1
.
That is, some customers may choose to buy the new products, and other customers
may be willing to buy the old products at a reduced price in period 2. Thus, the
maximal possible demand is lower and the demand approaches zero at a smaller price
in period 2. We introduce additional notation as follows:
Di(pi): expected demand in period i with a given retail price pi,
ξi: random variable denoting the demand in period i,
φi(·): density distribution function of demand in period i,
Φi(·): cumulative distribution function of demand in period i,
²i: positive random variable with mean equal to 1,
ψi(·): density distribution function of ²i,
Ψi(·): cumulative distribution function of ²i,
θ: discount factor for costs in period 2.
The demand faced by the buyer is uncertain and price-sensitive. The actual
demand is the product of Di(pi) and the positive random variable ²i. Thus, the
density function of demand in period i, can be expressed as:
φi(ξi, pi) =
1
Di(pi)
ψi(
ξi
Di(pi)
), ξi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2.
Channel coordination can be achieved if the supplier replicates the performance
of the fully integrated channel. To do so, the supplier has to provide an incentive to
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induce the buyer to choose the ”right” order quantity and retail price that is optimal
for an integrated channel. Thus, we begin our analysis by considering an integrated
channel. To solve the decision problem for the integrated channel, we work backward
starting with period 2. At the end of period 1, if the leftover stock is x, the channel’s
expected profit in the second period, denoted by piJ2(x, p2), is given by
piJ2(x, p2) = −c2x+
∫ x
0
[pξ2 − h2(x− ξ2)]dφ2(ξ2) +
∫
∞
x
[p2x− g2(ξ2 − x)]dφ2(ξ2)
= −g2D2(p2) + (p2 + g2 − c2)x−
∫ x
0
[(p2 + g2 + h2)(x− ξ2)]dφ2(ξ2)
= −g2D2(p2) + (p2 + g2 − c2)x−
∫ x
D2(p2)
0
[(p2 + g2 + h2)(x
−D2(p2)ξ2)]ψ2(ξ2)dξ2. (2.13)
Let Γ2(x) =
∫ x
0
ξ2ψ2(ξ2)dξ2. Substituting Γ2(·) into (2.13) leads to
piJ2(x, p2) = −g2D2(p2)− (p2 + g2 + h2)
[
xΨ2(
x
D2(p2)
)−D2(p2)Γ2( x
D2(p2)
)
]
+ (p2 + g2 − c2)x.
The first-derivative and second-derivative of piJ2(x, p2) with respect to p2 are
given by
∂piJ2(x, p2)
∂p2
= g2b2 + x− xΨ2( x
a2 − b2p2 ) + [a2 − b2p2 − b2(p2 + g2
+h2)]Γ2(
x
a2 − b2p2 ),
∂2piJ2(x, p2)
∂p22
= −2b2Γ2( x
a2 − b2p2 )− (p2 + g2 + h2)b
2
2
x2
(a2 − b2p2)3ψ2(
x
a2 − b2p2 ) < 0.
Thus, piJ2(x, p2) is a strictly concave function of p2. The optimal value of p2 is
unique. The optimal retail price p∗2 satisfies
g2b2 + x− xΨ2( x
a2 − b2p2 ) + [a2 − b2(2p2 + g2 + h2)]Γ2(
x
a2 − b2p2 ) = 0.
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To maintain analysis tractability and provide insightful understanding, we as-
sume ψ2(x) = 0.5, ∀x ∈ [0, 2] for the rest of this section. Then, we have
piJ2(x, p2) =


(p2 − c2)x+ (x− a2 + b2p2)g2 − (p2 + g2 + h2) x24D2(p2) , a2 − b2p2 ≥ x2 ,
(p2 + h2(a2 − b2p2)− (h2 + c2)x, a2 − b2p2 ≤ x2 .
Assume a2 is large enough that x < a2 is always true. That is, no matter how
many products are left at the end of the first period, there always exists a proper
price so that all products can be expected to be sold (or the expected demand is
greater than x). Then, the optimal price is
p∗2 =
1
b2

a2 −
√
b2(g2 + h2 +
a2
b2
)x2
4(x+ b2g2)

 . (2.14)
In the second period, a new product comes into the market. We further assume
g2 = 0, that is, the loss of goodwill is small and negligible in period 2 since the
customers have the option to buy the new product. Substituting (2.14) into piJ2(x, p2),
the maximal profit in period 2 for a given leftover stock x is given by
pi∗J2(x) =
(
a2
b2
− c2
)
x− x
2
4b2
. (2.15)
From (2.15), we note that the maximal expected profit only depends on a2, b2, c2,
not on h2. That is, the maximal expected profit in period 2 depends on the mar-
ket demand and the handling cost, but not the inventory cost. We may check the
concavity of pi∗J2(x) with respect to x as follows
∂pi∗J2(x)
∂x
=
(
a2
b2
− c2
)
− x
2b2
,
∂2pi∗J2(x)
∂x2
= − 1
2b2
< 0.
Thus, pi∗J2(x) is a strictly concave function of x. Moving back to the first period,
the expected profit of the integrated channel, denoted by piJ(Q, p1), is given by
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piJ(Q, p1) = −(s+ c1)Q+
∫ Q
0
[p1ξ1 − h1(Q− ξ1) + θpiJ2(Q− ξ1)]dφ1(ξ1)
+
∫
∞
Q
[p1 − g1(ξ1 −Q) + θpiJ2(0)]dφ1(ξ1)
= −(s+ c1)Q+
∫ Q
D1(p1)
0
[−D
2
1(p1)
4b2
ξ21 + (p1 + h1 − θk˜ +
Q
2b2
)D1(p1)ξ1
+ (θk˜ − h1)Q− Q
2
4b2
]ψ1(ξ1)dξ1 +
∫
∞
Q
D1(p1)
[(p1 + g1)Q
−g1D1(p1)ξ1]ψ1(ξ1)dξ1
where k˜ =
a2
b2
− c2.
The first-derivative and second-derivative of piJ(Q, p1) with respect to Q and p1
are given by
∂piJ(Q, p1)
∂Q
= −(s+ cˆ1) +
∫ Q
D1(p1)
0
[
D1(p1)ξ1
2b2
+ (θk˜ − h1)− Q
2b2
]
ψ1(ξ1)dξ1
+
∫
∞
Q
D1(p1)
(p1 + g1)ψ1(ξ1)dξ1, (2.16)
∂2piJ(Q, p1)
∂Q2
=
∫ Q
D1(p1)
0
(− 1
2b2
)ψ1(ξ1)dξ1 − p1 + g1 + h1 − θk˜
D1(p1)
ψ1(
Q
D1(p1)
) < 0,
∂piJ(Q, p1)
∂p1
=
∫ Q
D1(p1)
0
[
2b1D1(p1)
4b2
ξ21 +D1(p1)ξ1 − (p1 + h1 − θk˜
+
Q
2b2
)b1ξ1]ψ1(ξ1)dξ1 +
∫
∞
Q
D1(p1)
[Q+ g1b1ξ1]ψ1(ξ1)dξ1,
∂2piJ(Q, p1)
∂p21
=
∫ Q
D1(p1)
0
[
− b
2
1
2b2
ξ21 − 2b1ξ1
]
ψ1(ξ1)dξ1 − b
2
1Q
2(p1 + g1 + h1 − θk˜)
D31(p1)
ψ1(
Q
D1(p1)
) < 0.
For a given p1, the optimal order quantity Q is unique. Also, for a given Q, the
optimal retail price p1 is unique.
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When the buyer is independent, all of the above formulations are true except for
replacing s with w. It is easy to see from (2.16) that for a given p1, the independent
buyer will order less than the optimal quantity in an integrated channel.
When the demand is stochastic, we can not use β¯(p1− p2) as a protection mech-
anism for each unsold unit at the end of period 1 to induce the buyer to order more
because the pricing decision in period 2 (p2) depends on the realized demand in pe-
riod 1 and is unknown at the beginning of period 1 when the contract is signed. To
explicitly specify the protection level, the supplier can provide the protection as r
dollars per unit for products unsold at the end of period 1. Next, we examine how
the supplier should set the protection level to coordinate the channel.
PROPOSITION 2 Protection credit r will always induce the independent buyer to
set a higher retail price for a given Q.
Proof: The independent buyer’s expected profit in period 1, denoted by pˆiB(Q, p1),
and the first-order conditions are given by
pˆiB(Q, p1) = piJ(Q, p1) +
∫ Q
D1(p1)
0
θr(Q−D1(p1)ξ1)ψ1(ξ1)dξ1 − (w + s)Q,
∂pˆiB(Q, p1)
∂Q
=
∂piJ(Q, p1)
∂Q
+ θr
Q
2D1(p1)
− w + s,
∂pˆiB(Q, p1)
∂p1
=
∂piJ(Q, p1)
∂p1
+
1
4
θrb1
Q2
D21(p1)
.
Since
∂2piJ(Q, p1)
∂p21
≤ 0, 1
4
θrb1
Q2
D21(p1)
> 0,
we have p¯1 ≥ p∗1 where
∂pˆiB(Q, p1)
∂p1
|p¯1 = 0,
∂piJ(Q, p1)
∂p1
|p∗1 = 0.
¥
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Proposition 2 shows that since the protection credit r reduces the buyer’s cost
and risk of uncertain demand, the buyer will likely take more risk by increasing her
retail price such that the expected amount of unsold units at the end of period 1 is
larger than in the integrated channel. Therefore, price protection alone can not align
the independent buyer’s pricing decision with the channel optimum. An additional
term needs to be specified in the contract in order to coordinate the channel. A
common way of providing an incentive to the buyer is to offer a quantity discount
(Monahan 1988). The following theorem provides the pairing of a quantity discount
and a protection credit to coordinate the channel.
THEOREM 3 Let
K(Q, p1) = − θrQ
2
4D1(p1)
+ (w − s)Q+ k (2.17)
where k is a constant and K is the discount provided by the supplier. The pair of
(r,K(Q, p1)) coordinates the channel.
Proof: The buyer’s expected profit in period 1, denoted by p˜iB(Q, p1), and the first-
order conditions are given by
p˜iB(Q, p1) = pˆiB(Q, p1) +K(Q, p1),
∂p˜iB(Q, p1)
∂Q
=
∂piJ(Q, p1)
∂Q
+ θr
Q
2D1(p1)
− w + s+ ∂K(Q, p1)
∂Q
,
∂p˜iB(Q, p1)
∂p1
=
∂piJ(Q, p1)
∂p1
+
1
4
θrb1
Q2
D21(p1)
+
∂K(Q, p1)
∂p1
.
To align the buyer’s incentive with the integrated channel, the supplier is aiming
at
∂piJ(Q, p1)
∂Q
=
∂piJ(Q, p1)
∂p1
= 0.
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Thus, we have 

θr Q
2D1(p1)
− w + s+ ∂K(Q,p1)
∂Q
= 0,
1
4
θrb1
Q2
D21(p1)
+ ∂K(Q,p1)
∂p1
= 0,
and (2.17) is obtained. A proper value of k needs to be determined to satisfy the
buyer’s reservation profit level. ¥
Besides pairing a quantity discount and a protection credit to coordinate the
channel, we can also use the concept in the deterministic price-sensitive demand case
to achieve another coordination policy below.
THEOREM 4 Suppose the optimal solution in the integrated channel is (Q∗, p∗1).
Then, under the contract of (T, r) where
T = p∗1, and
r =
w − s
Ψ1(
Q∗
D1(p∗)
)
, (2.18)
channel coordination is achieved.
Proof: First, we note that in either the centralized case or the decentralized case,
the buyer’s optimal pricing decision in period 2 remains the same for a given left over
stock. To simplify our proof, we assume that the price in period 2 is fixed. For the
unfixed price case, the proof is similar.
For the independent buyer with price protection and for the integrated channel,
respectively, the first-order conditions are as follows
∂pˆiB(Q, p1)
∂Q
= p1 + g1 − w − cˆ1 − [p1 + g1 + h1 − θ(p2 + g2 + cˆ2]
∫ Q
D1(p1)
0
ψ1(ξ1)dξ1
− θ(p2 + g2 + h2)
∫ Q
D1(p1)
0
Ψ2(Q−D1(p1)ξ1)ψ1(ξ1)dξ1
+ θrΨ1(
Q
D1(p1)
) = 0, (2.19)
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∂piJ(Q, p1)
∂Q
= p1 + g1 − s− cˆ1 − [p1 + g1 + h1 − θ(p2 + g2 + cˆ2]
∫ Q
D1(p1)
0
ψ1(ξ1)dξ1
− θ(p2 + g2 + h2)
∫ Q
D1(p1)
0
Ψ2(Q−D1(p1)ξ1)ψ1(ξ1)dξ1 = 0. (2.20)
Setting p1 = p
∗ and comparing (2.19) with (2.20), we obtain (2.18). ¥
Theorem 4 shows that price protection and a recommended retail price together
can also achieve channel coordination. From the analysis in this section, it is obvious
that price protection alone fails to coordinate the channel due to the impact of the
buyer’s pricing decision. Therefore, it is important to take the buyer’s pricing decision
into account when developing implementable supply contracts.
II.2. Impact of Sales Efforts
Besides pricing decisions, buyers can also influence demand by merchandising, doing
point-of-sale or other advertising, providing attractive shelf space, and guiding con-
sumer purchases with sales personnel. In this section, we employ a two-period model
in which a buyer makes order quantity and sales effort decisions and then observes
demand. We will focus on a price protection contract in which the returns policy is
a special case under this setting. Specifically, let demand in period 1 be given as eξ1,
where e is the level of effort. Since a new product is introduced into the market in
period 2, we assume that the buyer loses interest in expending sales effort on the old
product in period 2. The cost to the buyer of exerting e units of effort is V (e). We
make the following assumption about cost function V (e).
ASSUMPTION 3 V (·) is convex, increasing, and V (0) = 0.
Thus, the marginal cost of effort is increasing. This modeling approach is con-
sistent with the implications of the sales response models having multiplicative error
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terms that are used in empirical studies of the relationship between advertising and
sales (Taylor 2002). In this section, we also assume that the retail prices are fixed in
order to concentrate on investigation of the impact of the sales effort.
In an integrated channel, the total expected profit of the channel is given by
piJ(Q, e) = −(s+ c1)Q+
∫ Q
e
0
[p1eξ1 − h1(Q− eξ1) + θpiJ2(Q− eξ1)]dΨ1(ξ1)
+
∫
∞
Q
e
[p1Q− g1(eξ1 −Q) + θpiJ2(0)]dΨ1(ξ1)− V (e).
Let Q0 = Q/e, then we have
piJ(Q0, e) = −(s+ c1)Q0e+
∫ Q0
0
[p1eξ1 − h1e(Q0 − ξ1) + θpiJ2[e(Q0
− ξ1)]dΨ1(ξ1) +
∫
∞
Q0
[p1eQ0 + g1e(ξ1 −Q0)]dΨ1(ξ1)− V (e),
piJ2[e(Q0 − ξ1)] = −g2µ2 + (p2 + g2 − c2)e(Q0 − ξ1)−
∫ e(Q0−ξ1)
0
[(p2 + g2
+h2)[e(Q0 − ξ1)− ξ2]]dΨ2(ξ2).
The first-order and second-order conditions of piJ2(x) are given by
∂piJ2(x)
∂x
= p2 + g2 − c2 − (p2 + g2 + h2)Ψ2(x),
∂pi2J2(x)
∂x2
= −(p2 + g2 + h2)f2(x) < 0.
Thus, piJ2(x) is a concave function of x. Next, we examine the impact of price
protection on the buyer’s sales effort decision.
PROPOSITION 3 In a decentralized channel, the optimal sales effort level with
price protection is higher than without price protection for a given Q0.
Proof: Let pˇiB(Q0, e) and p¯iB(Q0, e) denote the buyer’s total expected profit with and
without protection, respectively. Checking the first-derivative and second-derivative
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of p¯iB(Q0, e) with respect to e, we have
∂p¯iB(Q0, e)
∂e
= −(w + c1)Q0 +
∫
∞
Q0
(p1Q0 + g1(ξ1 −Q0))dΨ1(ξ1) +
∫ Q0
0
[p1ξ1
− h1(Q0 − ξ1) + θ[p2 + g2 − c2 − (p2 + g2 + h2)Ψ2(e(Q0
−ξ1)]]dΨ1(ξ1)− V ′(e), (2.21)
∂p¯i2B(Q0, e)
∂e2
=
∫ Q0
0
−θ(p2 + g2 + h2)f2[e(Q0 − ξ1)](Q0 − ξ1)dΨ1(ξ1)
−V ′′(e) < 0, (2.22)
where V ′(e) and V ′′(e) are the first-derivative and second-derivative of V (e) with
respect to e.
With protection, the buyer’s total expected profit is
pˇiB(Q0, e) = p¯iB(Q0, e) + θ[
∫ Q0
0
re(Q0 − ξ1)dΨ1(ξ1)]. (2.23)
The first-derivative of pˇiB(Q0, e) with respect to e is given by
∂pˇiB(Q0, e)
∂e
=
∂p¯iB(Q0, e)
∂e
+ θ
∫ Q0
0
rQ0dΨ1(ξ1). (2.24)
For a given Q0, the optimal sales effort level is unique from (2.22). Also p¯iB(Q0, e)
and pˇiB(Q0, e) are both concave functions over e. Let e1
∗ and e2∗ denote the buyer’s
optimal sales effort level with and without protection. Comparing (2.21) with (2.24),
it can be easily verified that e1∗ > e2∗. ¥
Proposition 3 shows a counter-intuitive result. With price protection, the buyer
faces a lower risk of demand uncertainty; thus, she should be able to save some sales
effort and some cost as a result. However, Proposition 3 shows that, in fact, the buyer
expends more sales effort when price protection is available. The explanation is that
price protection encourages the buyer to order a larger quantity by sharing the risk
of demand uncertainty. Accordingly, the buyer will expend more sales effort to sell
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the larger quantity.
Next, we examine how the supplier may set the protection level to coordinate
the channel.
PROPOSITION 4 Price protection itself can NOT coordinate the channel.
Proof: To align the independent buyer’s order quantity with the integrated channel,
the following equation has to be satisfied:
∂pˇiB(Q0, e)
∂Q0
=
∂piJ(Q0, e)
∂Q0
.
The first-derivative and second-derivative of the buyer’s total expected profit function
over Q0 in the integrated channel are given by
∂piJ(Q0, e)
∂Q0
= [p1 − g1 − s− c1]e− (p1 − g1 + h1)eΨ1(Q0) + e
∫ Q0
0
θ[p2 + g2 − c2
− (p2 + g2 + h2)Ψ2(e(Q0 − ξ1))]dΨ1(ξ1),
∂pi2J(Q0, e)
∂Q20
= −[p1 + g1 + h1 − θ(p2 + g2 − c2)]ef1(Q0)− e2
∫ Q0
0
(p2 + g2
+h2)f2(e(Q0 − ξ1)dΨ1(ξ1) < 0.
With some algebra, we have θ
∫ Q0
0
redΨ1(ξ1) = (w − s)e. Thus, the protection
level has to satisfy
r =
w − s
θΨ1(Q0)
.
To align the buyer’s sales effort level with the integrated channel, the following
equation has to be satisfied:
∂pˇiB(Q0, e)
∂e
=
∂piJ(Q0, e)
∂e
.
With some algebra, the following condition needs to be satisfied:
θ
∫ Q0
0
r(Q0 − ξ1)dΨ1(ξ1) = (w − s)Q0. (2.25)
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However,
θ
∫ Q0
0
r(Q0 − ξ1)dΨ1(ξ1) =
(w − s) ∫ Q0
0
(Q0 − ξ1)dΨ1(ξ1)
Ψ1(Q0)
< (w − s)Q0,
which contradicts (2.25). Thus, r alone is unable to coordinate the channel. The
sales effort level under r is lower than in the integrated channel. ¥
To coordinate the channel, we present the following contract terms.
THEOREM 5 To coordinate the channel, the supplier can provide price protection
together with cost sharing of the sales effort SE as follows:
r =
w − s
θΨ1(Q0)
, (2.26)
SE =
(w − s)Γ1(Q0)
Ψ1(Q0)
. (2.27)
Proof: Replacing s with w in piJ(Q0, e), the total expected profit p¯i1(Q0, e) for the
independent buyer is achieved. With protection and sales effort sharing, the buyer’s
expected profit is p¯i1(Q0, e) + Υ where Υ = θ[
∫ Q0
0
re(Q0 − ξ1)dΨ1(ξ1)] + SEe.
Checking the first-order conditions, after simplification, we have
∂Υ(Q0, e)
∂Q0
= θ
∫ Q0
0
redΨ1(ξ1) = (w − s)e, (2.28)
∂Υ(Q0, e)
∂e
= θ
∫ Q0
0
r(Q0 − ξ1)dΨ1(ξ1) + SE = (w − s)Q0. (2.29)
Solving (2.28-2.29) for r and SE, we obtain (2.26) and (2.27). ¥
In this section, we allow the buyer to make sales effort decisions to influence
demand. The impact of the buyer’s decision on the price protection contract design
is examined explicitly. When the contract is signed between a supplier and buyer, they
usually do not have complete information about each other. For example, the supplier
may not be able to observe the buyer’s handling cost c1 at the beginning of period
1. In the next section, we design contracts for the supplier that take information
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asymmetry into account.
II.3. Price Protection with Information Asymmetry
To provide an optimal design of price protection that considers information asymme-
try, we start with the case in which the demand is deterministic. The deterministic
case provides us with an example of the difficulties of designing incentive-compatible
contracts under conditions of information asymmetry. It also offers guidance on how
to design a proper contract in the stochastic demand case.
II.3.1. Deterministic Demand Case
Consider a two-period model with deterministic price-sensitive demand which is sim-
ilar to the model in Section II.1.1. The market demand in the final market is price-
sensitive. In this section, we assume the demand-curve is linear. Further results can
be easily achieved using other types of demand-curves based on the analysis in this
section. To maximize her profits, it is sufficient for the buyer to select either Q or p
as the other is then immediately determined.
In this section, for simplicity, we assume that the buyer’s handling costs in period
1 and 2 are the same and denote them by c. In general, the supplier does not know the
buyer’s marginal cost c exactly; we assume that the supplier holds a prior distribution
FS(c) with a continuous density function fS(c), defined on [c, c¯], where 0 ≤ c ≤ c¯ <∞.
Since the supplier has incomplete information, he may offer a menu of contracts
to the buyer. The sequence of events is as follows. The supplier offers a menu of
contracts [w(Q), r(Q)] where w(Q) is the wholesale price for a given Q and r(Q) is
the protection credit provided by the supplier to the buyer for each unit unsold by the
end of period 1. The buyer chooses an order quantity Q based on her internal cost
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c, pays the supplier w(Q)Q and receives r(Q) as protection. For any revealed choice
of Q, the supplier can infer the buyer’s true cost c, so, by the revelation principle
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1991), we can reformulate this equivalently as a menu of
contracts [w(c), r(c)]. A buyer announcing cˆ then chooses a contract [w(cˆ), r(cˆ)].
The supplier’s objective to is to maximize his expected profit as follows:
max
w(c),r(c)
∫ c¯
c
piS(c,Q(c))fS(c)dc (2.30)
s.t. Q(c) = argmax
Q
piB(c,Q) ∀c ≤ c ≤ c¯ (2.31)
The supplier’s expected net profits in (2.30) depend on the quantity Q ordered
by the buyer. Condition (2.31) is the buyer’s incentive-compatibility constraint. Pre-
sented with any menu of contracts, a buyer with cost c will choose Q to maximize
her profits.
Consider a menu of contracts [w(c), r(c)]. If a buyer with a marginal cost c
chooses cˆ, then the buyer’s profit is given by
piB(cˆ, c, p1, p2) = −(w(cˆ) + c)(a1 − b1p1 + a2 − b2p2) + p1(a1 − b1p1) + p2(a2 − b2p2)
+ r(cˆ)(a2 − b2p2)
= −(w(cˆ) + c)(a1 + a2) + b1(w(cˆ) + c)p1 + b2(w(cˆ) + c)p2 + a1p1
− b1p21 + a2p2 − b2p22 + a2r2(cˆ)− b2r(cˆ)p2. (2.32)
The buyer’s optimal price decision satisfies the first-order conditions
∂piB(cˆ, c, p1, p2)
∂p1
= b1(w(cˆ) + c) + a1 − 2b1p1 = 0,
∂piB(cˆ, c, p1, p2)
∂p2
= b2(w(cˆ) + c) + a2 − 2b2p2 − b2r(cˆ) = 0.
Thus, her unique optimal prices and order quantities, which can be easily verified,
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are
p∗1 =
1
2
(
a1
b1
+ w(cˆ) + c),
p∗2 =
1
2
(
a2
b2
+ w(cˆ) + c− r(cˆ)),
q∗1 =
1
2
[a1 − b1(w(cˆ) + c)],
q∗2 =
1
2
[a2 − b2(w(cˆ) + c− r(cˆ))].
Therefore, if a buyer with cost c chooses [w(cˆ), r(cˆ)], then her optimal profit is
given by
pi∗B(c, cˆ) =
b1
4
[
a1
b1
− (w(cˆ) + c)
]2
+
b2
4
[
a2
b2
− (w(cˆ) + c) + r(cˆ)
]2
.
The revelation principle states that there is an optimal contract under which the
buyer will optimally announce cˆ = c. Requiring that the first-order condition solved
at cˆ = c gives the buyer’s incentive-compatibility constraint:
∂pi∗B(c, cˆ)
∂cˆ
|cˆ=c = b1
2
[
a1
b1
− (w(c) + c)
]
w′(c) +
b2
2
[
a2
b2
− (w(c) + c)
+r(c)][r′(c)− w′(c)] = 0.
The above incentive-compatibility constraint derivation is based on the work of
Laffont and Tirole (1993). Although it provides a useful method for describing the
buyer’s incentive-compatibility, the resulting constraints are often complicated and
analytic results are difficult to achieve. To gain some further insight into this problem,
we study a two-type case.
Assume that the supplier knows that c belongs to the two-point support c, c¯ with
c¯ > c. Incentive-compatibility says that the contract designed for type c (respectively
type c¯) is the one preferred by the type c buyer (resp. type c¯) in the menu. The
supplier has a prior distribution on the values of c characterized by v = P (c = c) and
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designs the contract to maximize his expected profit.
Let w1 = w,w2 = w−r, w¯1 = w¯, w¯2 = w¯−r; the incentive-compatibility amounts
to
b1
4
[
a1
b1
− w1 − c
]2
+
b2
4
[
a2
b2
− w2 − c
]2
≥ b1
4
[
a1
b1
− w¯ − c
]2
+
b2
4
[
a2
b2
− w¯2 − c
]2
(2.33)
b1
4
[
a1
b1
− w¯ − c¯
]2
+
b2
4
[
a2
b2
− w¯2 − c¯
]2
≥ b1
4
[
a1
b1
− w1 − c¯
]2
+
b2
4
[
a2
b2
− w2 − c¯
]2
(2.34)
Add up (2.33), (2.34) and after simplification, we have
b1(w¯1 − w1) + b2(w¯2 − w2) ≥ 0.
The supplier’s expected profit is given by
E[piS] =
1
2
v(w1 − s)(a1 − b1w1 − b1c) +
1
2
v(w2 − s)(a2 − b2w2 − b2c) +
1
2
(1− v)(w¯1
− s)(a1 − b1w¯1 − b1c¯) + 1
2
(1− v)(w¯2 − s)(a2 − b2w¯2 − b2c¯).
The optimal solution without constraints (2.33),(2.34) can be easily obtained as
follows
w1 =
1
2b1
(a1 − b1c+ b1s),
w2 =
1
2b2
(a2 − b2c+ b1s),
w¯1 =
1
2b1
(a1 − b1c¯+ b1s),
w¯2 =
1
2b2
(a2 − b2c¯+ b2s).
It is easy to check that constraint (2.33) is binding. The following theorem
provides the optimal menu of contracts for the supplier.
THEOREM 6 The supplier’s optimal wholesale prices under a buyer’s two-type
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cost structure are
w∗1 =
(v − λ)a1
2
− (v − λ) b1
2
c+ 1
2
vb1s
vb1 − λ b12
,
w∗2 =
(v − λ)a2
2
− (v − λ) b2
2
c+ 1
2
vb2s
vb1 − λ b22
,
w¯∗1 =
1
2
(1− v + λ)a1 − 12(1− v)b1c¯+ 12(1− v)b1s+ λ2a1 − λ2 b1c
(1− v)b1 + b12 λ
,
w¯∗2 =
1
2
(1− v + λ)a2 − 12(1− v)b2c¯+ 12(1− v)b2s+ λ2a2 − λ2 b2c
(1− v)b2 + b22 λ
,
where λ is the solution of
b1
4
A21(vb1 −
λb1
2
)−2 +
b2
4
B21(vb2 −
λb2
2
)−2 =
b1
4
A22((1− v)b1 −
λb1
2
)−2
+
b2
4
B22((1− v)b2 −
λb2
2
)−2
and A1 =
a1
2
v − 1
2
vb1c− 12vb1s, A2 = 12(1− v)a1 + (1− v)b1
[
1
2
c¯− c]− 1
2
(1− v)b1s,
B1 =
a2
2
v − 1
2
vb2c− 12vb2s, B2 = 12(1− v)a2 + (1− v)b2
[
1
2
c¯− c]− 1
2
(1− v)b2s.
Based on Theorem 6, we obtain the following insights.
THEOREM 7 The supplier will provide less price protection (r1) under incomplete
information than under full information (r) for the buyer with cost c ( resp. c¯) and
more protection for the other type buyer with cost c¯ (resp. c). Their relations are as
follows
r1 =
v − λ
v − λ
2
r,
r¯1 =
1− v + λ
1− v + λ
2
r¯.
Proof: Since r = w1 − w2, substituting w1, w2, w¯1, w¯2 leads to the value of r as
follows:
r =
a1
2b1
− a2
2b2
= r¯.
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Similarly, we have
r1 =
(v − λ)( a1
2b1
− a2
2b2
)
v − λ
2
,
r¯1 =
(1− v + λ)( a1
2b1
− a2
2b2
)
1− v + λ
2
.
The relations of protection follow the comparison. ¥
When the supplier has incomplete information about the buyer’s cost structure,
it is intuitively expected that the supplier needs to provide higher protection to the
buyer to align her incentives with the channel optimum. Theorem 7 shows that this
is not always true. In fact, the level of protection depends on the buyer’s cost type.
From this deterministic demand case, we demonstrate that one of the difficul-
ties in designing incentive compatible contracts under information asymmetry is the
complicated incentive-compatibility constraints which result in difficulty in obtaining
analytical results. The complexity of the constraints usually is due to the complex
optimal response of the buyer facing a menu of contracts. One way to design a proper
contract is to fix the buyer’s decision parameter(s) in the contract, so that her re-
sponse is easily trackable. In the next section, we will design an incentive-compatible
contract under stochastic demand by incorporating this idea.
II.3.2. Stochastic Demand Case
In this section, we study the stochastic price-sensitive demand case. We assume that
the prices in two periods are exogenous in order to concentrate on the impact of
information asymmetry. The buyer has a reservation profit level piminB if she does not
purchase. In general, the supplier does not know c; again we assume the supplier
holds a prior distribution FS(c) with a continuous density function fS(c), defined on
[c, c¯], where 0 ≤ c ≤ c¯ < ∞. The supplier offers a menu of contracts (Q(c), r(c))
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and charges a constant wholesale price w. Note that instead of designing a contract
providing the wholesale price, we provide the order quantity in the contract so that
the buyer’s decision parameter is explicitly defined in the contract and her response
is easier to track.
In the integrated channel, in which there is a single decision maker with full
information of the whole system, the total expected profit in period 1 is given by
piJ(Q(c), c) = −(s+ c)Q+
∫ Q
0
[p1ξ1 − h1(Q− ξ1 + θpiJ2(Q− ξ1)]dΦ1(ξ1)
+
∫
∞
Q
[p1 − g1(ξ1 −Q) + θpiJ2(0)]dΦ1(ξ1)
= [p1 + g1 − s− c− [p1 + g1 + h1 − θ(p2 + g2 − c2)]Φ1(Q)
− θ(p2 + g2 + h2)Φ3(Q)]Q− g1µ1 − θg2µ2 + [p1 + g1 + h1
− θ(p2 + g2 − c2)]Γ1(Q) + θ(p2 + g2 + h2)Γ3(Q),
where Γi(x) =
∫ x
0
ξidΦi(ξi), and Φ3(·) is the cumulative distribution function of ξ3 =
ξ1 + ξ2, i.e., the convolution of Φ1(·) and Φ2(·). Define Q∗(c) as the optimal solution
of the integrated channel, which can be easily achieved based on the work of Lee et al.
(2000). In the decentralized channel, when there is no price protection, the buyer’s
expected profit is given by
piB(Q(c), c) = [p1 + g1 − w − c− [p1 + g1 + h1 − θ(p2 + g2 − c2)]Φ1(Q)
− θ(p2 + g2 + h2)Φ3(Q)]Q− g1µ1 − θg2µ2 + [p1 + g1 + h1
− θ(p2 + g2 − c2)]Γ1(Q) + θ(p2 + g2 + h2)Γ3(Q).
Now define piB(cˆ|c) as the expected profit of a buyer who has a marginal cost c
and chooses to participate by signing the contract (Q(cˆ), r(cˆ)). Her expected profit
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is given by
piB(cˆ|c) = [p1 + g1 − w − c− [p1 + g1 + h1 − θ(p2 + g2 − c2)]Φ1(Q(cˆ))
− θ(p2 + g2 + h2)Φ3(Q(cˆ))]Q(cˆ)− g1µ1 − θg2µ2 + [p1 + g1 + h1
− θ(p2 + g2 − c2)]Γ1(Q(cˆ)) + θ(p2 + g2 + h2)Γ3(Q(cˆ))
+ θr(cˆ)Φ1(Q(cˆ))Q(cˆ)− θr(cˆ)Γ1(Q(cˆ))
= piJ(Q(cˆ), c)− A(cˆ), (2.35)
where A(cˆ) = (w − s)Q(cˆ) + θr(cˆ)Γ1(Q(cˆ))− θr(cˆ)Φ1(Q(cˆ))Q(cˆ).
To simplify our exposition, it is more convenient to consider the equivalent repre-
sentation of the contract menu as (Q(c), A(c)), from which r(c) can be easily derived.
The supplier’s optimization problem can be formulated as
max
Q(c),A(c)
∫ c¯
c
A(c)dFS(c).
We now provide the optimal design of the menu of contracts in the following
theorem.
THEOREM 8 When the supplier has incomplete information of the buyer’s cost c,
the optimal design of the menu of contracts is (Q(c), A(c)) where
Q(c) = Q∗(c+ z(c)), (2.36)
A(c) = piJ(Q(c), c)−
∫ c¯
c
Q(u)du− piminB , and (2.37)
z(c) =
FS(c)
fS(c)
.
Proof: With some algebra, it can be shown that
piB(cˆ|c) = piB(cˆ|cˆ) + (cˆ− c)Q(cˆ).
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To reveal the buyer’s true cost, we have piB(cˆ|c) ≤ piB(c|c). Reverse the roles of
c and cˆ to get another inequality and combine the two inequalities to get
(cˆ− c)Q(cˆ) ≤ piB(c|c)− piB(cˆ|cˆ) ≤ (cˆ− c)Q(c). (2.38)
Now apply the standard argument in incentive theory to divide (2.38) by cˆ − c
and then take the limit as cˆ → c to get pi′B(c|c) = −Q(c) where pi′B(c|c) is the first-
derivative of piB(c|c) with respect to c. Integrate pi′B(c|c) with the initial condition
piminB to get
piB(c|c) = piminB +
∫ c¯
c
Q(u)du.
Now we can rewrite the supplier’s objective function as follows:
max
Q(c),A(c)
∫ c¯
c
[piJ(Q(c), c)− piB(c|c)]dFS(c) =
∫ c¯
c
[piJ(Q(c), c)− z(c)Q(c)]dFS(c)− piminB .
The equality follows from integrating by part. Thus, according to the definition
of Q∗(c), the above problem can be easily solved and thus (2.36) and (2.37) are
obtained. ¥
Although the stochastic case is usually more complicated than the deterministic
case, an analytical result is achieved in this section. The reason is that the order
quantity is specified in the contract menu. Thus, the buyer needs only to choose
one pair from the menu and does not need to make any other operational decisions.
Therefore, her optimal response is easy for the supplier to track, and we can focus
on the contract design itself. In the next section, we study a returns policy contract
with a different menu design which offers a wholesale price instead of an order quan-
tity. To our best knowledge, this is the first work to provide contracts specifying a
wholesale price under information asymmetry due to the analysis complexity under
the stochastic demand case.
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II.4. Returns Policy with Information Asymmetry
In this section, we consider a one-period problem. The market demand is stochastic.
The supplier offers a returns policy to the buyer to coordinate the channel. After the
selling season is over, the buyer returns any left-overs to the supplier and receives a
refund r for each unit returned. Pasternack (1985) shows that a returns policy can
achieve channel coordination with full information of the buyer’s cost structure.
In this section, we consider the information asymmetry case and make the same
assumption of information as in Section II.3.2. When the supplier has incomplete
information of the buyer’s cost structure, one way of offering an optimal contract
is by specifying the buyer’s order quantity and payment in the contract as shown
in Section II.3.2. A similar result can be easily achieved with a menu of contracts
(Q(c), r(c)), providing pairings of order quantity and returns credit based on the
approach in Section II.3.2.
In this section, we study another type of contract that pairs wholesale price and
returns credit. As we pointed out in Section II.3.1, contracts involving wholesale
prices under information asymmetry are analytically difficult. Here, we accept this
challenge and seek to design an optimal returns policy with information asymmetry
consideration.
We assume that the supplier initiates the process by offering a wholesale price
w, at which he will sell items to the buyer, and a repurchase price r, at which he will
buy items back from the buyer at the end of the season. In response to the offered
wholesale and repurchase prices, the buyer determines a quantity Q to order from the
supplier. As the supplier has incomplete information of the buyer’s cost c, he offers
a menu of contracts (w(c), r(c)) and leaves it to the buyer to select the pair of her
choice.
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Define piB(cˆ|c) as the expected profit of a buyer who has a marginal cost c and
chooses to participate by signing the contract (w(cˆ), r(cˆ)). The buyer’s expected
profit is given by
piB(cˆ|c) = p
∫ Q(cˆ)
0
xφ(x)dx+ pQ(cˆ)
∫
∞
Q(cˆ)
φ(x)dx− [w(cˆ) + c]Q(cˆ)
+r(cˆ)
∫ Q(cˆ)
0
(Q(cˆ)− x)φ(x)dx.
It is easy to achieve the buyer’s optimal order quantity as
Q(cˆ) = Φ−1(
p− c− w(cˆ)
p− r(cˆ) ).
Since the optimal quantity depends on the demand distribution faced by the
buyer, it is hard to track the buyer’s behavior without specific knowledge of Φ. To gain
some insight into the optimal design, we assume the demand is uniformly distributed
on [0,1] for the rest of this section. Then, we have the optimal order quantity
Q(cˆ) =
p− c− w(cˆ)
p− r(cˆ) .
The buyer’s maximal expected profit is given by
piB(cˆ|c) = 1
2
(p− c− w(cˆ))2
p− r(cˆ) .
By the revelation principle, solving the first-order condition at cˆ = c gives the
buyer’s incentive-compatibility constraint:
∂piB(cˆ|c)
∂cˆ
|cˆ=c= −2w
′(c)(p− c− w(c))(p− r(c)) + r′(c)(p− w(c)− c)2
2(p− r(c))2 = 0,
where w′(c) and r′(c) are the first-derivatives of w(c) and r(c) with respect to c. After
simplification, we have
r′(c)(p− w(c)− c) = 2w′(c)(p− r(c)) or w′ = 1
2
Qr′.
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To maximize his expected profit, the supplier faces the following optimization
problem:
max
w,r
∫ c¯
c
[
(w − s)Q− 1
2
rQ2
]
fSdc
s.t. w′ =
1
2
Qr′
where Q =
p− c− w
p− r
The following theorem provides the property of the optimal solutions.
THEOREM 9 The supplier’s optimal design of the menu of contracts is the solu-
tions of the following two equations:
w′ =
1
2
p− c− w
p− r r
′,
r′ =
(2r − p)fS + (w − s− r)(p− c− w)f ′S
p
2(p−r)
fS
. (2.39)
When the cost distribution is uniform, the optimal design can be solved through
w′ =
2r − p
p
, (2.40)
r′ = 3pr − 2r2 − p2. (2.41)
Proof: The proof relies on some fundamental results from optimal control theory as
outlined below (see Kamien and Schwartz (1991), pp. 142–146 for details). Letting
h = (w − s)p− c− w
p− r fS −
1
2
r(
p− c− w
p− r )
2,
g1 =
1
2
(
p− c− w
p− r )u, and
g2 = u = r
′,
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the above problem can be expressed as
max
∫ c¯
c
h(c)dc
s.t. w′(c) = g1(c), r
′(c) = g2(c).
The necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality can be stated in terms of
the Hamiltonian
H = h+ λ1g1 + λ2g2.
These conditions include the multiplier equations given by
λ′1 = −
[
p− c− 2w + s
p− r fS +
r(p− c− w)
(p− r)2 fS −
1
2(p− r)uλ1
]
, (2.42)
λ′2 = −[
(w − s)(p− c− w)
(p− r)2 fS −
1
2
(
p− c− w
p− r )
2fS − r (p− c− w)
2
(p− r)3 fS
+
1
2
p− c− w
(p− r)2 uλ1], (2.43)
and the optimality condition given by
1
2
p− c− w
p− r λ1 + λ2 = 0. (2.44)
Differentiating (2.44), we have[
−1− p−c−w
2(p−r)
u
]
(p− r) + u(p− c− w)
(p− r)2 λ1 +
p− c− w
2(p− r) λ
′
1 + λ
′
2 = 0.
Substituting (2.42),(2.43) into (2.44), we have
λ1 = r(
p− c− w
p− r )
2fS − (w − s)p− c− w
p− r fS,
λ2 =
1
2
(w − s)(p− c− w
p− r )
2fS − 1
2
r(
p− c− w
p− r )
3fS. (2.45)
Differentiating (2.45) and substituting it into (2.43), we obtain (2.39). When the
cost distribution is uniform, we have f ′S = 0; thus (2.40) and (2.41) are obtained. ¥
64
Based on Theorem 9, an optimal design of the menu of contracts can be solved
numerically for any instance. The difficulty in our analysis is due to the wholesale
price design in the menu. The buyer will make her own order decision, and it is hard
to track her behavior with the information asymmetry consideration.
II.5. Summary
In this chapter, we explicitly examine the buyer’s impact while designing price protec-
tion and returns policies contracts. We show that when the buyer is making pricing
or sales effort decisions to influence the market demand, a price protection or re-
turns policy alone is not able to coordinate the channel. Additional terms have to be
introduced into the contracts to achieve channel coordination. We provide optimal
contracts with pricing, sales effort, and information asymmetry considerations. Our
investigations are highlighted below:
• The design of optimal price protection contracts with retail-pricing decisions
under deterministic and stochastic price-sensitive demand.
• The design of optimal price protection contracts with buyer’s sales effort con-
siderations.
• The design of optimal price protection contracts and returns policies with in-
formation asymmetry consideration.
We have shown how to provide optimal supply contracts when the supplier has in-
complete information of the buyer’s cost, but there is also another type of information
asymmetry existing in practice. Note that in Section II.2, since the buyer may im-
prove the market demand with sales effort, the supplier needs to provide cost sharing
of the sales effort together with price protection to coordinate the channel. However,
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the supplier may not be able to observe the buyer’s level of sales effort. Therefore,
the cost sharing mechanism is difficult to implement. This type of information asym-
metry is called Moral Hazard (Laffont and Martimort 2002). This situation is also
sometimes referred to as hidden action. It is shown that Moral Hazard is not an issue
with a risk-neutral agent despite the non-observability of the effort. A system-wide
optimal solution is still implementable (see Laffont and Martimort 2002, pp. 154 for
details). One possible mechanism of coordination under a non-observable sales effort
is to provide a rebate to the buyer and set up a target rebate level simultaneously
(Taylor 2002). A similar target protection level can also be developed together with
price protection to coordinate the channel.
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CHAPTER III
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
In the context of supply contract design, the common wisdom is that the party holding
the bargaining power realizes the greater profit. Traditionally, the supplier (e.g.,
manufacturer) has been more powerful, and, hence, the existing literature in the area
emphasizes supplier-driven contracts. In fact, suppliers in monopolistic markets are
able to charge above-competitive prices and, thereby, easily establish supplier-driven
channels. However, in some markets, such as the grocery channel, the bargaining
power has shifted to the buyer (e.g., retailer) (Messinger and Narasimhan 1995).
In the United States, large retailers, such as Wal-mart, exert tremendous market
power over their suppliers. Furthermore, with the advent of the Internet, buyers have
access to much better information about alternative potential suppliers. As quoted
in Ertek and Griffin (2002), a recent survey by Forrester indicates that manufacturers
of standard products expect approximately one-third of their sales to occur on-line
within the next two years. Also, 40% of these manufacturers expect the Internet to
squeeze prices. Thus far, however, only a limited number of research papers have
analyzed this shift in the power structure.
This chapter considers the bilateral monopoly setting that has been analyzed
previously from the supplier’s perspective (Corbett and Tang 1999, Corbett et al.
2004, Corbett and Groote 2000, and Ha 2001). However, we focus on the case where
the buyer has the dominant bargaining power and establishes a buyer-driven channel
by offering the terms of the contract. In this context, the bilateral monopoly setting
is, in fact, of practical importance. Using Wal-Mart as an example, it is obvious
that any major cosmetics brand-name targeting budget-conscious, medium-income
female customers, such as Revlon, Maybelline, Cover Girl, etc., would be greatly
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interested in one-on-one negotiations with the price-cutting retailer and vice versa.
The list of examples can be easily extended by including the market shares of the few
retail giants for brand-name household items from personal hygiene products to small
electric appliances. This is due to increased consolidation at the retail level; larger
retailers have greater bargaining influence over their suppliers (Carstensen 2000).
In fact, consolidation in grocery retailing has been a powerful trend in recent
years. At the national level, the top five supermarket chains accounted for 20% of
the U.S. grocery sales in 1993, but 42% of the sales seven years later (Swenson 2000).
Some observers predict the near term emergence of four or five chains with more
than 60% of all U.S. supermarket sales (Foer 2000). As a natural consequence of
these trends, buyer-driven channels have become more prevalent, and the underlying
supply contract problems addressed in this chapter are increasingly important.
The three general types of contracts, i.e., one-part linear schemes, two-part linear
schemes, and two-part nonlinear schemes, that have been studied in the context of
supplier-driven channels are still applicable in the context of buyer-driven channels. In
the ACNielsen’s 2000 Annual Survey of Trade Promotion Practices (ACNielsen 2000),
85% of the retailers reported charging slotting fees whereas 42% of the manufacturers
reported that they were charged increased slotting allowances. As a general practice,
powerful retailers are seeking to provide more general contracts, and slotting fees
are identified as a mechanism through which their influence is exercised (Dimitri
2001). In order to investigate the impact of these practices, this chapter first examines
the impact of the power structure under the one-part linear scheme and then under
the more general schemes involving slotting fees. By deriving the buyer’s optimal
contracts and profits for different contract types and providing a comparative analysis
of our results with the early work on supplier-driven channels in Corbett and Tang
(1999) and Corbett et al. (2004), we aim to quantify the financial value of power in
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contract design.
Despite recent advances in information technology and the trend towards shar-
ing information among supply chain partners, information asymmetry remains a key
feature of real supply chain relationships. Since the entities in a supply chain may
belong to different firms that have conflicting objectives and/or may not have access
to private information, a system-wide optimal solution is not implementable unless
it can fully resolve any incentive alignment problems caused by asymmetric infor-
mation. For this reason, we investigate a total of six scenarios for the buyer-driven
channel: three general contracts, each under full and incomplete information about
the supplier’s cost structure. We develop the counterpart buyer-driven models which
complement the supplier-driven models studied in Corbett and Tang (1999) and Cor-
bett et al. (2004) and derive the buyer’s optimal contracts and profits for the three
different contract types. Obviously, by applying our results to any practical problem
instance, one can easily answer a set of questions for the buyer-driven channel similar
to those addressed in Corbett and Tang (1999) and Corbett et al. (2004) for the
supplier-driven channel, such as the value of information and the value of contract
flexibility. However, our main focus is on the impact of power shifting in the channel.
Hence, we use our work here, in combination with the analytical work presented in
Corbett and Tang (1999) and Corbett et al. (2004), to seek an answer to the funda-
mental question “Is bargaining power as beneficial as it is believed to be?”
By searching for an answer to this question, we obtain results addressing the following
additional questions:
• From the system’s perspective, which power structure is better under different
contract types?
• What is the value of power for the individual parties under different contract
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types and information structures? That is, what is the impact of power on
the buyer’s and supplier’s profits under three types of contracts with full and
asymmetric information?
Our analysis leads to several interesting observations. First, we prove that a
shift of power from the supplier to the buyer improves the system efficiency under
a one-part linear contract. Secondly, in the case of full information, we provide an
analytical confirmation that the bargaining power is beneficial for both the buyer
and the supplier and that the value of the bargaining power is higher under the
more general contract type. Thirdly, by investigating the interaction between the
power structure and information asymmetry, we find that the bargaining power is
not necessarily beneficial for either party and that this tenet of common wisdom does
not hold. In other words, it is not always wise for either the buyer or the supplier to
pursue the bargaining power when accurate information is not available. Finally, we
demonstrate that the more general types of contracts may not increase the value of
holding the power when information asymmetry exists. That is, the value of holding
the power may not be significantly higher under more general contract types, and
further, the party without accurate information does not necessarily benefit from the
power even when a two-part nonlinear contract is allowed. Our findings indicate that
sometimes one party can forfeit the bargaining power and retain a higher profit!
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section III.1 introduces the
modeling framework. Buyer’s optimal contracts are analyzed in Section III.2. The
impacts of power structure, information asymmetry, and contract type on channel
performance are explored in Section III.3. Finally, Section III.4 provides concluding
remarks.
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III.1. Power Structure and Information Asymmetry
We consider the same setting, with a single supplier and a single buyer, analyzed
in Corbett and Tang (1999) and Corbett et al. (2004) with the exception that our
preliminary goal is to derive the buyer’s optimal contracts and profits by focusing
on the buyer-driven channel. The supplier provides the product to the buyer at a
wholesale price w who in turn resells it to a final market with price-sensitive demand.
Demand per period for the product is denoted by d, and the selling price is denoted by
p where d decreases linearly in price, i.e., d = a−bp, where a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0 are known
parameters. Thus, the buyer’s order quantity d is uniquely determined by the selling
price p. In this context, the corresponding supplier- and buyer-driven contract design
models are developed by considering the supplier and the buyer as, respectively, the
first movers in a Stackelberg game to reflect channel power. Throughout the rest of
the chapter, we refer to the supplier as he and the buyer as she.
The supplier’s marginal cost is denoted by s whereas the buyer’s marginal cost
is denoted by c. Naturally, p > s + c, and since d = a − bp, to assure nonnegative
demand, we assume a − b(s + c) > 0. In the case of full information, each party
knows the actual value of the other party’s marginal cost. However, in general, there
is information asymmetry in the channel, and, hence, each party may keep his/her
marginal cost private so that the other party does not know the corresponding actual
value. If this is the case in the buyer-driven channel, then the buyer holds a prior
distribution FB(s) of the supplier’s marginal cost s (with continuous density function
fB(s), and mean µs, and second moment γs,) where the distribution is defined on a
finite interval [s, s¯]. Similarly, if information asymmetry exists in the supplier-driven
channel, then the supplier holds a prior distribution FS(c) (with continuous density
function fS(c), mean µc, and second moment γc,) where the distribution is defined on
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a finite interval [c, c¯].
Under these assumptions, for a given contract, i.e., when the contractual param-
eter values are known, the realized profit functions of the supplier and the buyer are
given, respectively, by
piS = (w − s)(a− bp)− L and piB = (p− w − c)(a− bp) + L,
where L represents a lump-sum side payment from the supplier to the buyer. When
L > 0, the side payment can be interpreted as a slotting fee, which is common when
dealing with large retailers. When L < 0, this lump sum can be seen as a franchise
fee which is more common when the supplier’s product is a strong brand.
In the supplier-driven channel, the supplier designs and provides the contract
while the reverse occurs in the buyer-driven channel. As we have already mentioned,
the three types of contracts that have been studied in Corbett and Tang (1999) for
the supplier-driven channel include the following:
• A basic one-part linear scheme, in which the supplier can only specify a constant
wholesale price w independent of the order quantity q selected by the buyer.
• A two-part linear scheme, denoted by (w,L), in which the supplier offers a unit
wholesale price w and a per-period lump-sum side payment L independent of
the order quantity q.
• A two-part nonlinear contract, denoted by (w(q), L(q)), in which both the actual
wholesale price w(q) and the side payment L(q) offered by the supplier depend
on the order quantity q selected by the buyer.
In order to develop the contract terms in the corresponding buyer-driven channel
that complements the above described supplier-driven channel, let us first examine
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the buyer’s response to the three types of contracts in the above list. In the supplier-
driven channel under the corresponding one-part linear scheme, after the supplier
specifies the constant wholesale price w, the buyer follows with the order quantity
q, and, thus, the retail price p is uniquely determined. For a given w, the buyer’s
optimization problem is given by maxp piB = (p−w−c)(a−bp). The optimal solution
is
p = αw + β, (3.1)
where α = 1/2 and β = a/(2b) + c/2. That is, after the supplier declares the
wholesale price w, the buyer responds with a specific relationship between w and p.
This relationship includes a multiplier α and a markup β. Under the two-part linear
scheme, the side payment is independent of p so it does not affect the buyer’s response.
Under the two-part nonlinear scheme, the menu of contracts is designed to reveal the
buyer’s true marginal cost. That is, the buyer with cost c chooses (w(c), L(c)) and
responds in the same way as in Expression (3.1) (see Section 4 in Corbett et al.
2004). Consequently, in order to examine the corresponding buyer-driven channel,
we let the buyer move first and specify the relationship between w and p in the same
way as in Expression (3.1). However, as we explain in Remark 1 below, without loss
of generality, it suffices to analyze the case where β = 0. Hence, the three types of
contracts we consider for the buyer-driven channel include the following:
• A one-part linear scheme in which the buyer declares a non-negative price mul-
tiplier α and states that the retail price will be equal to the product of α and
the wholesale price w.
• A two-part linear scheme, denoted by (α,L), in which the buyer charges a
slotting fee L along with declaring an α value.
• A two-part nonlinear contract, denoted by (α(w), L(w)), in which the buyer
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offers a menu of contracts where each item on the menu consists of a pair
including multiplier α(w) and slotting fee L(w), both of which depend on the
wholesale price w provided by the supplier. From this menu, the supplier selects
the desirable pair.
REMARK 1 Ertek and Griffin (2002) analyze the buyer-driven one-part linear con-
tract by considering the pricing scheme given by Expression (3.1), and they prove that,
under full information, it is optimal for the buyer to set β = 0 as outlined below. Ob-
serve that, for the one-part linear contract, considering given values of α and β, the
supplier’s optimization problem is given by maxw piS = (w−s)(a−bp) where p satisfies
Expression (3.1). The optimal solution is
w =
a− bp
bα
+ s. (3.2)
Observe that, when a, b, p, and s are fixed, the optimal w decreases as α, and, hence,
the buyer’s profit, increases. Also, observe that the largest α can be obtained by setting
β = 0. Therefore, under full information, we let
p = αw, (3.3)
without loss of generality. Under the two-part linear scheme, the side payment is
independent of w so that it does not affect the supplier’s response. Under the two-
part nonlinear scheme, the menu of contracts is designed to reveal the supplier’s’s true
marginal cost. That is, the supplier with cost s chooses (α(s), L(s)) and responds in
the same way as in Expression (3.2) (see Section III.2.1).
Since three types of contracts are considered under full and asymmetric infor-
mation for each channel structure, there are a total of twelve cases of interest, all of
which are summarized in Table III. In Table III, Cases BF1, BF2, and BF3 (resp.
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SF1, SF2, and SF3) represent the corresponding one-part linear, two-part linear, and
two-part nonlinear schemes for the buyer-driven (resp. supplier-driven) channel un-
der full information. Similarly, Cases BA1, BA2, and BA3 (resp. SA1, SA2, and
SA3) represent the corresponding one-part linear, two-part linear, and two-part non-
linear schemes for the buyer-driven (resp. supplier-driven) channel under asymmetric
information. As we have mentioned earlier, Cases SF1, SF2, SF3, SA1, SA2, and
SA3 have been analyzed in Corbett and Tang (1999), and the corresponding results
are summarized in the table on p.84 for the sake of completeness. Cases BF1, BF2,
BF3, BA1, BA2, and BA3 are the focus of the current chapter, and they provide the
foundation for a comparative analysis of buyer- and supplier-driven channels for the
purpose of quantifying the financial value of power in contract design.
The specifics of the setting we consider are as follows. In Cases BF1, BF2, and
BF3 (resp. SF1, SF2, and SF3), the buyer (resp. supplier) knows s (resp. c) and
offers a one-part linear contract α (resp. w), a two-part linear contract (α,L) (resp.
(w,L)), and a two-part nonlinear menu of contracts (α(w), L(w)) (resp. (w(q), L(q))),
respectively. Cases BA1, BA2, and BA3 (resp. SA1, SA2, and SA3) are analogous
except that the buyer (resp. supplier) does not know s (resp. c) and only holds a
prior FB(s) (resp. FS(c)). In the buyer-driven (resp. supplier-driven) channel, the
supplier (resp. buyer) chooses a wholesale price w (resp. an order quantity q) based
on his (resp. her) marginal cost s (resp. c). Then, all sales and financial transactions
take place simultaneously. Under information asymmetry, i.e., in Cases BA1, BA2,
and BA3 (resp. SA1, SA2, and SA3), for any revealed choice of w (resp. q), the
buyer (resp. supplier) can infer the supplier’s (resp. buyer’s ) true cost s (resp.
c). Therefore, by applying the revelation principle (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991), one
can reformulate the buyer-driven (resp. supplier-driven) two-part nonlinear menu of
contracts (α(w), L(w)) (resp. (w(q), L(q))) as a menu of contracts (α(s), L(s)) (resp.
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Table III Problem Cases in Supplier- and Buyer-driven Channels
Contract Type Supplier-Driven Buyer-Driven
1. one-part Case SF1: Case BF1:
linear contract the supplier offers a one-part the buyer offers a one-part
under full information linear contract at wholesale
price w;
linear contract with multiplier
α;
full information about c full information about s
2. one-part Case SA1: Case BA1:
linear contract the supplier offers a one-part the buyer offers a one-part
under incomplete information linear contract at wholesale
price w;
linear contract with multiplier
α;
incomplete information about
c
incomplete information about
s
3. two-part Case SF2: Case BF2:
linear contract the supplier offers a two-part the buyer offers a two-part
under full information linear contract (w,L); linear contract (α,L);
full information about c full information about s
4. two-part Case SA2: Case BA2:
linear contract the supplier offers a two-part the buyer offers a two-part
under incomplete information linear contract (w,L); linear contract (α,L);
incomplete information about
c
incomplete information about
s
5. two-part Case SF3: Case BF3:
nonlinear contract the supplier offers a two-part
menu
the buyer offers a two-part
menu
under full information of contracts (w(q), L(q)); of contracts (α(w), L(w));
full information about c full information about s
6. two-part Case SA3: Case BA3:
nonlinear contract the supplier offers a two-part
menu
the buyer offers a two-part
menu
under incomplete information of contracts (w(q), L(q)); of contracts (α(w), L(w));
incomplete information about
c
incomplete information about
s
(w(c), L(c))). The supplier (resp. buyer) announces sˆ (resp. cˆ) and then chooses the
contract (α(sˆ), L(sˆ)) (resp. (w(cˆ), L(cˆ))).
III.2. Optimal Contracts for the Buyer-Driven Channel
We begin our analysis by determining the supplier’s optimal wholesale price under
the contracts offered by the buyer. Next, we present the buyer’s optimal contracts
for the six cases of interest.
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III.2.1. The Supplier’s Optimal Wholesale Price
Given the contract parameters, the following proposition provides an expression of
the supplier’s optimal wholesale price denoted by w∗.
PROPOSITION 5
• In Cases BF1, BF2, BF3, BA1, and BA2,
w∗ =
a
2αb
+
s
2
. (3.4)
• In Case BA3, letting α′(s) and L′(s) denote the first derivatives of α(s) and
L(s) with respect to s, respectively, and considering the incentive-compatibility
constraint given by
IC : L′(s) =
b2s2α2(s)− a2
4bα2(s)
α′(s), ∀ s ≤ s ≤ s¯, (3.5)
for the supplier, we have
w∗ =
a
2α(s)b
+
s
2
(3.6)
Proof: In Case BF1, the buyer declares an α value, and, the supplier solves
SPBF1 max
w
piS = (w − s)(a− bp).
Since p = αw, the optimal wholesale price is given by (3.4).
In Case BF2, the buyer also charges a slotting fee L so that the supplier solves
SPBF2 max
w
piS = (w − s)(a− bp)− L.
However, since L is fixed and independent of w, this does not affect the supplier’s
wholesale price decision. In Section III.2.3, we show that Cases BF2 and BF3 are
equivalent so that the optimal wholesale price is given by Expression (3.4) in all three
cases.
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In Case BA1, the supplier solves the same problem as SPBF1, so the optimal
wholesale price is again given by Expression (3.4). We also note that the supplier’s
problem is the same as SPBF2 in Case BA2, and, as a result, the optimal wholesale
price is given by Expression (3.4) as well.
In Case BA3, the buyer offers a menu of (α(s), L(s)), and the supplier chooses
which cost parameter sˆ to announce. Once he announces sˆ, α(sˆ) and L(sˆ) are fixed.
In this case, it can be easily shown that the supplier’s optimal wholesale price is given
by
w =
a
2α(sˆ)b
+
s
2
so that, according to the contract, the buyer sets the retail price at
p =
a
2b
+
sα(sˆ)
2
. (3.7)
Consequently, in order to determine the marginal cost value to be announced, the
supplier solves the following problem:
SPBA3 max
sˆ
piS(s, sˆ) =
(
a
2bα(sˆ)
− s
2
)(
a
2
− bsα(sˆ)
2
)
− L(sˆ). (3.8)
The revelation principle states that there is an optimal contract under which the
supplier will optimally announce sˆ = s. Taking the first derivative of the above
expression of piS(s, sˆ) with respect to sˆ, setting it equal to zero, and requiring that sˆ =
s, we have Expression (3.5) which represents the incentive-compatibility constraint
for the supplier. This constraint, in turn, guarantees that the supplier announces his
true marginal cost s by choosing (α(s), L(s)) so the supplier’s optimal wholesale price
is given by Expression (3.6). ¥
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III.2.2. The Buyer’s Optimal Contract in Case BF1
When the buyer has complete information about the supplier’s marginal cost s, the
buyer knows the supplier’s optimal wholesale price w∗ and needs to determine the
value of α so that her profit is maximized. Recalling Expressions (3.3) and (3.4), and
noting that q = a− bp, it is easy to show that the buyer’s problem is
BPBF1 max
α
piB(α) = (p− w − c)q =
( a
2b
+
sα
2
− a
2bα
− s
2
− c
)(a
2
− bsα
2
)
.
The following proposition provides a method for computing the buyer’s optimal
markup value in Case BF1 denoted by1 α∗BF1.
PROPOSITION 6 In Case BF1, α∗BF1 is the unique positive solution of
α3 −
(
1
2
+
c
s
)
α2 − a
2
2b2s2
= 0. (3.9)
Proof: Observe that the above expression of piB(α) is concave, and, hence, the
optimal value of α, denoted by α∗BF1, satisfies
a2
4bα2
− bs
2α
2
+
bs2
4
+
bcs
2
= 0. (3.10)
After some algebra, Expression (3.10) leads to Expression (3.9) for which it is easy
to verify that there is a unique and finite positive solution. ¥
Since Expression (3.9) is a third degree polynomial, we do not have a closed form
solution of α∗BF1, but a numerical value can be easily obtained. It is worth noting
that here we implicitly assume that the buyer’s reservation profit level is zero, and,
thus, the buyer will trade as long as her profit is non-negative. Otherwise, the buyer
needs to determine her cut-off level (Corbett et al. 2004, Ha 2001). This assumption
1Similar notation is used in the remainder of the chapter, where the superscript (∗) represents the
optimal value of the contract parameter of interest, and the subscript (SF1, BF1, etc.) represents
one of the twelve cases of interest.
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is useful in that it allows us to concentrate on a detailed investigation of the impact
of power structure, information asymmetry, and contract type.
III.2.3. The Buyer’s Optimal Contract in Cases BF2 and BF3
Using the same argument presented for Case BF1, it is easy to show that the buyer
can determine the contract of (w,L) that optimizes her profit by solving the following
problem:
BPBF2 max
α
piB(α) =
( a
2b
+
sα
2
− a
2bα
− s
2
− c
)(a
2
− bsα
2
)
+ L
s.t. piS ≥ pi−S (3.11)
Here, Condition (3.11) represents the supplier’s individual rationality constraint.
That is, the supplier’s net profits must exceed his reservation profit level denoted
by pi−S .
PROPOSITION 7 In Case BF2, the buyer’s optimal contract is as follows:
α∗BF2 = 1 +
c
s
, and (3.12)
L∗BF2 = −pi−S +
a2s
4b(s+ c)
− as
2
+
bs(s+ c)
4
.
Proof: The proof relies on two observations. First, because the buyer has complete
information, she sets Expression (3.11) to be binding. Second, the buyer’s profit is
thus given by piB = piJ−pi−S where piJ denotes the joint profit so that problem BPBF2
is equivalent to maximizing the joint profit piJ . This completes the proof. ¥
Observe that, in Case BF2, it follows from Expressions (3.4) and (3.12) that the
supplier’s optimal wholesale price is given by
w∗BF2 =
as
2b(s+ c)
+
s
2
. (3.13)
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Since a − b(s + c) > 0, we have w > s. This is different from the two-part linear
contract in the supplier-driven channel where the supplier sets w = s. That is, in the
supplier-driven channel, the supplier extracts profit only through L. Note that using
Expressions (3.3), (3.12), and (3.13), we have
p∗BF2 − w∗BF2 − c =
ac
2b(s+ c)
− c
2
> 0,where p∗BF2 = α
∗
BF2w
∗
BF2
and, thus, in the corresponding buyer-driven channel, the buyer also extracts a per
unit profit from the sale of individual items. Since the buyer is able to extract all of
the profit from the supplier in Case BF2, the flexibility to offer a nonlinear contract
will not increase the buyer’s profit. As a result, we have the following corollary.
COROLLARY 1 The optimal contract is the same in Cases BF2 and BF3.
III.2.4. The Buyer’s Optimal Contract in Case BA1
In this case, the buyer holds a prior distribution FB(s) of the supplier’s marginal cost
s (with continuous density function fB(s)), where the distribution is defined on the
finite interval [s, s¯]. The buyer solves
BPBA1 max
α
Es[piB(α)] =
∫ s¯
s
( a
2b
+
sα
2
− a
2bα
− s
2
− c
)(a
2
− bsα
2
)
dFB(s).
PROPOSITION 8 In Case BA1, α∗BA1 is the unique positive solution of
α3 −
(
1
2
+
cµs
γs
)
α2 − a
2
2b2γs
= 0. (3.14)
Proof: It is easy to verify that Es[piB(α)] is concave in α, and the first order optimality
condition leads to Expression (3.14) which has a unique positive solution. ¥
81
III.2.5. The Buyer’s Optimal Contract in Case BA2
The buyer’s optimization problem in Case BA2 is given by
BPBA2 max
α
Es[piB(α)] =
∫ s¯
s
[
( a
2b
+
sα
2
− a
2bα
− s
2
− c
)(a
2
− bsα
2
)
+L]dFB(s) (3.15)
s.t. piS ≥ pi−S (3.16)
PROPOSITION 9 In Case BA2, the buyer’s optimal contract is as follows:
α∗BA2 =
1
2
+
1
2
s¯2
γs
+
cµs
γs
, and (3.17)
L∗BA2 =
( a
2bα
− s¯
2
)(a
2
− bs¯α
2
)
− pi−S . (3.18)
Proof: For any given α, the buyer will always choose the highest L that still satisfies
the supplier’s individual rationality constraint given by Expression (3.16). Observe
that piS(s) is decreasing in s so the constraint holds for all s if it holds at s = s¯. This
observation leads to Expression (3.18). Using Expression (3.18) in Expression (3.15)
and solving for α, we obtain Expression (3.17). ¥
III.2.6. The Buyer’s Optimal Contract in Case BA3
In this case, the buyer has the flexibility to offer a two-part nonlinear menu of con-
tracts (α(s), L(s)). By selecting any specific pair, the supplier reveals a marginal cost
value sˆ which will be his true marginal cost s according to the revelation principle. To
maximize her expected profit, the buyer solves the problem BPBA3. Observe that, in
the formulation, Expression (3.19) is identical to Expression (3.5) which represents the
supplier’s incentive-compatibility constraint. Under this constraint, presented with a
menu of contracts (α(s), L(s)), the supplier with cost s will choose w∗ to maximize
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his profit.
BPBA3 max
α(s)
Es[piB(α(s))] =
∫ s¯
s
[
(
a
2b
+
sα(s)
2
− a
2bα(s)
− s
2
− c
)(
a
2
− bsα(s)
2
)
+L]dFB(s)
s.t. L′(s) =
b2s2α2(s)− a2
4bα2(s)
α′(s) (3.19)
piS ≥ pi−S . (3.20)
PROPOSITION 10 In Case BA3, the buyer’s optimal contract is as follows:
α∗BA3 = 1 +
c
s
+
FB(s)
sfB(s)
, and (3.21)
L∗
′
BA3 =
b2s2α∗BA3
2 − a2
4bα∗BA3
2 α
∗
′
BA3. (3.22)
Proof: The proof relies on some fundamental results from optimal control theory as
outlined below (see Kamien and Schwartz 1991, pp. 142–146 for details.) Letting
h(s) =
(
a
2b
+
sα(s)
2
− a
2bα(s)
− s
2
− c
)(
a
2
− bsα(s)
2
)
fB(s) + L(s)fB(s),
g1 =
b2s2α2(s)− a2
4bα2(s)
u, and
g2 = u = α
′(s),
the above problem representing Case BA3 can be expressed as
max
∫ s¯
s
h(s)ds (3.23)
s.t. L′(s) = g1 (3.24)
α′(s) = g2 (3.25)
piS ≥ pi−S (3.26)
The necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality can be stated in terms of the
Hamiltonian
H = h+ λ1g1 + λ2g2.
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These conditions include the state equations given by Constraints (3.24) and (3.25),
the multiplier equations given by
λ′1 = −
∂H
∂L
= −
(
∂h
∂L
+ λ1
∂g1
∂L
+ λ2
∂g2
∂L
)
, λ′2 = −
∂H
∂u
= −
(
∂h
∂α
+ λ1
∂g1
∂α
+ λ2
∂g2
∂α
)
,
and the optimality condition given by
∂H
∂u
=
b2s2α2(s)− a2
4bα2(s)
λ1 + λ2 = 0. (3.27)
Then, it is easy to show that λ′1 = −fB(s) so that λ1 = −FB(s), whereas
λ′2 = −
(
a2
4bα2(s)
fB(s)− bs
2α(s)
2
fB(s) +
bs2
4
fB(s) +
bcs
2
fB(s) +
2a2
4bα3(s)
uλ1
)
.
(3.28)
Differentiating Expression (3.27), we have
λ′2 = −
[(
2bs
4
+
2a2
4bα3(s)
u
)
λ1 − b
2s2α2(s)− a2
4bα2(s)
fB(s)
]
, (3.29)
and substituting Expression (3.29) into Expression (3.28) leads to Expression (3.21).
Since we have ignored Expression (3.20) in the above discussion, we need to check
whether or not it is satisfied for all s ∈ [s, s¯]. Recalling Expression (3.8), piS(s) is
decreasing in s because
dpiS(s)
ds
=
(
− a
2bα2(s)
α′(s)− 1
2
)(
a
2
− bsα(s)
2
)
−
(
bα(s)
2
+
bsα′(s)
2
)
(
a
2bα(s)
−s
2
)− b
2s2α2(s)− a2
4bα2(s)
α′(s)
=
bsα(s)− a
2
< 0.
Consequently, we can set L(s¯) such that Expression (3.20) is binding, and this com-
pletes the proof. ¥
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Table IV Supplier-driven and Buyer-driven Optimal Supply Contracts
Contract Type Supplier Driven Buyer Driven
1. one part linear under w∗SF1 =
a
2b +
1
2 (s− c) w∗BF1 = a2bα∗
BF1
+ s2
full information: p∗SF1 =
3a
4b +
1
4 (s+ c) p
∗
BF1 =
a
2b +
s
2α
∗
BF1
w;α q∗SF1 =
1
4a− 14b(s+ c) q∗BF1 = 12a− 12sbα∗BF1
pi∗S,SF1 =
1
8b [a− b(s+ c)]2 pi∗S,BF1 = a
2
4bα∗
BF1
− as2 + bs
2α∗
BF1
4
pi∗B,SF1 =
1
16b [a− b(s+ c)]2 pi∗B,BF1 = a
2
−b2s2α∗
BF1
2
4b −
a2−b2s2α∗
BF1
2
4bα∗
BF1
− ac−bcsα∗BF12
where α∗BF1
3 − ( 12 + cs )α∗BF12 −
a2
2b2s2 = 0
2. one part linear under w∗SA1 =
a
2b +
1
2 (s− µc) w∗BA1 = a2bα∗
BA1
+ s2
asymm. information: p∗SA1 =
3a
4b +
1
4 (s+ c) +
1
4 (c− µc) p∗BA1 = a2b + s2α∗BA1
w;α q∗SA1 =
1
4a− 14b(s+c)− 14b(c−µc) q∗BA1 = 12a− 12sbα∗BA1
Ec[pi
∗
S,SA1] =
1
8b [a− (b(s+ µc)]2 pi∗S,BA1 = a
2
4bα∗
BA1
− as2 +
bs2α∗
BA1
4
pi∗B,SA1 =
1
16b [a− b(s+ 2c− µc)]2 Es[pi∗B,BA1] = a
2
−b2γsα
∗
BA1
2
4b −
a2−b2γsα
∗
BA1
2
4bα∗
BA1
− ac−bcµsα∗BA12
where α∗BA1
3− ( 12 + cµsγs )α∗BA1
2−
a2
2b2γs
= 0
3. two part w∗SF2 = s w
∗
BF2 =
as
2b(s+c) +
s
2
linear under L∗SF2 = pi
−
B − 14b [a− b(s+ c)]2 L∗BF2 = −pi−S + a
2s
4b(s+c) − as2 +
bs
4 (s+ c)
full information: p∗SF2 =
1
2b [a+ b(s+ c)] p
∗
BF2 =
1
2b [a+ b(s+ c)]
(w,L); (α,L) q∗SF2 =
1
2 [a− b(s+ c)] q∗BF2 = 12 [a− b(s+ c)]
pi∗S,SF2 = −pi−B + 14b [a− b(s+ c)]2 pi∗S,BF2 = pi−S
pi∗B,SF2 = pi
−
B pi
∗
B,SF2 = −pi−S + 14b [a− b(s+ c)]2
α∗BF2 =
s+c
s
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Table IV Continued.
Contract Type Supplier Driven Buyer Driven
4. two part w∗SA2 = s+ c¯− µc w∗BA2 = a2bα∗
BA2
+ s2
linear under L∗SA2 = pi
−
B− 14b [a−b(s+c¯)−b(c¯−
µc)]
2
L = ( a2bα∗
BA2
− s¯2 )(a2− bs¯α
∗
BA2
2 )−pi−S
asymm. information: p∗SA2 =
1
2b [a+ b(s+ c¯+ c− µc)] p∗BA2 = a2b + s2α∗BA2
(w,L); (α,L) q∗SA2 =
1
2 [a− b(s+ c¯+ c− µc)] q∗BA2 = 12a− 12sbα∗BA2
Ec[pi
∗
S,SA2] = −pi−B + 14b [a− b(s+
2c¯− µc)]2
pi∗S,BA2 =
a2
4bα∗
BA2
− as2 + bs
2α∗
BA2
4 −
L
+ 12 (c¯− µc)[a− b(s+ c¯)]
pi∗B,SA2 = pi
−
B +
1
4b [a − b(s + c¯ +
c− µc)]2
Es[pi
∗
B,BA2] =
a2−b2γsα
∗
BA2
2
4b
− 14b [a− b(s+ 2c¯− µc)]2 −a
2
−b2γsα
∗
BA2
2
4bα∗
BA2
− ac−bcµsα∗BA22 +L
α∗BA2 =
1
2 +
s¯2
2γs
+ cµs
γs
5. two part Case SF3: results are the same as
Case SF2
Case BF3: results are the same
nonlinear under as Case BF2
full information:
(w,L); (α,L)
6. two part w∗SA3 = s+
FS(c)
fS(c)
w∗BA3 =
a
2bα∗
BA3
+ s2
nonlinear under L∗
′
SA3 =
1
2 [a− b(w + c)]w′ L∗
′
BA3 =
b2s2α∗
BA3
2
−a2
4bα∗
BA3
2 α
∗
BA3
′
asymm. information: α∗BA3 = 1 +
c
s
+ FB(s)
sfB(s)
(w,L); (α,L)
III.3. The Impact of Power Structure, Information Asymmetry, and Con-
tract Type
Using the analysis above and the results summarized in Table IV, we are now able to
explore the impacts of power structure, information asymmetry, and contract type.
For this purpose, by assuming that both parties will trade as long as their profits are
nonnegative, we can concentrate on our investigation. In Section III.3.1, we examine
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the impact of information asymmetry on the buyer’s profit margin in the buyer-
driven channel. In Section III.3.2, we evaluate the impact of the power structure on
joint profits under full information in both supplier- and buyer-driven channels. The
simultaneous impact of power structure, information asymmetry, and contract type
is investigated in Section III.3.3.
III.3.1. The Impact of Information Asymmetry on the Buyer’s Profit
Margin
Considering the case where the buyer holds a prior distribution FB(s) of the supplier’s
marginal cost s, suppose that the supplier’s real marginal cost sˆ is equal to µs so the
buyer has an unbiased estimator of the supplier’s cost. Then, we have the following
theorem regarding the impact of information asymmetry on the buyer’s profit margin.
THEOREM 10 Information asymmetry decreases the buyer’s profit margin (p−w−
c) under the one-part linear contract and increases the buyer’s profit margin under
the two-part nonlinear contract. Specifically, we have
α∗BA1 ≤ α∗BF1, w∗BA1 ≥ w∗BF1, p∗BA1 ≤ p∗BF1,
α∗BA3 ≥ α∗BF3, w∗BA3 ≤ w∗BF3, p∗BA3 ≥ p∗BF3,
p∗BA1 − w∗BA1 − c ≤ p∗BF1 − w∗BF1 − c, (3.30)
p∗BA3 − w∗BA3 − c ≥ p∗BF3 − w∗BF3 − c. (3.31)
Under the two-part linear contract, information asymmetry decreases the buyer’s profit
margin when
s¯2 − γs
δ2s
<
2c
µs
, (3.32)
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and it increases the buyer’s profit margin when
s¯2 − γs
δ2s
>
2c
µs
(3.33)
where δ2s is the buyer’s estimation variance of s.
Proof: Considering the one-part linear contract and recalling Expression (3.9), first
we show that if s1 ≤ s2, then α1 ≥ α2 where s1, s2, α1, and α2 satisfy the following
two expressions:
α31 −
(
1
2
+
c
s1
)
α21 −
a2
2b2s21
= 0, (3.34)
α32 −
(
1
2
+
c
s2
)
α22 −
a2
2b2s22
= 0. (3.35)
Note that if s1 ≤ s2, then
c
s1
≥ c
s2
, and
a2
2b2s21
≥ a
2
2b2s22
.
Also, recalling Expression (3.10), we have
a2
4bα21
− bs
2
1α1
2
+
bs21
4
+
bcs1
2
= 0,
which is equivalent to Expression (3.34). Then, if α2 > α1,
a2
4bα22
− bs
2
1α2
2
+
bs21
4
+
bcs1
2
< 0,
and, hence,
α32 − (
1
2
+
c
s1
)α22 −
a2
2b2s21
> 0.
This, in turn, implies that
α32 −
(
1
2
+
c
s2
)
α22 −
a2
2b2s22
≥ α32 −
(
1
2
+
c
s1
)
α22 −
a2
2b2s21
> 0,
which contradicts Expression (3.35), and, therefore, if s1 ≤ s2, α1 ≥ α2.
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Since γs ≥ µ2s, comparing Expressions (3.9) and (3.14), we have
α∗BA1 ≤ α∗BF1,
Then, it follows from Expressions (3.3) and (3.4) that (also see the results summarized
in Table IV)
w∗BA1 ≥ w∗BF1 and p∗BA1 ≤ p∗BF1,
and this inequality leads to Expression (3.30). Under the two-part linear and non-
linear contracts, Expressions (3.31), (3.32), and (3.33) can be easily verified by a
comparison of the corresponding selling price and wholesale price values obtained in
Section III.2 and summarized in Table IV. ¥
Theorem 10 implies that the impact of information asymmetry on the buyer’s
profit margin varies depending on the contract type. Under the one-part linear con-
tract, information asymmetry decreases the buyer’s profit margin such that a buyer
with incomplete information should accept a smaller profit margin in order to main-
tain demand volume. Under the two-part linear contract, the impact of information
asymmetry depends on the information structure, i.e., the mean and variance of the
prior distribution FB(s) held by the buyer. If the variance is large, information asym-
metry decreases the buyer’s profit margin and the buyer should accept a smaller profit
margin to maintain demand volume. On the other hand, if the variance is small, in-
formation asymmetry increases the buyer’s profit margin, and the buyer may achieve
a higher profit margin under incomplete information. The latter case is counter-
intuitive. Since information asymmetry decreases the buyer’s total profit, how could
her profit margin be increased? To examine this phenomenon more precisely, one
must take the slotting fee into account. If the variance is small, the buyer prefers to
maintain a higher profit margin and to charge a smaller slotting fee at the same time.
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Under the two-part nonlinear contract, information asymmetry always increases the
buyer’s profit margin which suggests that the buyer can use the additional flexibility
offered by nonlinear contracts to maintain a high unit profit margin in a way that she
cannot always do when restricted to offering linear contracts.
III.3.2. The Impact of Power Structure on the Joint Profit
The following theorem provides a comparison of the resulting joint profits in both
supplier- and buyer-driven channels.
THEOREM 11 Assume that both parties have full information. Under the one-part
linear contract,
pi∗S,SF1 + pi
∗
B,SF1 < pi
∗
S,BF1 + pi
∗
B,BF1 (3.36)
where pi∗S,SF1 represents the supplier’s optimal profit in the supplier-driven channel
under full information and pi∗B,SF1 represents the buyer’s profit in the supplier-driven
channel under full information2. Under the two-part linear contract,
pi∗S,SF2 + pi
∗
B,SF2 = pi
∗
S,BF2 + pi
∗
B,BF2 = pi
∗
J (3.37)
where pi∗J represents the corresponding optimal joint profit of the channel.
Proof: The joint profit function of the channel is given by
piJ = (p− s− c)(a− bp),
where piJ is a concave function of p. Hence, the corresponding optimal retail price is
given by
p∗J =
a
2b
+
1
2
(s+ c).
2Similar notation is used in the remainder of the chapter, where the first subscript (S, B, or
J) represents the supplier, buyer, or supplier-buyer pair, and the second subscript (SF1, BF1, etc.)
represents one of the twelve cases of interest.
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From Table 2, under the one-part linear contract, the joint profit in the supplier-
driven channel is
piJ,SF1 = pi
∗
S,SF1 + pi
∗
B,SF1 =
3
16b
[a− b(s+ c)]2.
Let piJ1 = piJ,SF1 − piJ,BF1 where piJ,BF1 denotes the joint profit in the buyer-driven
channel. Recalling Expression (3.4), we know that
p∗BF1 =
a
2b
+
s
2
α∗BF1.
Then, substituting
p =
a
2b
+
s
2
α
in the above expression of piJ1 and solving piJ1 = 0 for α leads to the following two
roots:
α1 =
a+ bs+ bc
2bs
, and α2 = −a− 3bs− 3bc
2bs
.
Observe that α1 > α2 since a− b(s+ c) > 0. As a result, piJ1 < 0 when α2 < α < α1.
Next, we show that α2 < α
∗
BF1 < α1. In order to show that α
∗
BF1 < α1, we
rewrite a as a = b(s+ c)+k where k is a positive constant and recall that α∗BF1 solves
Expression (3.9). Then, using the above expressions of a and α1, the left-hand side
of Expression (3.9) reduces to
k(4b2c2 + bsk + 4bck + 4b2sc+ k2)
8b3s3
,
which is positive. It follows that α∗BF1 < α1 and p
∗
BF1 < p
∗
SF1. Finally, in order to
show that α2 < α
∗
BF1, we use the same expressions of a and α2 in the left-hand side
of Expression (3.9). After some algebra, we have
−k(4b
2c2 + 16b2s2 − bsk − 4bck + 20b2sc+ k2)
8b3s3
.
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Observe that the above quantity is negative as long as 4b2c2 + 16b2s2 − bsk − 4bck +
20b2sc+ k2 > 0 which is minimized at
k =
bs
2
+ 2bc,
with a corresponding minimum value of
18b2sc+
63b2s2
4
> 0.
It follows that α2 < α
∗
BF1. Therefore, piJ1 < 0, and this completes the proof of
Expression (3.36).
Under the two-part linear contract, Expression (3.37) holds because the corre-
sponding optimal joint solutions are always realizable, so the leader extracts all of
the additional system profits using the optimal contracts summarized in Table IV. ¥
Theorem 11 implies that, under the one-part linear contract, the buyer-driven
channel always performs better than the counterpart supplier-driven channel. That
is, the shift of power from the supplier to the buyer actually improves the system
efficiency. This is counter-intuitive in the sense that the performance of the channel
is expected to depend on the cost and demand parameters so that one power struc-
ture dominates the other in some cases whereas the opposite is true in other cases.
However, according to Theorem 2, the power structure itself determines the channel
performance, and the buyer-driven channel always achieves a higher joint profit under
the one-part linear contract. The intuitive explanation is that, in the supplier-driven
channel, the buyer is the follower and responds to the supplier’s wholesale price. Since
the supplier seeks to maximize his own profit, the buyer is pushed to select a higher
than system optimal retail price which limits the market demand. On the other hand,
when the buyer is the leader, she selects the α value before the supplier declares the
wholesale price, and, thus, the buyer has more freedom to warrant a higher market
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demand by choosing a relatively smaller retail price which is closer to the system op-
timal retail price. Under the two-part linear contract, obviously, the value of power
shifting is higher than under the one-part linear contract since the party with the
dominant bargaining power extracts all of the additional profits.
III.3.3. The Impact of Power Structure versus the Impact of Information
Asymmetry
In this section, we investigate the impact of power structure and information asym-
metry on individual profits under three types of contracts. The common wisdom is
that the buyer (resp. supplier), with dominant bargaining power, will gain more profit
in the buyer-driven (resp. supplier-driven) channel than in the supplier-driven (resp.
buyer-driven) channel. The following theorem provides a formal presentation of the
common wisdom which is true when each party has full information of the system
under the assumption that the buyer (resp. supplier) does not have any reservation
profit in the buyer-driven (resp. supplier-driven) channel.
THEOREM 12 For the case of full information, we have
pi∗B,BF1 ≥ 2pi∗B,SF1, (3.38)
pi∗S,SF1 ≥ pi∗S,BF1, (3.39)
pi∗B,BF2 = pi
∗
S,SF2 = pi
∗
J , and (3.40)
pi∗B,SF2 = pi
∗
S,BF2 = 0. (3.41)
Proof: The theorem cannot be verified analytically by a direct comparison of the
buyer’s profits in the two channels simply because we do not have a closed form
expression for α. Hence, instead of a direct comparison of the pi∗B,BF1 and pi
∗
B,SF1
values, we complete the proof by analyzing the more general one-part linear scheme
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(α, β).
First, we examine the case where the buyer uses only a mark-up in the contract,
that is, α = 1. In this case, given the value of β, it is easy to show that the supplier’s
optimal wholesale price is
w∗BF1 =
a
2b
+
1
2
(s− β),
whereas the buyer’s optimal mark-up is
β∗BF1 =
a
2b
+
1
2
(c− s).
Thus, the optimal retail price is
p∗BF1 =
3a
4b
+
1
4
(s+ c),
which is the same as the one in the supplier-driven channel. As a result, the buyer’s
optimal profit under the contract (α = 1, β = a
2b
+ 1
2
(c− s)) is given by
pi∗∗B,BF1 =
[a− b(s+ c)]2
8b
= 2pi∗B,SF1.
Now, recall Expression (3.2) in Remark 1, and note that for any fixed value of p, the
corresponding α and β values can be calculated once w is determined. Expression
(3.2) shows that when all other parameters are fixed, the supplier will select a smaller
w as α increases. The largest α can be obtained by setting β = 0. Thus, there exists
a contract (α, β), such that α > 1 and β = 0, under which the buyer’s profit is larger
than pi∗∗B,BF1. Hence, pi
∗
B,BF1 ≥ pi∗∗B,BF1 so Expression (3.38) is verified.
Noting that pi∗S,BF1 + pi
∗
B,BF1 ≤ pi∗J , we have
pi∗S,BF1 ≤ pi∗J − pi∗B,BF1 ≤
1
8b
[a− b(s+ c)]2,
94
where
pi∗J =
1
4b
[a− b(s+ c)]2
is the optimal joint profit, so Expression (3.39) is verified.
Expressions (3.40) and (3.41) can be easily verified using the results summarized
in Table IV. ¥
Naturally, the next question is whether or not the bargaining power remains
a significant advantage under conditions of information asymmetry. For example,
in the buyer-driven channel, when the buyer has incomplete information about the
supplier’s costs, is it still beneficial for the buyer to act as the channel leader? Below
we discuss some numerical results that answer this question.
Suppose that q = a − bp = 120 − 9p and the supplier’s and buyer’s prior dis-
tributions of c and s are on the bounded domains [c, c¯] = [1, 3.6], [s, s¯] = [3.6, 6.5],
respectively. Let Πb1 = pi
∗
B,BA1 − pi∗B,SA1, so that Πb represents the buyer’s relative
benefit from being the leader in a buyer-driven channel rather than being the fol-
lower in a supplier-driven channel. Under these assumptions, Figure 2 illustrates the
buyer’s realized relative benefit under power shifting when c is uniformly distributed
and s is exponentially distributed with
Fs(s) =
1− e 3.6−s2.9
1− e−1 .
Observe that Πb1 is higher when the buyer’s marginal cost c is smaller. This obser-
vation suggests that the buyer should keep the bargaining power when c is small.
Also, Πb1 decreases as the supplier’s marginal cost s increases, and, obviously, the
supplier’s (follower’s) marginal cost has a more significant impact on Πb1 than the
buyer’s (leader’s) marginal cost. In Figure 2, one interesting observation is that when
c is close to c¯ and s is close to s¯, the corresponding Πb1 value is negative. That is,
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Figure 2 The Impact of Power Structure and Information Asymmetry on the Buyer’s
Profit
considering those cases where the supplier’s marginal cost is large (so the buyer is
likely to underestimate its value), if the buyer’s own marginal cost is large as well,
then the buyer achieves a higher profit by giving up her bargaining power and acting
as a follower! As a result, under information asymmetry, the buyer (leader) may
potentially lose the relative benefit of the bargaining power to the supplier (follower.)
According to Figure 3, this is also true for the supplier-driven channel where Πs1 rep-
resents the supplier’s relative benefit of being the leader in a supplier-driven channel
rather than being the follower in a buyer-driven channel, i.e, Πs1 = pi
∗
S,SA1 − pi∗S,BA1.
Observe that, in Figure 3, Πs1 is decreasing in c, and, again, the follower’s (buyer’s)
marginal cost has a more significant impact than the leader’s (supplier’s) marginal
cost on the supplier’s relative benefit. Also, note that the supplier’s relative benefit
is negative when s is close to s and c is close to c¯. That is, when the supplier’s own
marginal cost is small, and the buyer’s marginal cost is large (so the supplier is likely
to underestimate the buyer’s cost), the supplier achieves a higher profit by acting
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as a follower. This phenomenon, in which the bargaining power under information
Figure 3 The Impact of Power Structure and Information Asymmetry on the Supplier’s
Profit
asymmetry reduces the leader’s relative benefit, can be explained as follows. When
information asymmetry exists in the channel, private information helps the follower
without the dominant bargaining power improve his/her bargaining position, and,
thus, the relative benefit of possessing the power is reduced and the follower’s conse-
quent profit might be improved. The above example shows that it is not always good
to pursue the bargaining power, especially when accurate information is not available.
Sometimes, in fact, one can forfeit the bargaining power and still have higher profit.
It is worth noting that Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the impact of power structure
and information asymmetry under one-part linear contracts for buyer- and supplier-
driven channels, respectively. Since two-part linear contracts help the leader of the
channel exercise his/her influence and extract all profits under full information, the
following questions arise:
• Should the leader offer more general contracts so that the advantage of leader-
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ship would be guaranteed?
• Is the relative benefit definitely positive under more general contracts?
The answer to both of these questions is still NO! Under information asymmetry,
more general contracts do not necessarily improve the relative benefits of holding
the bargaining power. Considering the above numerical example and concentrating
on the buyer-driven channel, suppose that the buyer offers both two-part linear and
two-part nonlinear contracts. The buyer’s relative benefits are negative when, for
instance, [c, s] = [3.2, 6.5] and [c, s] = [1, 6.3] under the two-part linear and non-linear
contracts, respectively. Therefore, even under two-part contracts, it is not necessarily
more beneficial for the buyer to act as the leader rather than as the follower. A
similar observation is true for the supplier-driven channel as well. Even under the
two-part nonlinear contract, the supplier may achieve less profit as the leader than as
the follower when, for instance, [c, s] = [3.6, 5.7]. Due to the existence of information
asymmetry, being the leader is not necessarily as beneficial as being the follower, even
under more general contracts. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the relative value of power
shifting under three types of contracts in full and incomplete information cases from
the buyer’s and supplier’s perspectives, respectively. Assuming that c = 1, Figure 4
provides a comparison of the corresponding three types of contracts for the buyer-
driven channel. We let Πb2 = pi
∗
B,BA2−pi∗B,SA2 and Πb3 = pi∗B,BA3−pi∗B,SA3, so that Πb2
and Πb3 represent the relative values of power shifting for the buyer under two-part
linear and nonlinear contracts with an information asymmetry consideration. Also,
we let ΠbF1 = pi
∗
B,BF1 − pi∗B,SF1 and ΠbF2 = pi∗B,BF2 − pi∗B,SF2, so that ΠbF1 and ΠbF2
represent the relative values of the power shifting to the buyer under the one-part and
two-part linear contracts with full information. Similarly, Πs1 = pi
∗
S,SA1−pi∗S,BA1, Πs2 =
pi∗S,SA2−pi∗S,BA2, Πs3 = pi∗S,SA3−pi∗S,BA3, ΠsF1 = pi∗S,SF1−pi∗S,BF1, ΠsF2 = pi∗S,SF2−pi∗S,BF2.
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Figure 4 The Impact of Power Structure, Information Asymmetry, and Contract Type
on the Buyer’s Profit
The corresponding illustration for the supplier-driven channel is presented in Figure
5. Figure 4 illustrates that the two-part linear contract always dominates the one-part
linear contract under full information, i.e., the relative value of the power shifting is
always higher for the buyer under the two-part linear contract than under the one-
part linear contract. This is consistent with Theorem 3, so the buyer extracts all
of the profits of the channel. Also, in Figure 4, under full information, the relative
value of the power shifting to the buyer depends purely on the contract type. Under
incomplete information, the one-part linear contract dominates the two-part contracts
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Figure 5 The Impact of Power Structure, Information Asymmetry, and Contract Type
on the Supplier’s Profit
when s is small (s < s1), whereas the two-part linear contract dominates both the
one-part linear and the two-part nonlinear contracts when s is large (s > s2). The two-
part nonlinear contract dominates the other two types of contracts when s1 < s < s2.
Obviously, no contract always dominates the other two under asymmetric information
where the relative value of the power shifting to the buyer does not purely depend
on the contract type due to the existence of information asymmetry. Figure 5 also
confirms that the relative value of power shifting does not depend purely on the
contract type from the supplier’s perspective.
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These numerical results imply that information asymmetry dramatically reduces
the benefits of possessing the bargaining power as well as the benefits of contract
flexibility. Therefore, bargaining power and/or more general contracts alone are not
necessarily helpful for extracting significant benefits in cases of incomplete informa-
tion.
III.4. Summary
In this chapter, we explore the impact of power structure, information asymmetry,
and contract type on the joint and individual profits in a two-stage supply chain with
a single-product. Considering the buyer-driven channel, we derive optimal supply
contracts with information asymmetry considerations. We show that the impact of
information asymmetry on the buyer’s profit margin is quite different under different
types of contracts. Under the one part linear contract, information asymmetry de-
creases the buyer’s profit margin. Under the two-part linear contract, the impact of
information asymmetry depends on the buyer’s estimation accuracy. Under the two-
part nonlinear contract, information asymmetry increases the buyer’s profit margin.
We also show that, from the system’s perspective, the buyer-driven channel is
more efficient than the supplier-driven channel under the corresponding one-part lin-
ear contract. We confirm the common wisdom that the bargaining power is beneficial
for both the buyer and the supplier and that the value of possessing bargaining power
is higher under more general contract types in full information cases. However, when
information asymmetry exists in the supply chain, the bargaining power is not nec-
essarily beneficial for either party and the common wisdom does not hold. Thus, it
is not always wise for the buyer or the supplier to pursue the bargaining power when
accurate information is not available. In addition, more general types of contracts
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may not increase the benefits of possessing power when information asymmetry ex-
ists. That is, the value of the bargaining power may be smaller under more general
contract types. Hence, the party without accurate information may not benefit from
having power even when a two-part nonlinear contract is allowed which means that
sometimes one can forfeit the bargaining power and still gain higher profit. Our
investigations are highlighted below:
• The design of different types of optimal contracts for a buyer-driven channel
with full information sharing.
• The design of different types of optimal contracts for a buyer-driven channel
with incomplete information of cost structure.
• The analysis of the impact of power structure and information asymmetry on
supply chain performance under different types of contracts.
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CHAPTER IV
SUPPLY UNCERTAINTY
The existing supply contract design literature ignores supply uncertainty issues. That
is, this literature assumes that when an order is placed, it is either filled immediately
(the case of zero lead time) or after a deterministic, or perhaps random, lead time.
In reality, the supply of a product may sometimes be interrupted due to suppliers’
random equipment breakdowns, maintenance durations, delays in raw material sup-
ply, etc. Hence, supply availability remains an important, but generally overlooked,
issue. Another reason for unpredictability in the supply process is uncertainty in the
yield quantity/quality due to the random proportion of defective items received.
A properly designed supply contract provides an opportunity to improve system-
wide profits under supply uncertainty by explicitly defining how to share the cost and
risk caused by this uncertainty, i.e., how to coordinate the channel. With cost-sharing,
the buyer can order more in each period so as to achieve optimal system-wide profits
(therefore, the supplier and the buyer have a bigger pie to share) without increasing
her cost. This is the main idea that we implement in designing an optimal contract
with supply uncertainty considerations.
As we have discussed in Chapter III, the power structure plays a key role in
supply contract design. Therefore, it is important to first build a fundamental model
that considers power structure and supply uncertainty and to present a framework
on which we may develop more dedicated contractual mechanisms. Therefore, the re-
minder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section IV.1 presents a framework that
incorporates power structure and supply uncertainty. Section IV.2 designs optimal
contracts with continuous deterministic demand. Under a stochastic single-period
demand, supply contracts are addressed in section IV.3. Concluding remarks are
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provided in Section IV.4.
IV.1. Optimal Contracts under Power Structure and Supply Uncertainty
In this section, we develop a one-supplier-one-buyer model in a single period that con-
siders power structure and supply uncertainty. Note that supply uncertainty refers to
several situations including supply availability, yield quantity, and yield quality. To
develop the fundamental model and to provide insights into the dynamics of the chan-
nel, we assume that the supply availability and yield quantity is in statistical control.
That is, the supplier’s production process generates a known, constant proportion of
defective items p¯ (such an assumption has been made previously in the literature by
Affisco et al. 2002 and Cheng 1991). Also, we assume that the demand is determin-
istic price-sensitive. Under this setting, the analysis to derive the supplier’s optimal
production lot size q1, or the buyer’s optimal order quantity Q1, is the same as that
without a supply uncertainty consideration (q2 or Q2) after adjustment with factor
p¯, that is, (1 − p¯)q1 = q2 or (1 − p¯)Q1 = Q2. Without loss of generality, we assume
that p¯ = 0 in this section. However, even if each product is non-defective, the design,
functions, and other aspects of the products may also affect the customer’s satisfac-
tion, and thus, the market demand. We assume that yield quality τ is a measurable
attribute with values in the interval [0,∞). Also, we assume that the market demand
function is linear in price and quality:
d = a− bp+ cτ.
The supplier has the option to improve the quality level with investment. The
investment cost function is given by
C = (ν + ζτ)d+ κ+ ητ 2.
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Such an assumption has been made previously in the literature by Banker et al.
(1998). Thus, the quality level selected by the supplier affects total cost in two ways:
1. Investment in a quality improvement program increases fixed production costs.
The fixed cost κ+ ητ 2 is increasing and convex at the quality level τ .
2. The quality level also has an impact on the production cost per unit. Specifi-
cally, ν denotes the variable production costs per unit not including the quality related
costs. Given a quality level τ selected by the supplier, the unit variable cost increases
by ζτ .
To develop the framework with power structure and supply uncertainty consider-
ations, we study the simple contract design in which the supplier decides the quality
level and the wholesale price and the buyer decides the retail price. Additional dedi-
cated contractual mechanisms can be further developed based on the model that we
present in this section. First we study the case where the supplier is the leader of the
channel. The price and quality decisions take place in the following sequence in time:
i) Supplier (manufacturer) selects his quality level; buyer (retailer) observes the
quality level;
ii) Supplier (manufacturer) selects the wholesale price;
iii) Buyer (retailer) selects the retail price.
Our model also reflects the assumption that price decisions are made after quality
decisions, since the choice of a quality level reflects a long-term decision which cannot
be changed as easily or as frequently as price. To solve this three-stage game, we first
calculate the optimal retail price for the buyer assuming a given quality level and
wholesale price, and then determine the optimal wholesale price assuming a given
quality level. Lastly, the optimal quality level is decided for the supplier.
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The profit functions of the supplier and buyer are given by:
piS = (w − ν − ζτ)(a− bp+ cτ)− κ− ητ 2, (4.1)
piB = (p− w)(a− bp+ cτ). (4.2)
For a given quality level and wholesale price, the first-order condition character-
izing the optimal retail price is given by
∂piB
∂p
= (a− bp+ cτ)− b(p− w) = 0.
We obtain the optimal retail price for a given quality level and wholesale price
as follows:
p =
a
2b
+
w
2
+
cτ
2b
. (4.3)
Substituting (4.3) into (4.1), we have
piS = (w − ν − ζτ)(a
2
− bw
2
+
cτ
2
)− κ− ητ 2.
The first-order condition characterizing the optimal wholesale price is given by
∂piS
∂w
= (
a
2
− bw
2
+
cτ
2
)− b
2
(w − ν − ζτ) = 0.
Thus, we obtain the optimal wholesale price for a given quality level:
w =
a
2b
+
cτ
2b
+
ζτ
2
+
ν
2
. (4.4)
Substituting (4.4) into (4.3), we have
p =
1
4b
(3a+ 3cτ + bν + bητ). (4.5)
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Substituting (4.4) into (4.1), we have
piS = (
a
2b
+
cτ
2b
− ν
2
− ζτ
2
)(
a
4
+
cτ
4
− bζτ
4
− bν
4
)− κ− ητ 2.
The first-order condition characterizing the optimal quality level is given by
∂piS
∂τ
= (
c
2b
− ζ
2
)(
a
4
+
cτ
4
− bζτ
4
− bν
4
) + (
c
4
− bζ
4
)(
a
2b
+
cτ
2b
− ν
2
− ζτ
2
)− 2ητ = 0.
Finally, we obtain the optimal quality level
τ =
aζ − ac
b
+ cν − bζν
c2
b
− 2cζ + bζ2 − 8η . (4.6)
Now we study the case when the supplier is the follower in the channel. The
price and quality decisions take place in the following sequence in time:
i) Supplier (manufacturer) selects his quality level; buyer (retailer) observes the
quality level;
ii) Buyer (retailer) announces her profit margin m;
iv) Supplier (manufacturer) selects the wholesale price.
REMARK 2 Note that here the buyer announces only her profit margin while in
Chapter III the buyer announces both the profit margin and the price multiplier. Thus,
the buyer has less bargaining power in this section than in Chapter III. An analysis
considering both the profit margin and a price multiplier can be easily conducted based
on the framework in this section.
To solve this three-stage game, we first calculate the optimal wholesale price
assuming a given quality level and the buyer’s profit margin, and then we determine
the optimal profit margin assuming a given quality level. Lastly, the optimal quality
level is determined.
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The profit function of the supplier is given by:
piS = (w − ν − ζτ)(a− b(w +m) + cτ)− κ− ητ 2. (4.7)
The first-order condition characterizing the optimal retail price for a given quality
level and the buyer’s profit margin is as follows
∂piS
∂w
= (a− b(w +m) + cτ)− b(w − ν − ζτ) = 0.
We obtain the optimal wholesale price for a given quality level and the buyer’s
profit margin:
w =
1
2b
(a− bm+ cτ + bν + bζτ). (4.8)
Substituting (4.8) into (4.2), we have
piB = m(a− bm− 1
2
(a− bm+ cτ + bν + bζτ) + cτ).
The first-order condition characterizing the optimal profit margin for a given
quality level is
∂piB
∂m
= (a− bm− 1
2
(a− bm+ cτ + bν + bζτ) + cτ)− bm
2
= 0.
Thus, we obtain the optimal profit margin for a given quality level:
m =
1
2b
(a+ cτ − bν − bζτ). (4.9)
Since p = w +m, we have
p =
1
4b
(3a+ 3cτ + bν + bητ). (4.10)
Recalling (4.5), note that the optimal retial prices are the same under both
channels for a given quality level τ .
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Substituting (4.9) into (4.7), we have
piS =
1
2
(
1
4b
(a+ cτ + 3bν + 3bζτ)− ν − ζτ)(a+ cτ − 1
4
(3a+ 3cτ
+bν + bζτ))− κ− ητ 2.
The first-order condition characterizing the optimal quality level is given by
∂piS
∂τ
=
1
32
(
c
b
− ζ)(a+ cτ − bν − bζτ) + 1
32
(c− bζ)(a
b
+
cτ
b
− ν − bζτ)− 2ητ = 0.
Finally, we obtain the optimal quality level:
τ =
aζ − ac
b
+ cν − bζν
c2
b
− 2cζ + bζ2 − 32η . (4.11)
Comparing the quality levels under two power structures, we obtain the following
theorem.
THEOREM 13 The optimal quality level is higher when the supplier is the follower
of the channel than when he is the leader.
Proof: It is easy to check by comparing (4.6) with (4.11). ¥
Theorem 13 shows that usually the supplier maintains a higher quality level
when he does not have the dominant bargaining power in the channel. Since the
buyer’s optimal retail prices are the same under both power structures for a given
quality level, the buyer will sell products at a higher price when she has the dominant
bargaining power according to (4.10). The supplier will also increase the wholesale
price accordingly. Therefore, it is important to take the power structure and supply
uncertainty into account when designing supply contracts. Now we have presented
the general framework with power structure and supply uncertainty considerations.
Further investigation of more subtle considerations of supply uncertainty can be con-
ducted under the general framework we have presented. In the next section, we will
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consider an infinite planning horizon problem with continuous deterministic demand,
in which the proportion of defective items p¯ has to be treated carefully.
IV.2. Optimal Contracts under Deterministic Demand
In this section, we seek to improve supply chain efficiency by designing supply chain
contracts that include lot sizing and quality (defective items) considerations. Specif-
ically, we consider a supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a single buyer
where the supplier ships in response to orders from the buyer on a lot-for-lot basis. A
proportion of products is defective in each lot. We investigate two cases. In the first
case, the quality level is fixed and the buyer is seeking proper contracts that promotes
cooperation with the supplier in order to reduce the system total cost and to prop-
erly share the savings. In the second case, the buyer initiates a supplier development
program and helps the supplier improve his product quality level. Also, the buyer
offers contracts as a formal mutual commitment to specify the targeted quality level,
to share the investment expense to improve quality level and to distribute the result-
ing savings between both parties. In the first case, one critical piece of information
that the buyer must have when offering contracts is the supplier’s product quality
level since the buyer needs to specify her lot size decision accordingly. However, the
supplier may not be willing to share his full knowledge with the buyer because, for
instance, there is lack of mutual trust or the supplier is an opportunist. In the sec-
ond case, the knowledge of how much total effort and investment must be spent to
improve the current quality to a certain level is also critical to the buyer offering con-
tracts. It may depend on the supplier’s current production conditions, management
effectiveness, employee training level, etc. Again, the supplier may hesitate to release
all of the information. Therefore, to design implementable supply chain contracts, we
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need to address the following questions:
• How can we design optimal contracts for the buyer when information asymmetry
exists in the system?
• What is the impact of information asymmetry on the system and the individual
parties?
To examine the situation where information asymmetry exists, we adapt the
principal-agent contracting approach and derive optimal menus of contracts for the
buyer. Our analysis leads to several interesting observations. Firstly, we show that
the buyer will order a larger lot size than the channel optimum when she has incom-
plete information of the supplier’s quality level. That is, the buyer tends to order
more than the optimum to guarantee that she will have a large enough inventory of
good units to reduce the average setup costs under asymmetric information. Sec-
ondly, a contract may be less effective than no form of contract when information
asymmetry exists, which occurs when the hazard rate of the buyer’s estimation of the
supplier’s quality level is small. Thirdly, when the buyer initiates a supplier develop-
ment program to help the supplier improve his quality level, asymmetric information
about the investment sensitivity evokes a lower quality requirement from the buyer
than when the buyer has full information. Fourthly, the buyer may give up the sup-
plier development program if her estimated hazard rate of the supplier’s investment
sensitivity is significantly small. Finally, through numerical examples, we show that
variation in the buyer’s estimation impairs her capability of extracting savings from
the supplier while she can extract all of the savings when she has full information
of the system. To our best knowledge, this work is the first attempt in the supply
chain contract literature to investigate the effect of lot sizing, quality information,
and supplier development programs.
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IV.2.1. Supply Uncertainty in Statistical Control
We consider a stylistic setting in which a single supplier ships on a lot-for-lot basis
in response to orders from a single buyer. Demand is deterministic. To concentrate
explicitly on the quality issue in our analysis, we assume in this setting that the sup-
plier’s inventory carrying cost is negligible or that the supplier’s production rate is
infinite so that the supplier bears no inventory cost. This setting can be easily ex-
tended to a considerable carrying cost setting, however. Under our stated conditions,
the joint economic lot size (JELS) of the channel may be obtained by minimizing the
joint total relevant cost as
Cj(Q) =
D
Q
(Ss + Sb) +
Q
2
hb,
where
D: annual demand or usage of the item,
Sb: buyer’s ordering cost per order,
Ss: supplier’s setup cost per setup,
hb: buyer’s annual inventory carrying cost,
Q: buyer’s order lot size in units.
The result of classical optimization yields the following formula:
Q∗j =
√
2D(Ss + Sb)
hb
. (4.12)
The implicit assumption in this derivation is that all units produced by the supplier, in
response to the buyer’s order, are of acceptable quality. This is a strong assumption,
and below we will analyze cases where defective units exist.
Let us look at a situation where the supplier operates a process that is in statis-
tical control. That is, the process generates a known, constant proportion of defective
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items, p (such an assumption has been made previously in the literature by Affisco
et al. 2002 and Cheng 1991). Under these circumstances, Deming (1981) proves that
the buyer should consider only two inspection policies on receiving the parts from the
supplier – zero inspection or 100% inspection. Full inspection is preferred when the
cost of inspecting an incoming item is small compared to the cost of a defective item
being released to the buyer’s production process. We assume this to be the situation
for the present research. To be consistent with Deming’s ideas, we further assume
that the buyer’s inspection process is perfect, and that all rejected parts are disposed
of by the supplier at his own expense.
Based on this scenario, we now adjust the model for the quality factor to provide
the benchmark for the channel. The joint total relevant cost including quality may
be written as
CJ(Q, p¯) =
D(Ss + Sb)
p¯Q
+
p¯Qhb
2
+
D
p¯
[(1− p¯)CM + CN ], (4.13)
where
p¯ proportion of good items produced by the supplier’s process,
CM supplier’s cost of disposing defective items per unit,
CN buyer’s cost of inspection per unit.
The implicit assumption in the structure of the cost function (4.13) is that defective
units are detected before they go into the buyer’s inventory and are immediately
returned to the supplier. The result of classical optimization yields the following
formula for the quality-adjusted JELS:
Q∗J1 =
√
2D(Ss + Sb)
hbp¯2
. (4.14)
Noting that in Expression (4.14), if p¯ = 1, then the quality is perfect and the quality-
adjusted JELS simply reduces to the basic JELS expressed in Expression (4.12). Also
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note that Q∗J1 is inversely related to p¯. This is intuitively evident because the required
joint lot size is smaller if more items in the lot are acceptable.
Now, we formally introduce the notion that the system described above is being
managed by two independent entities. We first examine the case in which the supplier
and the buyer do not coordinate. Then, the supplier’s and the buyer’s total costs,
denoted by Cs1 and Cb1, respectively, may be written as
Cs1 =
DSs
p¯Q
+
D
p¯
(1− p¯)CM ,
Cb1 =
DSb
p¯Q
+
p¯hbQ
2
+
D
p¯
CN .
It is easy to derive the optimal lot size of the buyer:
Q∗b1 =
√
2DSb
hbp¯2
. (4.15)
In the absence of some form of coordination, the resulting lot size is smaller than
the joint optimum, that is, Q∗b1 < Q
∗
J1, and thus, the system’s total cost increases.
To improve the system’s performance and thus to increase the competence of the
channel, the buyer may seek to coordinate with the supplier. In the next section, we
will show that the contracting approach may reduce the system’s cost by modifying
the structure of the relationships contractually in order to more closely align the
individual incentives with the channel optimum.
IV.2.2. Contracting in Supply Uncertainty
With the facilitation of a contract, the buyer may build up a long-term partnership
with the supplier by delineating mutual concessions that favor the persistence of the
business relationship and make its terms more explicit. Obviously, the fundamental
term in the contract is the proper lot size to improve the system’s savings. Also, the
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way to distribute the total savings to each party is a critical term. Therefore, in the
next section, we design supply contracts based on lot size and the buyer’s sharing of
savings when each party has full information of the system. When we closely examine
both parties’ objectives, we can see that, on one hand, both parties are glad to see
more system savings so that they have a bigger pie to share; on the other hand, each
party seeks to take more of the total savings. Due to these conflicting objectives,
they may not be willing to share their private information. One critical piece of
information is the product quality level p¯. It determines the optimal lot size of the
system and the total realizable savings. Therefore, in Section IV.2.2.2, we design
supply contracts based on lot size and the buyer’s sharing of the savings when the
buyer has incomplete information of p¯.
IV.2.2.1. Coordination on Lot Size Q under Full Information
It is clear that by coordinating on the jointly optimal lot sizeQ∗J1, rather than choosing
Q∗b1, both supplier and buyer will be better off. Analogously to the basic principle
of the joint economic lot sizing literature (see, e.g., Banerjee 1986, Lal and Staelin
1984, and Monahan 1984), we know that both parties will reduce their total costs
by coordinating on Q∗J1; i.e., Cs1(Q
∗
b1)−Cs1(Q∗J1) ≥ Cb1(Q∗J1)−Cb1(Q∗b1). The buyer
can implement this by placing her order lot size at Q∗J1 to the supplier and specifying
that a sharing rate of L ∈ [Cb1(Q∗J1) − Cb1(Q∗b1), Cs1(Q∗b1) − Cs1(Q∗J1)] be charged to
the supplier in return for the buyer’s choosing Q = Q∗J1. Under full information,
the buyer can set the sharing rate at L = Cs1(Q
∗
b1) − Cs1(Q∗J1), extracting all of the
savings from the supplier. Let Cmaxs be the highest total net costs (after sharing) under
which the supplier is still willing to contract with the buyer. With full information,
the buyer can impose a sharing rate L = Cmaxs − Cs1(Q∗J1), pushing the supplier to
incur the highest costs he will accept while keeping all remaining cost savings for
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herself. However, such a rate L, and the jointly optimal lot size Q∗J1, depend on the
supplier’s product quality p¯, so the buyer must know the supplier’s product quality.
In practice, this is often an unrealistic assumption, and below we show how the buyer
can offer a menu of contracts when she does not know the exact product quality p¯.
IV.2.2.2. Coordination under Incomplete Information of p¯ with Contract
(Q(p¯), L(p¯))
To address this problem, we follow the approach outlined in Laffont and Tirole (1993).
The buyer is the entity taking the initiative and, therefore, is the principal, but the
supplier holds private information about his product quality p¯. Assume the buyer
holds a prior distribution F (·), differentiable on its domain [pL, pU ] with 0 < pL <
pU ≤ 1, density f(·), mean µp¯ and standard deviation δp¯. We make a common
assumption as follows:
ASSUMPTION 4 Increasing hazard rate:
d
dp¯
(
f(p¯)
1− F (p¯)
)
≥ 0.
Many common distributions satisfy Assumption 4, including uniform, normal, logistic,
chi-squared, and exponential; see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1989) for details on the
hazard rate. Instead of proposing a single contract (Q,L) as in section IV.2.2.1, the
buyer now offers a menu of contracts (Q,L(Q)), letting the supplier choose a specific
pair from the menu. To model the contracting process, we parameterize each Q and
L on p¯. Note that offering a (Q(p¯), L(p¯)) menu is equivalent to a (Q,L(Q)) menu,
although the equivalence relation need not exist in the closed form. The supplier’s
product quality p¯ can be inferred from the (Q(p¯), L(p¯)). The contracting steps are:
Step 1. The supplier knows his product quality p¯; the buyer does not.
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Step 2. The buyer offers a menu (Q(·), L(·)), linking Q(pˆ) to compensation rate
L(pˆ) for whatever product quality pˆ the supplier announces.
Step 3. The supplier chooses a contract (Q(pˆ), L(pˆ)), effectively announcing pˆ.
Step 4. Production and delivery lot size are fixed at Q(pˆ), and the supplier pays
sharing rate L(pˆ).
We make a common assumption here that contracting is a one-shot process, so
that renegotiation is not allowed. From the revelation principle (Laffont and Tirole
1993), we can restrict our attention to menus of contracts in which the supplier an-
nounces his product quality truthfully. The intuitive explanation of the revelation
principle is that the buyer can predict what product quality pˆ any supplier with true
quality p¯ will announce, so she can take this knowledge of pˆ(p¯) into account in de-
signing the menu (Q(·), L(·)). This allows us to formulate an incentive-compatibility
constraint, which ensures that a supplier with product quality p¯ will indeed announce
pˆ = p¯. The optimization problem S1 faced by a supplier with true product quality p¯,
who has to choose what product quality pˆ to announce, is
S1 min Cs1(p¯, pˆ) =
DSs
p¯Q(pˆ)
+
D
p¯
(1− p¯)CM + L(pˆ). (4.16)
Letting Q′(pˆ) and L′(pˆ) denote the first derivatives of Q(pˆ) and L(pˆ) with respect to
pˆ respectively, the first-order condition of (4.16) for the supplier to minimize his own
cost requires
− DSs
p¯Q2(pˆ)
Q′(pˆ) + L′(pˆ) = 0. (4.17)
In fact, (4.17) is also sufficient to provide the optimal product quality pˆ for the
supplier’s optimization problem S1 (see proof of proposition 11). Inducing truthful
revelation is equivalent to ensuring that the optimum is reached at pˆ = p¯; hence, we
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can formulate the incentive-compatibility constraint:
IC1 : L′(p¯) =
DSs
p¯Q2(p¯)
Q′(p¯), ∀p¯ ∈ [pL, pU ]. (4.18)
To make the contract acceptable to the supplier, regardless of p¯, total costs under the
contract may not exceed some predetermined and commonly known cost limit Cmaxs .
This is formulated as an individual rationality constraint:
IR1 : Cs1(p¯, p¯) ≤ Cmaxs , ∀p¯ ∈ [pL, pU ]. (4.19)
To find the optimal menu of contracts, the buyer solves the following problem:
B1 min
Q(·),L(·)
∫ pU
pL
[
DSb
p¯Q(p¯)
+
Q
2
p¯hb +
D
p¯
CN − L(p¯)]f(p¯)dp¯
s.t. (IC1), (IR1), ∀p¯ ∈ [pL, pU ].
Solving the optimal control problem, B1 yields the optimal menu of contracts
below.
PROPOSITION 11 When the supplier holds private information about p¯, the op-
timal menu of contracts (Q∗JA(p¯), L
∗
JA(p¯)), is such that:
Q∗JA =
√
2D(Ss + Sb +
Ss(1−F (p¯))
p¯f(p¯)
)
hbp¯2
, ∀p¯ ∈ [pL, pU ], (4.20)
L∗JA
′(p¯) =
DSs
p¯Q∗JA
2(p¯)
Q∗JA
′(p¯), ∀p¯ ∈ [pL, pU ]. (4.21)
Proof: The proof relies on some fundamental results from optimal control theory as
outlined below (see Kamien and Schwartz (1981), pp. 142-146 for details.). Letting
h(p¯) = [
DSb
p¯Q(p¯)
+
Q
2
p¯hb +
D
p¯
CN − L(p¯)]f(p¯),
g1 =
DSs
p¯Q2(p¯)
u, and
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g2 = u = Q
′(p¯),
the above problem B1 can be expressed as
min
∫ pU
pL
h(p¯)dp¯ (4.22)
s.t. L′(p¯) = g1, (4.23)
Q′(p¯) = g2, (4.24)
IR1 : Cs1(p¯, p¯) ≤ Cmaxs (4.25)
The necessary conditions for optimality can be stated in terms of the Hamiltonian
H = h+ λ1g1 + λ2g2.
These conditions include the state equations given by Constraints (4.23) and (4.24),
the multiplier equations given by
λ′1 = −
∂H
∂L
= −
(
∂h
∂L
+ λ1
∂g1
∂L
+ λ2
∂g2
∂L
)
, λ′2 = −
∂H
∂p¯
= −
(
∂h
∂p¯
+ λ1
∂g1
∂p¯
+ λ2
∂g2
∂p¯
)
,
and the optimality condition given by
∂H
∂u
=
DSs
p¯Q2
λ1 + λ2 = 0. (4.26)
Then, it is easy to show that λ′1(p¯) = f(p¯) and λ1(p¯) = F (p¯)− 1, whereas
λ′2 = −[−
DSb
p¯Q2
f(p¯) +
1
2
p¯hbf(p¯)− 2λ1DSs
p¯Q3
u], (4.27)
Differentiating (4.26), we have
λ′2 = −[
DSs
p¯Q2
f(p¯)− DSs
p¯2Q2
λ1 − 2λ1DSs
p¯Q3
u]. (4.28)
Substituting (4.28) into (4.27) leads to (4.20). Since we have ignored Expression
(4.25) in the above discussion, we need to determine whether or not it is satisfied for
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all p¯ ≥ pL. Recalling Expression (4.16), Cs1(p¯, p¯) is decreasing in p¯ because
dCs1(p¯)
dp¯
= − DSs
p¯2Q(p¯)
− D
p¯2
< 0.
Consequently, we can set L(pL) such that Expression (4.25) is binding.
To prove that IC1 (4.18) is sufficient for the supplier’s optimization problem, we
use a contradiction analogous to that in Laffont and Tirole (1993).
Assume there is a pˆ 6= p¯ such that Cs1(p¯, pˆ) < Cs1(p¯, p¯). This is equivalent to∫ pˆ
p¯
∂
∂x
[Cs1(p¯, x)]dx < 0.
Since
∂
∂x
[Cs1(x, x)] = 0
for all x, so that the previous expression is equivalent to
∫ pˆ
p¯
[
∂
∂x
[Cs1(p¯, x)]− ∂
∂x
[Cs1(x, x)]]dx < 0,
which in turn is equivalent to
∫ pˆ
p¯
∫ p¯
x
∂
∂x∂u
[Cs1(u, x)]dudx < 0. (4.29)
Since Q(p¯) is decreasing in p¯ according to Assumption 4, it is easy to verify that
∂
∂x∂u
[Cs1(u, x)] =
DSs
u2Q2(x)
∂Q(x)
∂x
< 0.
So, if pˆ > p¯, then x > p¯ for all x ∈ [p¯, pˆ], so that the double integral in (4.29) is
positive, which is a contradiction. A similar contradiction follows for the case pˆ < p¯.
If the prior distribution F (p¯) is uniform, we have
Q∗JA =
√
2D(Ss + Sb + Ss(
pU
p¯
− 1))
hbp¯2
,
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and Q∗JA is decreasing in p¯, so the incentive-compatibility constraint is sufficient for
the supplier’s optimization problem. ¥
Based on Proposition 11, we can explicitly examine the system’s performance
and individual decisions.
THEOREM 14 When the supplier holds private information about p¯, the buyer’s
realized lot size is larger than the channel optimum. It holds that Q∗JA ≥ Q∗J1 > Q∗b1.
Further, the realized costs of the decentralized channel without contract (CJ(Q
∗
b1)),
with contract and full information (CJ(Q
∗
J1)), and with contract and asymmetric
information (CJ(Q
∗
JA)), satisfy the following relationships:
1. CJ(Q
∗
J1) ≤ CJ(Q∗JA) < CJ(Q∗b1) if
1− F (p¯)
p¯f(p¯)
< 1 +
Ss
Sb
; (4.30)
In this case, contracting is more effective than no form of contract;
2. CJ(Q
∗
J1) ≤ CJ(Q∗b1) ≤ CJ(Q∗JA) if
1− F (p¯)
p¯f(p¯)
≥ 1 + Ss
Sb
; (4.31)
In this case, contracting is less effective than no form of contract.
Proof: Q∗JA ≥ Q∗J1 > Q∗b1 follows directly from Proposition 11.
To compare CJ(Q
∗
JA) with CJ(Q
∗
b1), recalling expression (4.13), we need only to
compare
D(Ss + Sb)
p¯Q∗JA
+
p¯Q∗JAhb
2
with
D(Ss + Sb)
p¯Q∗b1
+
p¯Q∗b1hb
2
.
Letting
CEOQ(Q) =
D(Ss + Sb)
p¯Q
+
p¯Qhb
2
,
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it is true that
CEOQ(Q)
CEOQ(Q∗J1)
=
1
2
[
Q
Q∗J1
+
Q∗J1
Q
].
It follows that CEOQ(Q
∗
JA) < CEOQ(Q
∗
b1) if Q
∗
JAQ
∗
b1 < Q
∗2
J1. That is, CJ(Q
∗
JA) <
CJ(Q
∗
b1) if
Q∗JA ≤
2D(Ss + Sb)
hbp¯2Q∗b1
. (4.32)
Substituting (4.15) and (4.20) into (4.32), the inequality in (4.32) follows from (4.30).
Similarly, it can be shown that CJ(Q
∗
b1) ≤ CJ(Q∗JA) if (4.31) holds. ¥
Theorem 14 shows that the buyer will order a larger lot size than the channel
optimum when she has incomplete information of the supplier’s product quality. This
is because the buyer does not know the exact quality level and thus she tends to order
more than the optimum in order to guarantee that she will have enough good units
per lot to satisfy demand as well as to reduce the average setup costs. Theorem 14 also
shows that contracting may not always be more efficient than no form of coordination.
If the hazard rate of the buyer’s estimation of the supplier’s true quality level is small,
then (4.31) may hold and thus no contract is more effective. If the ratio Ss/Sb is large,
that is, the potential for performance improvement under a contract is considerable,
contracting tends to be more efficient than no form of coordination. For example,
suppose that Ss = $400/setup, Sb = $250/order, the supplier’s product quality level
p¯ = 0.785, the buyer’s prior distribution of the supplier’s quality level is truncated
normal over the interval [0.75, 0.95] with a mean of 0.85 and a standard deviation of
0.023. Thus, F (p¯) = 0.0024, f(p¯) = 0.3198, we have
1− F (p¯)
p¯f(p¯)
= 3.97 > 1 +
Ss
Sb
= 2.6,
CEOQ(Q
∗
JA)
CEOQ(Q∗b1)
= 1.25.
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If Sb = $100/order, then
1− F (p¯)
p¯f(p¯)
= 3.97 < 1 +
Ss
Sb
= 5,
CEOQ(Q
∗
JA)
CEOQ(Q∗b1)
= 0.85.
Therefore, the buyer’s information structure of the supplier’s quality level p¯ is critical
to contracting efficiency. Sometimes the buyer is unable to improve the system’s
performance by offering a contract due to asymmetric information, especially when
potential improvement is insignificant.
COROLLARY 2 When the buyer holds a prior uniform distribution, CJ(Q
∗
b1) ≥
CJ(Q
∗
JA), ∀p¯ ∈ [pL, pU ] only if
δp¯
µp¯
≤ (1 +
Ss
Sb
)√
3(3 + Ss
Sb
)
. (4.33)
If µp¯ ≥ 0.75, then CJ(Q∗b1) ≥ CJ(Q∗JA), ∀p¯ ∈ [pL, pU ]. Also, if p¯ = µp¯, then CJ(Q∗b1) ≥
CJ(Q
∗
JA).
Proof: When the buyer holds a prior uniform distribution, we have the upper bound
and lower bound of the domain of p¯ as follows:
pL = µp¯ −
√
3δp¯, (4.34)
pU = µp¯ +
√
3δp¯ (4.35)
Substituting (4.34) and (4.35) into (4.31), after simplification, we have (4.33). If
µp¯ ≥ 0.75, noting that pU ≤ 1, we have
δp¯
µp¯
≤ 1
3
√
3
≤ (1 +
Ss
Sb
)√
3(3 + Ss
Sb
)
.
If p¯ = µp¯, the left-hand side of inequality (4.30) can be simplified as
√
3δp¯
µp¯
≤ 1 since pL ≥ 0.
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¥
When the buyer holds a prior uniform distribution, contracting is more efficient
than no form of contract as long as the buyer’s expected quality level µp¯ is high
enough (more than 0.75) or the buyer’s estimation of the quality level is unbiased.
Thus, if the supplier provides high quality products, it is always more efficient for the
buyer to offer a contract to the supplier even when asymmetric information exists. In
the following proposition, we provide the closed form of optimal contracts when the
buyer’s prior distribution of p¯ is uniform.
PROPOSITION 12 When the prior F (p¯) is uniform, and the buyer’s ordering cost
Sb = 0, the optimal menu of contracts are:
Q∗JA =
√
2DSspU
hbp¯3
, ∀p¯ ∈ [pL, pU ], (4.36)
L∗JA = −3
√
hbDSsp¯
2pU
+ Cmaxs +
√
2hbDSspL
pU
− D
pL
(1− pL)CM , ∀p¯ ∈ [pL, pU ].
Proof: When F (p¯) is uniform,
F (p¯) =
p¯− pL
pU − pL ,
and
(1− F (p¯))
p¯f(p¯)
=
pU
p¯
− 1. (4.37)
Thus, substituting (4.37) into (4.20) we have (4.36), and
dQ∗JA
dp¯
= −3Q
∗
JA
2p¯
. (4.38)
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Substituting (4.38) into (4.21) leads to
L∗JA
′(p¯) = − 3DSs
2
√
2DSspU p¯
hb
,
L∗JA(p¯) = −3
√
hbDSsp¯
2pU
+X for some constant X.
To solve for X, solving Cs1(pL, pL) = C
max
s , that is, when (4.19) is binding at p¯ = pL,
leads to
X = Cmaxs +
√
2hbDSspL
pU
− D
pL
(1− pL)CM .
¥
Proposition 12 provides an explicit menu of contracts under the uniform case.
Both the lot size and the sharing rate are decreasing in p¯. A larger lot size Q will lead
to a larger sharing rate L. From the supplier’s perspective, a higher product quality
level will incur a smaller order lot size from the buyer, which results in larger setup
costs and less sharing. This is a tradeoff for the supplier to balance his setup costs
and sharing rate, which is designed by the buyer under the incentive-compatibility
constraint to make sure that the supplier will announce his true product quality.
IV.2.3. Contracting in Supplier Development Program
In this section, we study the case when the buyer initiates a supplier development
program and both parties work closely to improve the supplier’s product quality level
in order to reduce the total costs. We consider p¯ to be a decision variable. From
the perspective of the system, the objective is to minimize the sum of the investment
cost for increasing p¯ and the quality-adjusted joint total relevant cost. Specifically,
we seek to minimize
G(Q, p¯) = iap¯(p¯) + CJ(Q, p¯), (4.39)
125
s.t 0 < p¯0 ≤ p¯ < 1,
where i is the cost of capital; p¯0 is the original proportion of good units produced by
the supplier’s process; ap(p¯) is a convex and strictly increasing investment function
of p¯. Thus, iap¯(p¯) represents the annual investment cost. We use the following
logarithmic form, which is similar to the one employed in Porteus (1986):
ap¯(p¯) = β − αln(1− p¯) 0 < p¯0 ≤ p¯ < 1,
where α denotes the investment sensitivity. The following proposition provides system-
wide optimal quality improvement and determines the lot size decisions in the supplier
development program.
PROPOSITION 13 The optimal lot size and the product quality level are unique
and given by
p¯∗J2 = max{p¯0, p¯∗J3},
Q∗J2 = min{Q∗J0, Q∗J3},
where
p¯∗J3 =
√
(CM + CN)2D2 + 4iα(CM + CN)D − (CM + CN)D
2iα
, (4.40)
Q∗J0 =
√
2D(Ss + Sb)
hbp¯20
,
Q∗J3 =
√
2D(Ss + Sb)
hbp¯∗2J3
. (4.41)
Proof: For a given p¯, there exists a unique optimal lot size Q∗J3 since
∂2G
∂Q2
=
2D(Ss + Sb)
pQ3
> 0
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and (4.41) can be easily obtained from
∂G
∂Q
= 0.
Define Gp¯(p¯) = G(Q
∗
J3(p¯), p¯) so that
Gp¯(p¯) = i(β − αln(1− p¯)) +
√
2hbD(Ss + Sb) +
D
p¯
[(1− p¯)CM + CN ]. (4.42)
Also, let p¯∗J3 denote the optimal minimizer of Gp¯(p¯). It follows that Q
∗
J3(p¯
∗
J3) and p¯
∗
J3
minimizes (4.39). Therefore, in order to complete the proof, it is sufficient to compute
p¯∗J3. Solving
∂Gp¯(p¯)
∂p¯
=
iα
1− p¯ −
(CM + CN)D
p¯2
= 0 (4.43)
for p¯, we have
iαp¯∗2J3 + (CM + CN)Dp¯
∗
J3 − (CM + CN)D = 0,
and (4.40) is easily achieved. Noting that
∂Gp¯(p¯)
∂p¯
|0+ = −∞, ∂Gp¯(p¯)
∂p¯
|1− = +∞,
and
∂2Gp¯(p¯)
∂p¯2
> 0,
we conclude that p¯∗J3 is unique and 0 < p¯
∗
J3 < 1. ¥
Proposition 13 provides the benchmark to the supplier development program.
In the next section, we further investigate the case where both parties are managed
independently, and examine the joint and individual performances.
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IV.2.3.1. Coordination on Lot Size Q and Product Quality p¯ under Full
Information
Here, again, by properly targeting the improved quality level at p¯∗J3, and coordinating
on the jointly optimal lot size Q∗J2 accordingly, both supplier and buyer will be better
off, i.e., G(Q∗b1, p¯0) ≥ G(Q∗J2, p¯∗J3). The buyer can implement this by placing her order
lot size at Q∗J2, urging and committing to help the supplier to improve his product
quality level up to p¯∗J3, and specifying a cost/saving sharing rate L which includes
the buyer’s investment in a supplier development program and the saving-sharing
rate from coordination. Let Cmaxs be the highest total net costs (after sharing) under
which the supplier is still willing to contract with the buyer. With full information, the
buyer can impose a sharing L = Cmaxs −[Cs1(Q∗J2, p¯∗J3)+iap¯(p¯∗J3)], pushing the supplier
to incur the highest costs he will accept while keeping all remaining cost savings for
herself. However, such a sharing L depends on how much total effort and investment
have to be spent to improve the supplier’s quality to a certain level. It may depend
on the supplier’s current production conditions, management effectiveness, employee
training level, etc. Although the supplier is better informed about these conditions,
he may hesitate to release all his information to the buyer. In the next section, we
show how the buyer can offer a menu of contracts when she does not know the exact
value of the supplier’s investment sensitivity α.
IV.2.3.2. Coordination under Incomplete Information about α with Con-
tract (Q(α), p¯(α), L(α))
Now assume that only the supplier observes α. We follow a contracting approach anal-
ogous to that in Section IV.2.2.2. The buyer offers a menu of contracts (Q(·), p¯(·), L(·)),
letting the supplier choose according to the latter’s investment sensitivity α. The con-
128
tracting process is analogous to that in Section IV.2.2.2. We also assume that there
is no renegotiation after the initial contracting.
The buyer holds a prior distribution H(α), differentiable on its domain [α, α¯]
with 0 < α < α¯ < ∞ with density h(α), mean µα and standard deviation δα. We
make a common assumption as follows:
ASSUMPTION 5 Decreasing reverse hazard rate:
d
dα
(
h(α)
H(α)
)
≤ 0.
Many common distributions satisfy Assumption 5, including uniform, normal, logistic,
chi-squared, and exponential; see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1989) and Corbett (2001)
for details on the reverse hazard rate. The optimization problem S2 faced by a
supplier with a true investment sensitivity parameter α and having to choose what αˆ
to announce is
S2 min Cs2(α, αˆ) = i[β − α ln (1− p¯(αˆ))] + DSs
p¯(αˆ)Q(αˆ)
+
D
p¯(αˆ)
(1− p¯(αˆ))CM
+L(αˆ). (4.44)
Similarly to Section IV.2.2.2, we derive the supplier’s incentive-compatibility con-
straint and individual-rationality constraint
IC2 : L′(α) = − iα
1− p¯(α) p¯
′(α) +DSs[
1
p¯2(α)Q(α)
p¯′(α)
+
1
p¯(α)Q2(α)
Q′(α)] +
D
p¯2(α)
p¯′(α)CM , ∀α ∈ [α, α¯],(4.45)
IR2 : Cs2(α, α) ≤ Cmaxs , ∀α ∈ [α, α¯]. (4.46)
To find the optimal menu of contracts, the buyer solves the following problem:
B2 min
Q(·),p¯(·),L(·)
∫ α¯
α
[
DSb
p¯(α)Q(α)
+
Q(α)
2
p¯(α)hb +
D
p¯(α)
CN − L(α)]h(α)dα
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s.t. IC2, IR2, ∀α ∈ [α, α¯].
Solving the optimal control problem, B2 yields the optimal menu of contracts below.
PROPOSITION 14 When the supplier holds private information about α, the op-
timal menu of contracts, (Q∗JAI(α), p¯
∗
JAI(α), L
∗
JAI(α)), is such that:
p¯∗JAI(α) = max{p¯0, p¯∗JAα}, ∀α ∈ [α, α¯],
Q∗JAI(α) = min{Q∗J0, Q∗JAα}, ∀α ∈ [α, α¯],
L′(α) = − iα
1− p¯∗JAI(α)
p¯∗
′
JAI(α) +
D
p¯∗2JAI(α)
p¯∗
′
JAI(α)CM , ∀α ∈ [α, α¯],
where
p¯∗JAα =
√
D2(CM + CN)2 + 4iD(CM + CN)(α+
H(α)
h(α)
)−D(CM + CN)
2i(α + H(α)
h(α)
)
,(4.47)
Q∗JAα =
√
2D(Ss + Sb)
hbp¯∗2JAα
. (4.48)
In addition, p¯∗JAI(α) is decreasing in α and Q
∗
JAI(α) is increasing in α.
Proof: We use an approach similar to that in the proof of Proposition 11. The above
problem B2 can be expressed as
min
∫ α¯
α
h2(α)dα (4.49)
s.t. L′(α) = g1, (4.50)
p¯′(α) = g2, (4.51)
Q′(α) = g3, (4.52)
IR2 : Cs2(α, α) ≤ Cmaxs ,
where
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h2(α) = [
DSb
p¯(α)Q(α)
+
Q(α)
2
p¯(α)hb +
D
p¯(α)
CN − L(α)]h(α),
g1 = − iα
1− p¯(α)u+DSs[
1
p¯2(α)Q(α)
u+
1
p¯(α)Q2(α)
v] +
DCM
p¯2(α)
u,
g2 = p¯
′ = u,
g3 = Q
′ = v.
The necessary conditions for optimality can be stated in terms of Hamiltonian
H2 = h2 + λ1g1 + λ2g2 + λ3g3.
These conditions include the state equations given by Constraints (4.50), (4.51), and
(4.52), the multiplier equations given by
λ′1 = −
∂H2
∂L
= −
(
∂h2
∂L
+ λ1
∂g1
∂L
+ λ2
∂g2
∂L
+ λ3
∂g3
∂L
)
,
λ′2 = −
∂H2
∂p¯
= −
(
∂h2
∂p¯
+ λ1
∂g1
∂p¯
+ λ2
∂g2
∂p¯
+ λ3
∂g3
∂p¯
)
, and
λ′3 = −
∂H2
∂Q
= −
(
∂h2
∂Q
+ λ1
∂g1
∂Q
+ λ2
∂g2
∂Q
+ λ3
∂g3
∂Q
)
,
and the optimality condition given by
∂H2
∂u
= − iα
1− p¯λ1 +
DSs
p¯2Q
λ1 +
D
p¯2
CMλ1 + λ2 = 0, (4.53)
∂H2
∂v
=
DSs
p¯Q2
λ1 + λ3 = 0. (4.54)
Then, it is easy to show that λ1 = H(α) whereas
λ′2 = −[−
DSb
p¯2Q
h(α) +
1
2
Qhbh(α)− D
p¯2
CNh(α)− iα
(1− p¯)2uλ1 −
2DSs
p¯3Q
uλ1 − DSs
p¯2Q2
vλ1
− 2D
p¯3
CMuλ1], (4.55)
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λ′3 = −[−
DSb
p¯Q2
h(α) +
1
2
p¯hbh(α)− DSs
p¯2Q2
uλ1 − 2DSs
p¯Q3
vλ1]. (4.56)
Differentiating (4.53), (4.54) results in
λ′2 = −[−
iα
1− p¯h(α)−
i
1− p¯λ1 −
iα
(1− p¯)2uλ1 +
DSs
p¯2Q
h(α)− 2DSs
p¯3Q
uλ1 − DSs
p¯2Q2
vλ1
+
D
p¯2
CMh(α)− 2D
p¯3
CMuλ1], (4.57)
λ′3 = −[
DSs
p¯Q2
h(α)− DSs
p¯2Q2
uλ1 − 2DSs
p¯Q3
vλ1]. (4.58)
Substituting (4.58) into (4.56), we have (4.48). Substituting (4.57) and (4.48) into
(4.55) leads to
i(α + H(α)
h(α)
)
1− p¯ =
D(CM + CN)
p¯2
. (4.59)
and (4.47) is obtained.
Since we have ignored Expression (4.46) in the above discussion, we need to
determine whether or not it is satisfied for all α ≤ α¯. Recalling Expression (4.44),
Cs2(α) is increasing in α because
dCs2(α)
dα
= −iln(1− p¯(α)) > 0,
Consequently, we can set L(α) such that Expression (4.46) is binding, and this com-
pletes the proof. ¥
Proposition 14 shows that a larger value of investment sensitivity α would result
in a lower quality level p¯, which is intuitively evident since a larger α means a greater
expense for a certain quality level. The buyer’s order lot size increases according to
the lower product quality in order to guarantee a certain amount of realized lot size
p¯Q.
THEOREM 15 The targeted quality level under asymmetric information is lower
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than under full information, that is,
p¯∗JAα ≤ p¯∗J3. (4.60)
The optimal lot size under asymmetric information is larger, that is,
Q∗JAα ≥ Q∗J3. (4.61)
Contracting under asymmetric information is worthwhile only if
D(CM + CN)(1− p¯0)
ip¯20
≥ α+ H(α)
h(α)
. (4.62)
Proof: (4.60) and (4.61) can be easily obtained by comparing (4.40) and (4.41) with
(4.47) and (4.48). Contracting under asymmetric information is worthwhile only if
p¯∗JAα ≥ p¯0. Note that p¯∗JAα is the root of equation (4.59). Thus, we need only to show
that
i(α + H(α)
h(α)
)
1− p¯0 ≤
D(CM + CN)
p¯20
(4.63)
and (4.62) is achieved. ¥
The asymmetric information results in a lower quality requirement from the
buyer. Interestingly, the realized lot size p¯∗JAαQ
∗
JAα is the same as the joint optimal
realized lot size p¯∗J2Q
∗
J2. Recalling (4.13), the joint setup cost and inventory holding
cost are
D(Ss + Sb)
p¯Q
and
p¯Qhb
2
,
respectively. Under an optimal menu of contracts, the resulting setup cost and in-
ventory holding cost are system-wide optimal. However, the buyer specifies a lower
quality level than the optimum to the supplier, which results in a lower investment ex-
pense for the supplier and higher inspection and disposal costs as well. The intuitive
explanation is that since the buyer has incomplete information of the product quality
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level, she will conservatively request a lower quality level. After the buyer specifies
the product quality level, she adjusts her order lot size accordingly to minimize the
total setup and inventory holding cost so that she may ask for more compensation
from the supplier without driving him away.
Contracting under asymmetric information may not be worthwhile. If the reverse
hazard rate of the buyer’s estimation of the supplier’s true investment sensitivity is
small, then (4.62) may not hold and thus no investment will be made. For example,
suppose that D = 1000 units/year, CM = $12/unit, CN = $5/unit, i = 0.1, the
supplier’s original product quality level p¯0 = 0.85, investment sensitivity α = 14600,
the buyer’s prior distribution of the supplier’s investment sensitivity is truncated
normal over the interval [8750, 16250] with a mean of 12500 and a standard deviation
of 1000. Thus, H(α) = 0.9823, f(α) = 0.4399× 10−4, and we have
α +
H(α)
f(α)
= 36929.59 >
D(CM + CN)(1− p¯0)
ip¯20
= 35294.12, p¯∗JAα = 0.845 < p¯0.
Thus, no investment decision will be made. The existence of information asymmetry
may ruin the buyer’s interest in initiating a supplier development program in this
instance.
IV.2.4. Numerical Analysis
We first present an example to illustrate the form of the optimal contract and the
performance of the system and each party. The parameters of the example are as
follows: D = 1000 units/year, Cp = $25/unit, Ss = $400/setup, Sb = $20/order,
r = 0.2, CM = $12/unit, and CN = $5/unit. The initial product quality level is
p¯ = 0.85. Investment may be made in improving the quality with i = 0.1, α = 12500,
and β = −23714. Suppose that the prior distribution of the supplier’s quality level p¯
is uniform over the interval [0.75, 0.95] with a mean of 0.85 and a standard deviation
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of 0.0577. Suppose that the prior distribution of the supplier’s investment sensitivity
α is uniform over the interval [8750, 16250] with a mean of 12500 and a standard
deviation of 2165.13. Thus, the buyer’s estimation of p¯ and α is unbiased in this
example. For simplicity, we assume that the supplier’s highest cost for signing a
contract with the buyer is Cmaxs = 6589.78, which is the same as his total cost with
no form of contract.
Table V presents five cases, including no form of contract, a contract with full
information, a contract with asymmetric information of the quality level p¯, a con-
tract to improve the quality with full information, and a contract with asymmetric
information of the investment sensitivity α. As Table V indicates, when each party
has full information of the system, a contract based on the lot size can help reduce
the total cost of the system by 22.22%, and the buyer extracts all of the savings from
the supplier by initiating the contract. When the buyer has incomplete information
of the supplier’s quality level p¯, the total savings are almost the same as in the full
information case since the buyer’s estimation is unbiased in this example. However,
the buyer can only reduce her own cost by 13.78%, instead of 45.34% as in the full in-
formation case, due to the information asymmetry. The supplier’s cost is reduced by
30.27% at the same time since he has full knowledge of his quality level. If a supplier
development program is initiated by the buyer and both parties reach a contractual
agreement, the total cost of the system can by further reduced by 28.20%, and the
buyer extracts all of the savings from the supplier if she has full information of the
system. If the buyer has incomplete information of the investment sensitivity to im-
prove the quality level, her own cost can be reduced by 43% in contrast to 57.55%
in the full information case. The total savings are almost the same as in the full
information case since the buyer’s estimation of α is unbiased. The supplier’s cost
is reduced by 13.36% at the same time. In this example, we observe that a contract
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Table V Comprehensive Results under Supply Uncertainty
Variable No contract Contract with Contract with Contract to Contract to
full infor. asym. p¯ improve (full) improve (asym. α)
Q 105 482 612 438 446
L - 3496.24 1718.29 3730.80 2905.25
p¯ 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.936 0.919
Supplier’s cost 6589.78 6589.78 4595.01 6589.78 5709.34
% Savings - 0 30.27% 0 13.36%
Buyer’s cost 6329.57 3459.60 5457.27 2686.67 3607.58
% Savings - 45.34% 13.78% 57.55% 43.00%
Total costs 12919.35 10049.38 10052.28 9276.45 9316.92
% Savings - 22.22% 22.19% 28.20% 27.88%
would help reduce the system’s total cost, and a supplier development program would
help achieve further savings. If the buyer has full information of the system, she is
able to extract all of the savings from the supplier. However, information asymme-
try does impair the buyer’s capability to extract savings. Next, we examine further
how the buyer can design contracts under information asymmetry and the impact of
information asymmetry on the system’s and both individuals’ costs.
Figure 6 illustrates the buyer’s contract pairs (Q,L(Q)) when she has incomplete
information of the supplier’s quality level p¯. We observe that a larger lot size Q will
lead to a larger sharing rate L. From the supplier’s perspective, a larger lot size
means a smaller setup cost, and he would receive less savings as well. The tradeoff
for the supplier, which is designed by the buyer under the incentive-compatibility
constraint, is that he balances his setup costs and sharing rate which guarantees that
the supplier will announce his true product quality.
Figure 7 illustrates the relationship of p¯ and L in the buyer’s contract menu
136
Figure 6 Buyer’s Contract Menu (Q,L(Q))
(Q, p¯, L) when she has incomplete information of the supplier’s investment sensitiv-
ity α. We observe that a higher quality expectation p¯ is associated with a smaller
sharing rate L. Recall Proposition 14 which states that the realized lot size p¯Q in
the buyer’s contract menu is the same as the joint optimal realized lot size, and thus
the joint setup cost and inventory holding cost are system-wide optimal. Thus, from
the supplier’s perspective, a lower quality expectation means less investment expense,
larger disposal costs, and less savings received. When the quality expectation is high,
the buyer’s sharing rate drops significantly. This is because the total investment to
improve the quality level increases dramatically, and thus the buyer needs to expend
much more effort and investment to help the supplier improve product quality as
well as to make sure that the supplier is still willing to reveal his true investment
sensitivity under the contract menu.
Obviously, when the buyer has incomplete information of the supplier’s quality
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Figure 7 p¯ and L in Buyer’s Contract Menu (Q, p¯, L)
level p¯ or investment sensitivity α, she is unable to extract all of the savings from the
supplier. Next, we examine explicitly the impact of information asymmetry on the
system’s and both individuals’ costs.
Figure 8 illustrates the impact of the coefficient of variation of the buyer’s esti-
mation of p¯ on the joint total cost T1, the supplier’s cost S1 and the buyer’s cost B1.
It indicates that the buyer’s estimation variation has little impact on the system’s
cost. However, the buyer’s cost increases significantly as the coefficient of variation
increases. That is, the buyer’s capability of extracting savings from the supplier is
considerably impaired if she has information about p¯ that is not accurate. Of course,
the supplier’s benefits from this and his cost are significantly reduced.
Figure 9 illustrates the impact of the coefficient of variation of the buyer’s esti-
mation of α on the joint total cost T2, the supplier’s cost S2 and the buyer’s cost B2.
Again, we observe that the buyer’s capability of extracting savings from the supplier
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Figure 8 The Impact of the Coefficient of Variation δp¯
µp¯
is considerably impaired if she has inaccurate information of α, while the supplier’s
benefits from this and his cost is significantly reduced.
The findings reported here clearly show that ignoring incentive conflicts and qual-
ity information issues can lead to undesirable behavior. The practical implications
are significant. In designing a supply chain, it is tempting to take the perspective of
a central planner and focus on improving overall efficiency. Few supply chains have
any mechanism that can pass for a central planner, so this is rarely an option. This
section proposes a framework for how lot size, quality level, and transactions should
be structured to help reduce supply chain inefficiency due to individual incentives
and private information.
In this section, to concentrate on the supply contract design, we assume that
the supply is in statistical control. In the next section, we further develop the model
when the supply is random.
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Figure 9 The Impact of the Coefficient of Variation δα
µα
IV.2.5. Random Supply
In this section, we present a modification of the well-known single-vendor single-buyer
integrated production-inventory model on the assumption that the percentage of de-
fective items in the accepted lot is a random variable whose probability distribution
is known to management from their experience. We also assume that the defective
items are non-reworkable. We seek to demonstrate more closely how the possible
presence of defective items in the accepted lot affects the structure as well as the
cost of certain production-inventory systems. We present the total expected costs of
the system and provide the optimal solutions. Further, we investigate the effect of
defective items on the system performance. Our findings show that a high percentage
of defective items, together with a large demand, has a significant impact on the total
expected cost.
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IV.2.5.1. Problem Formulation
The problem considered here concerns a single vendor supplying a single buyer with
a product. The vendor manufactures, at a finite rate, in batches and incurs a batch
setup cost. Each batch is despatched to the buyer in a number of shipments. Both
vendor and buyer incur time-proportional holding costs. The buyer has to meet a
fixed, level external demand. We summarize the additional notation below.
R: annual production rate,
hs: annual inventory holding cost per unit for the vendor,
n: an integer multiplier, and thus the vendor’s production batch size is nQ,
TCS: the total expected annual cost for the vendor,
TCB: the total expected annual cost for the buyer,
TCJ : = TCS + TCB, the total expected annual cost for both vendor and buyer.
Under the assumption of perfect quality, Hill (1997) shows that the total annual
costs, denoted by CJ , are:
CJ =
D
nQ
(nSb + Ss) +
hbQ
2
+ hs
[
(n− 1)Q
2
− (n− 2)DQ
2R
]
,
and the joint optimal solution (Q∗∗, n∗∗) satisfies:
Q∗∗(n) =
√
2D(nSb + Ss)
n(hb + hs[(n− 1)− (n−2)DR ])
,
n∗∗(n∗∗ − 1) ≤ Ss[2hsD +R(hb − hs)]
Sbhs(R−D) ≤ n
∗∗(n∗∗ + 1).
However, the quantity accepted may not exactly match the quantity requisitioned
by the buyer due to the existence of defective items. Defective items may occur during
production or in transit, i.e., during transportation or handling. We assume that
the buyer inspects each incoming shipment and returns the defective items to the
vendor. Further, we assume that the inspection time is negligible. We will discuss a
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considerable inspection time case in the concluding section. For simplicity, we assume
that all of the defective items are non-reworkable and have to be disposed of and that
there is no disposal cost or salvage value related to the defective items. The case in
which the defective items are partially reworkable and there is a cost related to the
reworking and disposal can be easily incorporated into our model.
Define p¯i as the percentage of non-defective items in lot i received by the buyer
where the p¯i’s are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables
with cumulative distribution F (·) and 0 < pL ≤ p¯i ≤ pU ≤ 1. E[p¯i] = µ and
V ar[p¯i] = δ
2. Further, we assume that the vendor’s production rate is high enough
so that he can always produce enough units to fulfill the buyer’s order on time within
consecutive shipments to the buyer.
ASSUMPTION 6
QpL
D
>
Q
R
, or R >
D
pL
.
Thus, shortages would not occur.
We use the renewal-reward theorem for deriving an expression of the total ex-
pected long-run average cost. Naturally, this quantity is a function of Q and n. Thus,
the total expected long-run average cost is denoted by TCJ(Q, n). The renewal-reward
theorem simply states that
TCJ(Q, n) =
E[Production cycle cost]
E[Production cycle length]
. (4.64)
The optimal joint policy parameters Q and n can be computed via minimizing
TCJ(Q, n). Hence, the mathematical problem can be stated as
min TCJ(Q, n)
s.t. Q ≥ 0, n ≥ 0, n is an integer.
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Denote
Xi =
p¯iQ
D
, i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Then, the Xi’s are also i.i.d. random variables, which represent the buyer’s replen-
ishment cycle length. Letting S0 = 0 and Si =
∑i
j=1Xj, we define
N(t) = sup{i : Si ≤ t}.
It follows that N(t) is a renewal process that registers the number of shipments
by time t. Since the event {N(t) ≥ i} occurs if, and only if, {Si ≤ t}, we have
P{N(t) ≥ i} = F (i)(tD
Q
), (4.65)
where F (i)(·) denotes the i-fold convolution of F (·).
IV.2.5.2. Expected Production Cycle Length
First, we need to clearly define the cycle since random shipments are involved in each
cycle. We assume that the production of a batch is started as late as possible and
that the despatch of the first shipment returns the vendor’s stock to zero. Recall
Assumption 6: the time to consume the last shipment of one batch will be greater
than the time to produce the first shipment of the next batch, and, therefore, the
despatch of the last shipment of one batch takes place before the production of the
next batch starts. We define each production cycle as starting when the buyer receives
the last shipment of a batch from the vendor and ending when the vendor despatches
the last shipment of the next batch. Therefore, the buyer receives n shipments from
the vendor in each cycle. It follows that
E[Production Cycle Length] = E[
n∑
i=1
Xi] =
nµQ
D
. (4.66)
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IV.2.5.3. Expected Production Cycle Cost
The total expected cost of a production cycle has two components: i) setup costs,
ii) inventory costs. The setup costs can be easily obtained as Ss + nSb. However,
the computation of inventory costs is much more challenging due to the existence of
defective items. We compute the buyer’s and vendor’s inventory costs, respectively,
as follows.
Buyer’s Expected Inventory Cost
Qp¯i units are accepted in the shipment i by the buyer. Thus, the replenishment
cycle time of the buyer is
Qp¯i
D
.
Since the buyer receives n shipments in each production cycle, the buyer’s expected
inventory cost, denoted by E[ICb], is
E[ICb] = E[
n∑
i=1
hb
2
Q2p¯2i
D
] =
nhbQ
2(µ2 + δ2)
2D
(4.67)
Vendor’s Expected Inventory Cost
Since defective items exist in each shipment, and thus the shipment frequency
is random, the shape of the vendor’s inventory profile is stochastic. Therefore, the
computation of the vendor’s expected inventory cost is challenging. We consider two
cases as follows.
Case 1. n = 1
When n = 1, the vendor is implementing a lot-for-lot policy. Q units are pro-
duced in each production batch with the production rate R. Recall Assumption 6
which makes the lot-for-lot policy feasible. It follows that the vendor’s inventory cost,
which becomes deterministic, is
1
2
hs
Q2
R
.
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Case 2. n > 1
Let Is(t) and Ib(t) denote the inventory level at time t of the vendor and the
buyer, respectively. A realization of Is(t) and Ib(t) is depicted in Figure 10.
Figure 10 Inventory Profile under Random Supply
Define
τ =
(n− 1)Q
R
,
which is the production time length of a batch excluding the first shipment. Let T
denote the production cycle length, that is, T =
∑n
i=1Xi. Further, let A0 denote
the triangle area in the vendor’s inventory profile between the beginning of a batch
and the first shipment of the batch in the vendor’s inventory profile. Let A3 denote
the total inventory between the first shipment of a batch and the first shipment right
145
after the end of the batch production, if there is such a shipment; otherwise, let A3
denote the total inventory between the first shipment of a batch and the end of the
batch production. Let A4 denote the total inventory between the first shipment right
after the end of the batch production and the last shipment of the batch.
A0 is deterministic and easily obtained as
A0 =
1
2
Q2
R
.
Now we calculate the expected value of A4. Recall that N(t) registers the number
of shipments by time t. Thus, if N(τ) = n− 1, which means there are no shipments
after the batch production according to the definition of τ , then A4 = 0 since there
are n shipments totally within the production cycle; if N(τ) = n − 2, which means
there is only one shipment after the batch production, then A4 = 0 as well since the
shipment right after the end of the batch production is taken into account by A3. If
N(τ) ≤ n − 3, there are n − 2 − N(τ) shipments within A4 as shown in Figure 11.
Thus, we have
A4 =


0, if N(τ) ≥ n− 2,
∑n−1−N(τ)
i=2 [n− i−N(τ)]pN(τ)+i Q
2
D
, if N(τ) ≤ n− 3 and n ≥ 3.
Thus, E[A4] = 0 if n = 2. When n ≥ 3, note that N(τ) and pN(τ)+i are
independent. We have
E[A4] = E[E[A4|N(τ)]] = Q
2
D
n−3∑
j=0
E[
n−1−j∑
i=2
(n− i− j)pi+j]P (N(τ) = j)
=
µQ2
D
n−3∑
j=0
n−1−j∑
i=2
(n− i− j)P (N(τ) = j)
=
µQ2
2D
n−3∑
j=0
(n− 1− j)(n− 2− j)P (N(τ) = j)
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Figure 11 A Realization of A4
We do not calculate the area of A3 directly. Instead, we calculate the area of the
large triangle first, which is A1 +A2 +A3 in Figure 10. The extra inventory A1 +A2
occurs under the assumption that the vendor keeps producing after the first shipment
of a batch until the first shipment after τ and that there is no shipment in-between.
The total inventory of A2 is the extra stock under the assumption that the vendor
keeps producing after τ until the first shipment after τ . So A1 = 0 if, in fact, there is
no shipment between the first shipment of a batch and the end of production, that is,
N(τ) = 0. Obviously, N(τ) ≤ n− 2 according to Assumption 6, and thus N(τ) = 0
if n = 2. Let A = A1 + A2 + A3. The length of the bottom of A is
Q
D
N(τ)+1∑
i=1
p¯i
and the height of A is
QR
D
N(τ)+1∑
i=1
p¯i.
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It follows that
A =
Q2R
2D2
(
N(τ)+1∑
i=1
p¯i)
2.
A1 is a set of parallelograms as shown in Figure 10. Thus, we have
A1 =


0, if n = 2,
∑N(τ)
i=1
∑N(τ)+1
j=i+1
Q2pj
D
, if n > 2.
A2 can be easily obtained as
A2 =
R
2
(
N(τ)+1∑
i=1
Qp¯i
D
− τ)2.
Therefore, we have
A3 =


τRQp¯i
D
− τ2R
2
, if n = 2,
τR
∑N(τ)+1
i=1
Qp¯i
D
− τ2R
2
−∑N(τ)i=1 ∑N(τ)+1j=i+1 Q2pjD , if n > 2.
(4.68)
Now we calculate E[A3] when n > 2. Since N(τ) + 1 is a stopping time for
p¯i, i = 1, 2, ..., by Wald’s Equation, we have
E[τR
N(τ)+1∑
i=1
Qp¯i
D
] =
µτRQ
D
E[N(τ) + 1]. (4.69)
Define
Ii =


1, if N(τ) + 1 ≥ i,
0, otherwise.
Then Ii and p¯i are independent since N(τ) + 1 is a stopping time for pi. Thus,
we have
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E[
N(τ)∑
i=1
N(τ)+1∑
j=i+1
Q2pj
D
] = E[
N(τ)+1∑
i=2
(i− 1)Q
2p¯i
D
]
=
Q2
D
E[
n−1∑
i=2
(i− 1)p¯iIi]
=
Q2
D
n−1∑
i=2
(i− 1)E[p¯i]E[Ii]
=
µQ2
D
n−1∑
i=2
(i− 1)P (N(τ) + 1 ≥ i)
=
µQ2
D
n−2∑
i=1
iP (N(τ) ≥ i) (4.70)
From (4.68), (4.69), and (4.70), we have
E[A3] =


τRQµ
D
− τ2R
2
if n = 2
µτRQ
D
E[N(τ) + 1]− τ2R
2
− µQ2
D
∑n−2
i=1 iP (N(τ) ≥ i) if n > 2
Hence, the vendor’s expected holding costs, denoted by E[ICs], can be expressed
as
E[ICs] = hs(A0 + E[A3] + E[A4])
=


hs[
1
2
Q2
R
+ τRQµ
D
− τ2R
2
] if n = 2
hs[
1
2
Q2
R
+ µτRQ
D
E[N(τ) + 1]− τ2R
2
− µQ2
D
∑n−2
i=1 iP (N(τ) ≥ i)
+µQ
2
2D
∑n−3
j=0 (n− 1− j)(n− 2− j)P (N(τ) = j)] if n ≥ 3
(4.71)
When n ≥ 3, recall (4.65), we have
E[N(τ) + 1] = 1 +
n−2∑
i=1
F (i)(
(n− 1)D
R
), (4.72)
P (N(τ) ≥ i) = F (i)((n− 1)D
R
), (4.73)
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P (N(τ) = i) = F (i)(
(n− 1)D
R
)− F (i+1)((n− 1)D
R
). (4.74)
Let
Z =
(n− 1)D
R
.
Substituting (4.72)-(4.74) into (4.71), we have
E[ICs] = hs[
1
2
Q2
R
+
µ(n− 1)Q2
D
− (n− 1)
2Q2
2R
+
µQ2
D
n−2∑
i=1
(n− 1− i)F (i)(Z)
+
µQ2
2D
n−3∑
i=0
(n− 1− i)(n− 2− i)[F (i)(Z)− F (i+1)(Z)]]
= hs[
1
2
Q2
R
+
µ(n− 1)Q2
D
− (n− 1)
2Q2
2R
+
µQ2
D
n−2∑
i=1
(n− 1− i)F (i)(Z)
+
µQ2
2D
n−3∑
i=0
(n− 1− i)(n− 2− i)F (i)(Z)− µQ
2
2D
n−2∑
i=1
(n− i)(n− 1
−i)F (i)(Z)]] (4.75)
= hs[
1
2
Q2
R
+
µ(n− 1)Q2
D
− (n− 1)
2Q2
2R
+
µQ2
2D
(n− 1)(n− 2)]
= hs[
µn(n− 1)Q2
2D
− n(n− 2)Q
2
2R
]. (4.76)
When n = 2, we have
E[ICs] = hs[
Q2
2R
+
Q2µ
D
− Q
2
2R
] =
hsµQ
2
D
(4.77)
It is easy to see that (4.77) is a special form of (4.76) when n = 2. In addition,
it is easy to verify that the case n = 1 is a special case of n > 1 by comparing the
expected holding costs.
IV.2.5.4. Long-Run Average Cost
Substituting (4.66), (4.67), and (4.76) into (4.64), we obtain the long-run average cost
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TCJ(Q, n) =
Ss + nSb +
nhbQ
2(µ2+δ2)
2D
+ hs[
µn(n−1)Q2
2D
− n(n−2)Q2
2R
]
nµQ
D
= (Ss + nSb)
D
nµQ
+
hbQ(µ
2 + δ2)
2µ
+ hs[
(n− 1)Q
2
− (n− 2)DQ
2µR
]
The buyer’s expected average cost is
TCB =
DSb
µQ
+
hbQ(µ
2 + δ2)
2µ
,
which is the same as that derived by Silver (1976). The buyer’s expected holding
cost depends on both µ and δ. An interesting finding is that the vendor’s expected
average cost is
TCS =
DSs
nµQ
+ hs[
(n− 1)Q
2
− (n− 2)DQ
2µR
]
and δ has no effect on it. The explanation is that since there are n shipments within
a batch, the uncertainty of defective items neutralizes its own effect on the vendor’s
inventory and thus δ does not appear in the vendor’s expected average cost. If we look
only at the vendor’s expected holding cost, it appears as if the vendor is producing
at a constant rate µR.
Obviously, the model in Section IV.2.1 is a special case of TCJ(Q, n) when n = 1.
Thus, contracts under this general model can be developed based on the analysis in
Section IV.2.2 and IV.2.3.
IV.2.5.5. Numerical Analysis
The joint optimal solution for the single-vendor single-buyer production-inventory
model with defective items satisfies:
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Q∗(n) =
√
2D(nSb + Ss)
n(hb(µ2 + δ2) + hs[(n− 1)µ− (n−2)DR ])
,
n∗(n∗ − 1) ≤ Ss[2hsD − µhsR +Rhb(µ
2 + δ2))]
Sbhs(µR−D) ≤ n
∗(n∗ + 1).
Obviously, Q∗(n) ≥ Q∗∗(n) for a given n. That is, the joint optimal order
quantity is larger with consideration of the defective items. This is intuitively evident
since the existence of defective items would incur more frequent orders and thus
increase setup costs while the larger order quantity would reduce the order frequency
and thus relieve the effect of defective items. In addition, Q∗(n) is decreasing in µ
and δ. A large proportion of non-defective items and high uncertainty would both
decrease the joint optimal order quantity.
Table VI Numerical Example 1 under Random Supply (D=1000)
Solution 1: Solution 2:
Perfect Quality Defective items
Q 110 120
n 5 5
TCB 500.13 501.46
TCS 1458.44 1450.88
TCJ 1958.57 1952.34
Consider the example used by Banerjee (1986a), Goyal (1988), and Khouja (2003)
in which D = 1000 units/year, R = 3200 units/year, Sb = $25/order, Ss = $400/set-
up, hb = $5/unit/year, and hs = $4/unit/year. In addition, suppose that µ = 0.9
and δ = 0.02. Table VI shows two solutions to the problem. Solution 1 optimizes the
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whole supply chain without incorporating defective items. In solution 2, decectives
are incorporated and the whole chain is optimized.
Under this setting, there is only a slight difference between the two solutions.
Define
α =
Cj(Q
∗∗, n∗∗)− TCJ(Q∗, n∗)
TCJ(Q∗, n∗)
.
α1 = 0.3%. The next example is under the same setting except that the demand
is significantly larger (D = 2750). Table VII shows that when the demand is large,
Table VII Numerical Example 2 under Random Supply (D=2750)
Solution 1: Solution 2:
Perfect Quality Defective items
Q 132 171
n 15 27
TCB 875.88 831.88
TCS 1036.22 991.56
TCJ 1912.1 1823.44
the difference between the two solutions is significant. α1 = 4.9%. To examine the
effects of incorporating defective items into the two-stage model as well as the impact
of demand level, we plot the α versus the expected proportion of defective items µ
and the demand D in Figures 12 and 13. In Figure 12, α is large when µ is small
(α = 16% when µ = 0.5). That is, when the proportion of defective items is high,
it has a significant impact on the joint optimal costs. In Figure 13, the increase in
α becomes larger as demand increases. The defective items have little impact on the
joint optimal costs when the demand is small, i.e., the production capacity is abundant
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to satisfy the demand. When the demand is large, i.e., the production capacity is
barely adequate to satisfy the demand, the defective items have a significant effect
on the joint optimal costs (α = 7.5% when D = 2800).
Figure 12 α versus µ
In our analysis, we assume that the inspection process time is negligible. For a
considerable inspection process time as in Salameh and Jaber (2000) and Goyal and
Cardenas-Barron (2002), the vendor’s inventory profile remains the same because the
buyer’s order quantity and frequency does not change. Thus, our analysis can be
easily extended by adopting the buyer’s cost of Salameh and Jaber (2000).
IV.3. Optimal Contracts under Stochastic Demand
In this section, we study a general two-stage single-period model with uncertain
supply and demand. When production activities are initiated or orders placed, the
outputs or quantities received can be somewhat uncertain. The yield, or quantity
received, might be itself uncertain, or possibly the usable portion of the yield varies.
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Figure 13 α versus D
These uncertainties can affect inventory stocking decisions and production lot sizes.
A general analysis of production/inventory models with uncertain yield requires
complete specification of the form of the dependence between the output level and
the input level. A rather plausible assumption is that the output level is the product
of the input level and a random variable which is independent of the input level. Let
ξ be the random demand, with cumulative distribution Φ. Denote the supplier’s lot
size by q, and the resulting random yield by Yq. Assume that Yq is contingent on the
input level q in the following manner
Yq = p¯q
where p¯ is a non-negative random variable which is not contingent on q and is
independent of ξ. When Yq represents the proportion of nondefective discrete units
in a lot size q, we clearly have Yq ≤ q and p¯ ≤ 1; in other applications, this might
not be the case. For instance, if Yq represents a random output measured in volume
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units (e.g., liquid), and q is input measured in weight units (e.g., powder), there is
no obvious upper bound on Yq. For the sake of generality then, we do not impose a
prior upper bound on Yq and p¯.
The following notation is used throughout:
p: unit retail price,
c: unit production cost,
w: unit wholesale price,
gb: unit shortage cost for the buyer,
gs: unit shortage penalty paid to the buyer by the supplier if there is such
term in their agreement,
hb: unit overage value for the buyer; hb can be positive (salvage value) or
negative (holding cost). If hb > 0, it is assumed that hb < c,
hs: unit overage value for the supplier; hs can be positive (salvage value) or
negative (holding cost). If hs > 0, it is assumed that hs < c. Also, it is
assumed that hs ≥ hb. That is, the unit salvage value at the supplier’s is
at least as high as that at the buyer’s since the supplier disposes of the
item at the beginning of the period while the buyer disposes of the item
at the end of the period; the unit holding cost for the buyer is at least
as high as that for the supplier,
Q: order quantity from the buyer,
Fp¯: cumulative distribution of p¯,
µp¯: mean value of p¯.
Let piS, piB, and piJ denote the supplier’s, buyer’s and joint expected profits,
respectively. To provide a benchmark, we first consider the centralized channel.
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IV.3.1. The Centralized Model
There are two decision variables q and Q. In this centralized model, q is the input
level of the chain while Q specifies the throughput level of the yield product. That
is, if Yq > Q, then Yq −Q units are discarded at the beginning of the period to save
on holding costs and to achieve a higher salvage value.
The realized joint profit of the channel, denoted by ΠJ , will be
ΠJ(q,Q) =


−cpq + hb(pq − ξ) + pξ if pq ≤ Q and ξ ≤ pq
−cpq − gb(ξ − pq) + ppq if pq ≤ Q and ξ > pq
−cpq + hs(pq −Q) + hb(Q− ξ) + pξ if pq > Q and ξ ≤ Q
−cpq + hs(pq −Q)− gb(ξ −Q) + pQ if pq > Q and ξ > Q
(4.78)
where ξ represents the market demand. From (4.78), we have the expected joint profit
of the channel as follows
piJ(q,Q) = −cµp¯q + hs
∫
∞
Q
q
(pq −Q)dFp¯(p¯) +
∫ Q
q
0
[hb
∫ pq
0
(pq − ξ)dΦ(ξ)
−gb
∫
∞
pq
(ξ − pq)dΦ(ξ) + p(
∫ pq
0
ξdΦ(ξ) +
∫
∞
pq
pqdΦ(ξ))]dFp¯(p¯)
+
∫
∞
Q
q
[hb
∫ Q
0
(Q− ξ)dΦ(ξ)− gb
∫
∞
Q
(ξ −Q)dΦ(ξ)
+p(
∫ Q
0
ξdΦ(ξ) +
∫
∞
Q
QdΦ(ξ))]dFp¯(p¯). (4.79)
To find the optimal order quantity Q of the buyer, we derive the first derivative of
E[piJ(q,Q)] with respect to Q as follows
∂piJ(q,Q)
∂Q
= [1− Fp¯(Q
q
)][−hs + hbΦ(Q) + gb(1− Φ(Q)) + p(1− Φ(Q))]. (4.80)
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Letting (4.80) equal 0 and solving for Q, we have
Q∗J = Φ
−1
(
gb + p− hs
gb + p− hb
)
. (4.81)
Since hs ≥ hb, then Q∗J in (4.81) exists. Furthermore,
∂piJ(q,Q)
∂Q
|0 = gb + p− hs > 0,
∂piJ(q,Q)
∂Q
> 0 for all Q < Q∗J ,
and
∂piJ(q,Q)
∂Q
≤ 0 for all Q > Q∗J .
Thus, Q∗J is the unique minimizer of (4.79). Note that Q
∗
J is independent of q. That
is, the buyer is able to make optimal order quantity decisions independently without
considering the supplier’s lot size decision.
To find the optimal lot size q for the supplier, we derive the first derivative of
piJ(q,Q) with respect to q as follows
∂piJ(q,Q)
∂q
= −cµp¯ + hs
∫
∞
Q
q
pdFp¯(p¯) + hb
∫ Q
q
0
pΦ(pq)dFp¯(p¯) + gb
∫ Q
q
0
p[1
−Φ(pq)]dFp¯(p¯) + p
∫ Q
q
0
p[1− Φ(pq)]dFp¯(p¯). (4.82)
Substituting Q∗J into (4.82) and solving
∂piJ(q,Q)
∂q
= 0
for q, we have
∫ Q∗J
q
0
p[1− Φ(pq)]dFp¯(p¯) =
cµp¯ − hb
∫ Q∗J
q
0 pdFp¯(p¯)− hs
∫
∞
Q∗
J
q
pdFp¯(p¯)
gb + p− hb . (4.83)
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Deriving the second derivative of piJ(q,Q) with respect to q leads to
∂2piJ(q,Q)
∂q2
= −
∫ Q
q
0
p2fξ(pq)dFp¯(p¯) < 0.
Since
∂piJ
∂q
|0+ = µp¯(gb + p− c) > 0,
lim
q→∞
∂piJ
∂q
=
µp¯(hs − c)
gb + p− hb < 0,
the minimizer q∗J exists and is unique.
When Q∗J =∞, (4.83) reduces to∫
∞
0
pΦ(pq)dFp¯(p¯) =
µp¯(gb + p− c)
gb + p− hb .
We are not able to achieve the closed form of the optimal lot size q for the
supplier analytically. However, since we know the optimal lot size q exists and is
unique, for any instance we can solve (4.83) numerically and find the optimal lot size
q for the supplier. Next, we examine the decentralized channel and the impact of
supply uncertainty on the channel’s performance.
IV.3.2. The Decentralized Model
To examine the impact of supply uncertainty on the channel’s performance, we ana-
lyze two cases. In the first case, the buyer makes an order quantity decision without
considering the supply uncertainty. In the second case, the buyer makes her decision
taking the supply uncertainty into account.
In case 1, since the buyer does not consider supply uncertainty and assumes
she will receive exactly as she orders, the buyer is facing the classical newsvendor’s
problem as follows:
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min piB(Q) = −wQ+ hb
∫ Q
0
(Q− ξ)dΦ(ξ)− gb
∫
∞
Q
(ξ −Q)dΦ(ξ)
+p[
∫ Q
0
ξdΦ(ξ) +
∫
∞
Q
QdΦ(ξ)].
We can easily achieve the optimal order quantity Q∗D1 for the buyer
Q∗D1 = Φ
−1
(
gb + p− w
gb + p− hb
)
. (4.84)
Thus, the expected profit for the supplier is
piS(q) = −cµp¯q + hs
∫
∞
Q∗
D1
q
(pq −Q∗D1)dFp¯(p¯) + w[
∫ Q∗D1
q
0
pqdFp¯(p¯) +
∫
∞
Q∗
D1
q
Q∗D1dFp¯(p¯)].
To obtain the optimal lot size q for the supplier, we derive the first derivative of
piS(q) with respect to q as follows
∂piS(q)
∂q
= w
∫ Q∗D1
q
0
pdFp¯(p¯) + hs
∫
∞
Q∗
D1
q
pdFp¯(p¯)− cµp¯.
Define Λ(ξ) =
∫ ξ
0
pdFp¯(p¯). Solving
∂piS(q)
∂q
= 0
for q leads to
q∗D1 =
Φ−1
(
gb+p−w
gb+p−hb
)
Λ−1
(
µp¯(c−hs)
w−hs
) . (4.85)
By comparing the optimal order quantity and lot size in the decentralized channel
with the centralized channel, we achieve the following theorem.
THEOREM 16 Q∗D1 < Q
∗
J and q
∗
D1 < q
∗
J(Q
∗
D1).
Proof: Q∗D1 < Q
∗
J can be easily achieved by comparing (4.84) with (4.81). To show
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that q∗D1 < q
∗
J(Q
∗
D1), recall (4.83); it is equivalent to show that
∫ Q∗D1
q∗
D1
0
p[1− Φ(pq∗D1)]dFp¯(p¯) >
cµp¯ − hb
∫ Q∗D1q∗
D1
0 pdFp¯(p¯)− hs
∫
∞
Q∗
D1
q∗
D1
pdFp¯(p¯)
gb + p− hb . (4.86)
Substituting (4.85) into the left-hand side of (4.86), we have
∫ Q∗D1
q∗
D1
0
p[1− Φ(pq∗D1)]dFp¯(p¯) >
∫ Q∗D1
q∗
D1
0
p[1− Φ(Q∗D1)]dFp¯(p¯)
=
w − hb
gb + p− hb
∫ Q∗D1
q∗
D1
0
pdFp¯(p¯)
=
(
w − hb
gb + p− hb
)(
µp¯(c− hs)
w − hs
)
Substituting (4.85) into the right-hand side of (4.86), we have
µp¯(c− hs)− (hb − hs)µp¯(c−hs)w−hs
gb + p− hb =
(
w − hb
gb + p− hb
)(
µp¯(c− hs)
w − hs
)
.
¥
Theorem 16 shows that the buyer’s optimal order quantity in case 1 is always
smaller than that in the centralized channel. The supplier’s lot size in case 1 is also
smaller than that in the centralized channel for a given order quantity Q∗D1. Thus, the
behaviors of both the buyer and the supplier deviate from the channel optimum due
to the existence of supply uncertainty and the buyer’s ignorance of it. An immediate
question arises: if the buyer is aware of the supply uncertainty, how should she make
the proper order quantity decision? Next, we study case 2 in which the buyer is aware
of the supply uncertainty and selects the order quantity accordingly. Additionally,
there is a penalty term gs specified between the supplier and the buyer for each unit
not delivered to the buyer.
In this case, the supplier’s expected profit for a given order quantity Q is given
by
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piS(q) = −cµp¯q + hs
∫
∞
Q
q
(pq −Q)dFp¯(p¯)− gs
∫ Q
q
0
(Q− pq)dFp¯(p¯)
+w[
∫ Q
q
0
pqdFp¯(p¯) +
∫
∞
Q
q
QdFp¯(p¯)].
The optimal lot size q for a given order quantity Q can be easily achieved as
follows
q∗D2(Q) =
Q
Λ−1
(
µp¯(c−hs)
w+gs−hs
) .
Let
K = Λ−1
(
µp¯(c− hs)
w + gs − hs
)
,
then we have
q∗D2(Q) =
Q
K
.
Based on the supplier’s optimal response to the buyer’s order quantity Q, the
buyer’s expected profit is given by
piB(Q) = −w[
∫ K
0
pQ
K
dFp¯(p¯) +
∫
∞
K
QdFp¯(p¯)] + gs
∫ K
0
(Q− pQ
K
)dFp¯(p¯)
+
∫ K
0
[hb
∫ pQ
K
0
(
pQ
K
− ξ)dΦ(ξ)− gb
∫
∞
pQ
K
(ξ − pQ
K
)dΦ(ξ)
+p[
∫ pQ
K
0
ξdΦ(ξ) +
∫
∞
pQ
K
pQ
K
dΦ(ξ)]]dFp¯(p¯) +
∫
∞
K
[hb
∫ Q
0
(Q− ξ)dΦ(ξ)
−gb
∫
∞
Q
(ξ −Q)dΦ(ξ) + p[
∫ Q
0
ξdΦ(ξ) +
∫
∞
Q
QdΦ(ξ)]]dFp¯(p¯).
To find the optimal order quantity Q for the buyer, we derive the first derivative
of piB(Q) with respect to Q as follows
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∂piB(Q)
∂Q
= −w[Λ(K)
K
+ (1− Fp¯(K))] + gs[Fp¯(K)− Λ(K)
K
] +
∫ K
0
[hb
p
K
Φ(
pQ
K
)
+
p
K
gb(1− Φ(pQ
K
)) +
p
K
p[1− Φ(pQ
K
)]]dFp¯(p¯) +
∫
∞
K
[hbΦ(Q)
+gb[1− Φ(Q)] + p[1− Φ(Q)]]dFp¯(p¯)
= −w[Λ(K)
K
− Fp¯(K))]− w + gs[Fp¯(K)− Λ(K)
K
] + (gb + p)
Λ(K)
K
+(gb + p)[1− Fp¯(K)] +
∫ K
0
[hb
p
K
Φ(
pQ
K
)− p
K
gbΦ(
pQ
K
)
− p
K
pΦ(
pQ
K
)]dFp¯(p¯) +
∫
∞
K
[hbΦ(Q)− gbΦ(Q)− pΦ(Q)]dFp¯(p¯).
Solving
∂piB(Q)
∂Q
= 0
for Q, we have
∫ K
0
p
K
Φ(
pQ
K
)dFp¯(p¯) +
∫
∞
K
Φ(Q)dFp¯(p¯) =
1
(p+ gb − hb) [(p+ gb − w − gs)[1
+
Λ(K)
K
− Fp¯(K))] + gs]. (4.87)
Denote the solution of (4.87) as Q∗D2. Let
M =
(p+ gb − w)[1 + Λ(K)K − Fp¯(K))] + gs(Fp¯(K)− Λ(K)K )
(p+ gb − hb) ,
Q2 = Φ
−1(M).
Since
Fp¯(K) ≥ Λ(K)
K
,
we have M ≥ 0 and Q2 ≤ Q∗D2.
It is easy to verify that
∂2piB(Q)
∂Q2
< 0,
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and thus the minimizer Q∗D2 is unique. In addition, from (4.87) it is true that Q
∗
D2
is increasing in gs. Obviously, the buyer would like to charge a higher penalty to the
supplier when the supplier is unable to fulfill her order. However, a high penalty may
result in poor channel performance as shown in the following theorem.
THEOREM 17 For a given Q, if gs > gb + p− w + hs − hb, then q∗D2(Q) < q∗J(Q).
Proof: For a given Q define variables q∗J(Q), q1(Q), and q2(Q) as follows:
∫ Q
q∗
J
(Q)
0
p[1− Φ(pq∗J(Q))]dFp¯(p¯) =
cµp¯ − hb
∫ Qq∗
J
(Q)
0 pdFp¯(p¯)− hs
∫
∞
Q
q∗
J
(Q)
pdFp¯(p¯)
gb + p− hb ,∫ Q
q1(Q)
0
p[1− Φ(pq1(Q))]dFp¯(p¯) = µp¯(c− hs)
gb + p− hb ,∫ Q
q2(Q)
0
pdFp¯(p¯) =
µp¯(c− hs)
gb + p− hb .
Obviously, q1(Q) < q2(Q). If gs > gb + p−w+ hs− hb, then q2(Q) < q∗D2(Q). In
addition, q1(Q) > q
∗
J(Q) since
cµp¯ − hb
∫ Qq∗
J
(Q)
0 pdFp¯(p¯)− hs
∫
∞
Q
q∗
J
(Q)
pdFp¯(p¯)
gb + p− hb >
µp¯(c− hs)
gb + p− hb .
Thus, we have q∗D2(Q) > q
∗
J(Q). ¥
Theorem 17 shows that for a given order quantity Q from the buyer, if the buyer
charges a penalty larger than gb + p − w + hs − hb, the supplier will always choose
a smaller lot size than the channel optimum. Although the buyer prefers a higher
penalty, Theorem 17 shows that, from the system’s perspective, it is not good to set
the penalty level too high. To determine the optimal penalty level for the system,
knowledge of the distributions of the supply uncertainty and the market demand is
critical to the buyer. In the following section, we provide a consignment contract
where the terms can be easily determined.
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IV.3.3. Consignment Contract
Under a consignment contract, the supplier decides the delivery quantity for his prod-
uct and retains ownership of the goods. For each item sold, the buyer deducts a
percentage from the selling price; for each item unsold, the buyer shares a percent-
age of the cost. Also, the buyer specifies the maximal stock level. The contracting
procedure is as follows:
1. The supplier decides the production input level and delivers all of the output
to the retailer;
2. The buyer inspects the products and returns all of the defective items and
overstock good items to the supplier;
3. The supplier disposes of all returned items;
4. Demand occurs. The buyer returns all unsold items to the supplier and remits
his revenue share as well as his cost share.
Define r as the percentage of the revenue share where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 and β as the
percentage of cost share where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
To coordinate the channel, the buyer should set the maximal stock level at Q∗J .
Then, the supplier’s expected profit is given by
piS(q,Q) = −cµp¯q + (β(c− hs) + hs)
∫
∞
Q
q
(pq −Q)dFp¯(p¯) +
∫ Q
q
0
[(β(c− hb)
+ hb)
∫ pq
0
(pq − ξ)dΦ(ξ) + (1− r)p(
∫ pq
0
ξdΦ(ξ)
+
∫
∞
pq
pqdΦ(ξ))]dFp¯(p¯) +
∫
∞
Q
q
[(β(c− hb) + hb)
∫ Q
0
(Q− ξ)dΦ(ξ)
+(1− r)p(
∫ Q
0
ξdΦ(ξ) +
∫
∞
Q
QdΦ(ξ))]dFp¯(p¯). (4.88)
To find the optimal lot size q for a given maximal stock level Q, we derive the
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first derivative of ΠS(q,Q) with respect to q as follows
∂piS(q,Q)
∂q
= −cµp¯ + (β(c− hs) + hs)
∫
∞
Q
q
pdFp¯(p¯) + (β(c− hb)
+hb)
∫ Q
q
0
pΦ(pq)dFp¯(p¯) + (1− r)p
∫ Q
q
0
p[1− Φ(pq)]dFp¯(p¯).(4.89)
Recall (4.81), substituting Q∗J into (4.89) and solving
∂piS
∂q
= 0
for q, we have
∫ Q∗J
q
0
p[1− Φ(pq)]dFp¯(p¯) =
(1− β)(cµp¯ − hb
∫ Q∗J
q
0 pdFp¯(p¯)− hs
∫
∞
Q∗
J
q
pdFp¯(p¯))
(1− r)p− (1− β)hb − βc .
Recall (4.83), to align the supplier’s optimal lot size with the channel optimum,
the buyer should set r and β satisfying
1− β
(1− r)p− (1− β)hb − βc =
1
gb + p− hb .
That is,
(r − β)p+ (1− β)gb + βc = 0, or
r = β − (1− β)gb + βc
p
. (4.90)
From (4.90), we can see that r < β and r is increasing in β. That is, to coordinate
the channel, the more revenue share that is taken by the buyer, the more cost she
should share. The advantage of the consignment contract is that the buyer does not
need to have specific knowledge of the distribution of the supply uncertainty to design
the contract, and thus it makes the buyer’s contract design easier.
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IV.4. Summary
In this chapter, we seek to provide implementable contractual arrangements to coor-
dinate a channel with supply uncertainty considerations. We first develop a general
framework that includes power structure and supply uncertainty. We demonstrate
that power structure and supply uncertainty are important considerations when de-
signing supply contracts. Based on this general framework, we further develop supply
contracts under supply uncertainty and deterministic demand with an infinite plan-
ning horizon. The findings reported clearly show that ignoring incentive conflicts
and supply information issues can lead to undesirable behavior. We propose a model
that shows how lot size, quality level, and transactions can be structured to reduce
supply chain inefficiency due to individual incentives and private information. In ad-
dition, we develop supply contracts under supply uncertainty and stochastic demand
in a single period. We examine the impact of both supply and demand uncertainty
on channel performance and propose a consignment contract to help coordinate the
channel. The problems investigated in this chapter are summarized below:
• A general framework of supply chain contract design under supply uncertainty
in supplier- and buyer-driven channels.
• Exploration of the impact of the power structure.
• The design of optimal cost-sharing contracts under supply uncertainty and con-
tinuous deterministic demand.
• The design of optimal cost-sharing contracts under supply uncertainty and
stochastic single-period demand.
• Exploration of the value of supply uncertainty information.
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CHAPTER V
SUPPLIER COMPETITION
Most studies to date have focused on markets consisting of exclusive dealers that
sell only one producer’s brand; little attention has been given to the larger segment
of most consumer goods markets in which retailers sell multiple (often highly sub-
stitutable) brands at the same location. This latter channel structure represents
numerous markets including those consisting of specialty stores, such as consumer
electronics, sporting goods, and automobile parts etc. As Tsay et al. (1999) point
out, “another deficiency in the current literature is the lack of attention to com-
petition, either between multiple buyers or multiple suppliers. Buyers that share a
common supplier and compete in the same consumer market might behave in a way
that obstructs their competitors’ access to suppliers...Multiple suppliers to a common
buyer might need to alter their price, service, lead time, or flexibility offerings in light
of the competitive environment.”
Although consideration of competition is rare in the operations management
literature, there is substantial coverage of it in the economics literature. For example,
Choi (1991) analyzes a channel structure with two competing manufactures and a
common retailer and studies three different power structures, i.e., supplier dominant,
balanced power, and buyer dominant structures. He shows that all channel members
are better off when no one dominates the structure. His work is followed by Trivedi
(1998), who models a channel structure in which there are duopoly manufacturers
and duopoly common retailers. Trivedi shows that the presence of competitive effects
at both the retailer and manufacturer levels of distribution has a significant impact
on profits and prices.
As we discussed in Chapters III and IV, consideration of the power structure and
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supply uncertainty is important for implementable supply contract design. In this
chapter, we follow the ideas in Chapters III and IV to develop a general framework
with power structure, supply uncertainty, and supplier competition considerations.
Under this framework, we further examine the case in which a single buyer is facing
one stable supplier and one unstable supplier and provide optimal ordering policies
for the buyer in each case. In addition, we study the case in which a single buyer is
facing two unstable suppliers.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section V.1 develops the
general framework with power structure, supply uncertainty, and supplier competition
considerations concentrating on the case of two stable suppliers. Section V.2 considers
the one stable supplier and one unstable supplier case. The two unstable suppliers
case is addressed in section V.3. Concluding remarks are provided in Section V.4.
V.1. Optimal Contracts under Power Structure, Supply Uncertainty, and
Supplier Competition
In this section we develop a two-supplier-one-buyer model in a single period with
power structure, supply uncertainty, and supplier competition considerations. This
model is based on Choi (1991) and Banker et al. (1998). Similarly as in Section IV.1,
in this section, we assume that the proportion of defectives is p¯ = 0. In addition, the
model we construct is based on the following assumptions.
(1) There are two suppliers, labeled 1 and 2. Each supplier has one product, for
which he must choose a wholesale price level w and a quality level τ . We assume
that quality is a measurable attribute with values in the interval [0,∞). There is one
buyer placing orders to the two suppliers. She sells the product to the retail market
at price pi for each unit of product i, i = 1, 2.
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(2) We assume that the market demand function is linear in price and quality:
di = kiα− βpi + γpj + λτi − µτj,
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, (5.1)
where k1+ k2 = 1. Here kiα is the intrinsic demand potential parameter for firm
i, i = 1, 2. Parameter β (λ) denotes the demand responsiveness to the firm’s own
price (quality), while γ (µ) denotes the demand responsiveness to the competitor’s
price (quality). We refer to β/γ (λ/µ) as the relative responsiveness to price (quality)
and assume that it is greater than one, i.e.,
β > γ and λ > µ.
Thus, the demand di for each firm i’s product is affected more by changes in
its own price and quality than those of its competitors. This condition is necessary
because if both firms were to raise their prices by $1 or to decrease their quality by
one unit, then both firms would lose sales (Tirole 1988).
(3) The supplier has the option to improve the quality level with investment.
The investment cost function is given by
ci = Ci(di, τi) = (ν + ζτi)di + κ+ ηiτ
2
i , i = 1, 2.
To develop the framework while considering power structure and supply uncer-
tainty, we study the simple contract design in which the suppliers decide the quality
levels and wholesale prices and the buyer decides the retail prices. Additional dedi-
cated contractual mechanisms can be further developed based on the model that we
present in this section. First, we study the case when the suppliers are the leaders of
the channel. The price and quality decisions take place in the following sequence in
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time:
i) Two suppliers simultaneously select their own quality levels; two suppliers and
one buyer observe each supplier’s quality level;
ii) Each supplier selects a wholesale price for his product;
iii) The buyer selects the retail prices for two products. Demand is realized based
on the prices and quality levels.
Our model also reflects the assumption that price decisions are made after the
quality decisions, since the choice of a quality level reflects a long-term decision which
cannot be changed as easily or as frequently as price. To solve this three-stage game,
we first calculate the optimal retail prices assuming given quality levels and wholesale
prices, and then determine the optimal wholesale prices assuming given quality levels.
At last, the optimal quality levels are determined.
The profit functions of the suppliers and the buyer are given by:
piiS = (wi − ν − ζτi)(kiα− βpi + γpj + λτi − µτj)− κ− ηiτ 2i , (5.2)
piB =
2∑
i=1
(pi − wi)qi, (5.3)
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
The buyer’s reaction function given wholesale prices and quality levels can be
derived from the first-order conditions for maximizing (5.3) as follows
∂piB
∂p1
= k1α + λτ1 − µτ2 − 2βp1 + 2γp2 + βw1 − γw2 = 0,
∂piB
∂p2
= k2α + λτ2 − µτ1 − 2βp2 + 2γp1 + βw2 − γw1 = 0.
Note that the Hessian matrix of (5.3) in terms of p1 and p2 is negative-definite
since β > γ > 0. Thus, piB is a joint concave function of p1 and p2. The optimal
values of p1 and p2 are unique. We obtain the optimal retail prices for given quality
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levels and wholesale prices as follows
p1 =
w1
2
+
β(k1α + λτ1 − µτ2) + γ(k2α + λτ2 − µτ1)
2(β2 − γ2) , (5.4)
p2 =
w2
2
+
β(k2α + λτ2 − µτ1) + γ(k1α + λτ1 − µτ2)
2(β2 − γ2) , (5.5)
both of which are linear in wholesale prices. These expressions imply that only
half the change in the wholesale price is reflected in the retail price, and the other
half is absorbed by the buyer.
Substituting (5.4) and (5.5) into (5.2), the suppliers’ Nash equilibrium of whole-
sale prices can be derived from the first-order conditions for maximizing (5.2) which
are given by
∂piis
∂wi
=
1
2
(kiα + λτi − µτj − 2βwi + γwj + β(ν + ζτi)) = 0. (5.6)
Solving (5.6) results in the following wholesale prices
w∗i = ν + ζτi +
1
W
(Ri + Sτi − Tτj),
where
W = 4β2 − γ2,
R = 2kiαβ + kjαγ − ν(β − γ)(2β + γ),
S = 2βλ− 2β2ζ − γµ+ ζγ2, and
T = 2βµ− βγζ − γλ, (5.7)
and the corresponding profits and demand quantities at the equilibrium prices
are computed as
pii∗s =
β
2W 2
(Ri + Sτi − Tτj)2 − κ− ηiτ 2i , (5.8)
q∗i =
β
2W
(Ri + Sτi − Tτj). (5.9)
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Having characterized the price equilibrium, we now are able to analyze the quality
equilibrium. Differentiating (5.8) with respect to τi and equating it to zero, we obtain
the following reaction function for firm i that gives the best action for firm i given
that firm j chooses τj:
τi =
βS
2W 2ηi − βS2 (Ri − Tτj). (5.10)
Finally, we obtain the optimal quality levels given by
τ ∗i =
sβ[Ri(2W
2ηj − βS2)−RjSTβ]
(2W 2ηi − βS2)(2W 2ηj − βS2)− S2T 2β2 . (5.11)
Now we study the case when the suppliers are the followers of the channel. The
price and quality decisions take place in the following sequence in time:
i) Two suppliers simultaneously select their own quality level; two suppliers and
one buyer observe each supplier’s quality level;
ii) The buyer announces her profit margin m;
iii) Each supplier selects a wholesale price for his product; demand is realized
based on the prices and the quality levels.
To solve this three-stage game, we first calculate the optimal wholesale prices for
given values of quality levels and buyer’s profit margin, and then we determine the
optimal profit margin for given quality levels. At last, the optimal quality levels are
determined.
The profit functions of the suppliers are given by:
piiS = (wi − ν − ζτi)(kiα− β(wi +mi) + γ(wj +mj) + λτi − µτj)− κ− ηiτ 2i ,
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.(5.12)
The suppliers’ reaction functions, given the buyer’s profit margins and quality
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levels, can be derived from the first-order conditions as follows:
∂pi1S
∂w1
= k1α− β(w1 +m1) + γ(w2 +m2) + λτ1 − µτ2 − β(w1 − ν − ζτ1) = 0,
∂pi2S
∂w2
= k2α− β(w2 +m2) + γ(w1 +m1) + λτ2 − µτ1 − β(w2 − ν − ζτ2) = 0.
It can be easily seen that the second-order Jacobian matrix is negative-definite,
implying that a unique Nash equilibrium exists between the two suppliers. The
resulting reaction functions are as follows
w1 =
1
2β
(k1α− βm1 + γp2 + λτ1 − µτ2 + βν + βζτ1),
w2 =
1
2β
(k2α− βm2 + γp1 + λτ2 − µτ1 + βν + βζτ2).
or, equivalently,
w1 =
1
β
(k1α− βp1 + γp2 + λτ1 − µτ2 + βν + βζτ1),
w2 =
1
β
(k2α− βp2 + γp1 + λτ2 − µτ1 + βν + βζτ2).
The buyer applies these suppliers’ reaction functions to maximize her own profit
by setting optimal retail prices. Her optimization problem is given by
max
p1,p2
piB = (p1 − w1(p1, p2))q1(p1, p2) + (p2 − w2(p1, p2))q2(p1, p2). (5.13)
Solving the optimization problem (5.13) with respect to retail prices p1 and p2
leads to:
pi =
2βai + γaj
2(4β2 − γ2) +
β(kiα + λτi − µτj) + γ(kjα + λτj − µτi)
2(β2 − γ2)
where
ai = kiα + λτi − µτj + β(ν + ζτi),
and from the suppliers’ reaction functions, we obtain the following equilibrium
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wholesale prices:
w∗∗i = ν + ζτi +
1
2W
(Ri + Sτi − Tτj).
Note that, after rearrangement, the retail prices are the same as those when the
suppliers are the leaders, while the wholesale prices are lower. That means, when
the suppliers do not have the dominant bargaining power, they have to charge less
to the buyer though the market demand remains the same. The corresponding profit
margins can be derived using mi = pi − wi as follows
m∗∗i = −
1
2
(ν + ζτi) +
β(kiα + λτi − µτj) + γ(kjα + λτj − µτi)
2(β2 − γ2) ,
and the corresponding profit and demand quantities at the equilibrium prices are
computed as
pii∗∗s =
β
4W 2
(Ri + Sτi − Tτj)2 − κ− ηiτ 2i , (5.14)
q∗∗i =
β
2W
(Ri + Sτi − Tτj). (5.15)
Having characterized the price equilibrium, we now analyze the quality equilib-
rium. Differentiating (5.14) with respect to τi and equating it to zero, we obtain the
following reaction function for firm i that gives the best action for firm i given that
firm j chooses τj:
τi =
βS
4W 2ηi − βS2 (Ri − Tτj). (5.16)
Solving (5.16) for τi, we obtain the optimal quality levels as
τ ∗i =
sβ[Ri(4W
2ηj − βS2)−RjSTβ]
(4W 2ηi − βS2)(4W 2ηj − βS2)− S2T 2β2 . (5.17)
Comparing the quality levels under two power structures, we obtain the following
175
theorem.
THEOREM 18 The optimal quality levels are higher when the suppliers are the
leaders of the channel than when they are the followers.
Proof: The theorem is easy to prove by comparing (5.11) with (5.17). ¥
The conclusion of Theorem 18 is opposite to the conclusion of Theorem 13 under
the single-supplier-single-buyer case. That is, when suppliers compete, they choose
to increase their quality levels when they have the bargaining power, rather than
to decrease the quality level as when there is no supplier competition. The intuitive
explanation is that when there is a single supplier, he is willing to improve his product
quality level so that the market demand will increase. However, when suppliers
compete, they have less interest in improving quality since their market share is less
than in the no competition case, and they invest more than they can gain due to the
competition. In this section, we assume that the proportion of defectives is p¯ = 0 and
that the demand is deterministic. In the next two sections, we will consider supplier
competition under stochastic supply and demand.
V.2. Optimal Contracts under One Stable Supplier and One Unstable
Supplier
In this section, we consider a supply chain consisting of one buyer and two suppliers
where one supplier is stable and the other is unstable. Ciarallo et al. (1994) consider
a one-supplier one-buyer supply chain in which the supplier’s production capacity is
uncertain. Our model is based on their work and our interest lies in the optimal
ordering policy for the buyer under supplier competition.
Supplier 1 has infinite capacity and delivers the order quantity, u, received from
the buyer on time at cost $s1/unit; while supplier 2 has variable capacity, Y , and
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charges $s2 for each delivered unit where s2 ≤ s1. We consider the case where Y is
a random variable with cumulative distribution Fy(y). The actual amount of units
received from supplier 2 may be limited by his capacity. If the order quantity exceeds
the actual capacity that is available, the actual amount is determined by the capacity.
Otherwise, the complete order quantity is received successfully. In terms of the order
quantity, v, and the uncertain capacity, y, the actual amount received is min(u, y).
The orders are intended to satisfy a random demand, ξ, with distribution Φ(ξ).
It is assumed that the inventory holding and backlog penalty costs are linear,
with per unit costs of h and gb, respectively. The unit sale price is w. The single-
period profit for the buyer, piB(x, u, v), is a function of the starting inventory, x, as
well as orders u and v given by:
piB(x, u, v) = −s1u− s2v[1− Fy(v)]− s2
∫ v
0
yfy(y)dy + [1− Fy(v)][w
∫ x+u+v
0
ξ
φ(ξ)dξ + w
∫
∞
x+u+v
(x+ u+ v)φ(ξ)dξ − gb
∫
∞
x+u+v
(ξ − x− u
−v)φ(ξ)dξ − h
∫ x+u+v
0
(x+ u+ v − ξ)φ(ξ)dξ]
+
∫ v
0
[w
∫ x+u+y
0
ξφ(ξ)dξ + w
∫
∞
x+u+y
(x+ u+ y)φ(ξ)dξ
−gb
∫
∞
x+u+y
(ξ − x− u− y)φ(ξ)dξ − h
∫ x+u+y
0
(x+ u+ y
−ξ)φ(ξ)dξ]fy(y)dy (5.18)
In (5.18), note that the number of units received is given by x + u + v, if the
capacity is greater than v. Otherwise, it is x + u + y, where y is the realization of
capacity. Also, note that the expectation is taken over both the demand and the
capacity distributions.
The following proposition provides the optimal ordering policy for the buyer.
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PROPOSITION 15 When x < X, the optimal ordering policy for the buyer is
(u∗, v∗) =


(X − x, 0) if s1 = s2
(u∗∗, X − x− u∗∗) if s2 < s1 < s3(x)
(0, X − x) if s1 ≥ s3(x)
where
X = Q−1(
gb + w − s2
gb + w + h
),
s3(x) = [1− Fy(X − x)]s2 +
∫ X−x
0
[(w + gb)− (w + gb + h)Q(x+ y)]fy(y)dy,
−s1 + [1− Fy(X − x− u∗∗)]s2 +
∫ X−x−u∗∗
0
[(w + gb)− (w + gb + h)Q(x+ u∗∗
+y)]fy(y)dy = 0.
When x ≥ X, the optimal ordering policy is (u∗, v∗) = (0, 0).
Proof: We compute the optimal values of u and v using the first partial derivatives
of (5.18), with respect u and v. For this purpose, we have
∂piB(x, u, v)
∂u
= −s1 + [1− Fy(v)][w
∫
∞
x+u+v
φ(ξ)dξ + gb
∫
∞
x+u+v
φ(ξ)dξ
−h
∫ x+u+v
0
φ(ξ)dξ] +
∫ v
0
[w
∫
∞
x+u+y
φ(ξ)dξ + gb
∫
∞
x+u+y
φ(ξ)dξ
−h
∫ x+u+y
0
φ(ξ)dξ]fy(y)dy
= −s1 + [1− Fy(v)][(w + gb)− (w + gb + h)Q(x+ u+ v)]
+
∫ v
0
[(w + gb)− (w + gb + h)Q(x+ u+ y)]fy(y)dy, (5.19)
∂piB(x, u, v)
∂v
= [1− Fy(v)][(−s2 + w + gb)− (w + gb + h)Q(x+ u+ v)].(5.20)
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First, we show that for a given pair of x and u, the optimal order quantity v∗
minimizing (5.18) is given by
v∗ =


Q−1( gb+w−s2
gb+w+h
)− x− u if x+ u < Q−1( gb+w−s2
gb+w+h
)
0 if x+ u ≥ Q−1( gb+w−s2
gb+w+h
)
(5.21)
Setting (5.20) equal to zero and solving for v, we have
v∗∗ = Q−1(
gb + w − s2
gb + w + h
)− x− u
as the unique v value that satisfies the first-order condition. Noting that,
∂piB(x, u, v)
∂v
≥ 0 for all v ≤ v∗∗,
and
∂piB(x, u, v)
∂v
< 0 for all v > v∗∗,
we conclude that (5.21) is correct. That is, since v∗ must be nonnegative, v∗ = v∗∗
when v∗∗ ≥ 0 and v∗ = 0 when v∗∗ < 0.
Below we consider two cases with x < X and x ≥ X respectively.
When x < X, we substitute v∗∗ into (5.19). The resulting expression is denoted
by g(u) and given by
g(u) = −s1 + [1− Fy(X − x− u)]s2 +
∫ X−x−u
0
[(w + gb)− (w + gb + h)Q(x+ u
+y)]fy(y)dy. (5.22)
Now, we show that g(u) is decreasing in u when 0 ≤ u ≤ X − x. For any ua and
ub satisfying 0 ≤ ua < ub ≤ X − x, we have
179
g(ua)− g(ub) = [Fy(X − x− ub)− Fy(X − x− ua)]s2 +
∫ X−x−ua
0
[(w + gb)− (w
+gb + h)Q(x) + ua + y)]fy(y)dy −
∫ X−x−ub
0
[(w + gb)− (w
+gb + h)Q(x) + ub + y)]fy(y)dy
≥ [Fy(X − x− ub)− Fy(X − x− ua)]s2 +
∫ X−x−ua
X−x−ub
[(w + gb)
−(w + gb + h)Q(x) + ua + y)]fy(y)dy
> [Fy(X − x− ub)− Fy(X − x− ua)]s2 +
∫ X−x−ua
X−x−ub
[(w + gb)
−(w + gb + h)Q(X)]fy(y)dy = 0.
Next, we set (5.22) equal to 0 and solve for u. If s1 = s2, it is easy to see that
u∗ = X − x is the solution. If s2 < s1 ≤ s3, there exists a unique solution u∗∗
minimizing piB(x, u, v
∗). If s1 > s3(x), u
∗ = 0 minimizes piB(x, u, v
∗).
When x ≥ X, it is easy to check that u∗ = v∗ = 0 minimizes piB(x, u, v). ¥
Proposition 15 shows that the total order-up-to level from the buyer to both
suppliers is X, which does not depend on the cost of supplier 1 (s1). Also, if supplier
1’s product is too expensive (s1 ≥ s3(x)) for the buyer, then the buyer will give up
supplier 1 and place orders with supplier 2 only. Since supplier 2 is unstable, the
buyer will give up supplier 2 if supplier 1 and supplier 2 provide the products at the
same price. Therefore, the buyer is balancing price and supply uncertainty when she
is placing orders in order to maximize her own expected profit.
V.3. Optimal Contracts under Two Unstable Suppliers
In this section, we consider the case where both suppliers are unstable. Our interest
is in the optimal ordering policy for the buyer in this environment.
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Suppose both suppliers have variable capacities, Yi, i = 1, 2. The buyer requests
u and v units from supplier 1 and 2, and pays $s1 and $s2 for each received unit,
respectively. Without the loss of generality, we assume s1 ≤ s2.
Yi is a random variable with cumulative distribution Fi(yi). The actual amount
of units received from both suppliers may be limited by their capacities. If the placed
order exceeds the actual capacity that is available, the actual amount is determined by
the capacity. Otherwise, the complete order quantity is received successfully. In terms
of the order quantity, u and v, and the uncertain capacity, yi, the actual amounts
received are min(u, y1) and min(v, y2), respectively. The orders are intended to satisfy
a deterministic demand, D.
Again, we assume that the inventory holding and backlog penalty costs are linear,
with per unit costs of h and p, respectively. The unit sale price is w. The single-period
profit, piB(x, u, v), is a function of the starting inventory, x, as well as orders u and
v. The following proposition provides the optimal ordering policy for the buyer.
PROPOSITION 16 Let
U = F−11
(
s2 + h
w + gb + h
)
, V = F−12
(
s1 + h
w + gb + h
)
,W = F−11
(
s2 − s1
w + gb − s1
)
.
The optimal order quantity pair for the buyer is as follows:
(u∗, v∗) =


(D − x− V,D − x− U) if x ≤ D − U − V
(u∗∗, D − x− u∗∗) if D − U − V < x ≤ D −W
(D − x, 0) if D −W < x < D
(0, 0) if x ≥ D
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where
(w + gb − s2)F2(D − x− u∗∗)− (w + gb − s1)F1(u∗∗)− s1 + s2 = 0.
Proof: We consider five cases as follows
• Case 1: x < D, x+ u ≤ D, x+ v ≤ D, and x+ u+ v ≥ D.
• Case 2: x < D, x+ u ≥ D, x+ v ≤ D.
• Case 3: x < D, x+ u ≤ D, x+ v ≥ D.
• Case 4: x < D, x+ u+ v ≤ D.
• Case 5: x ≥ D.
In Case 1, the buyer’s expected profit function piB(x, u, v) is given by
piB(x, u, v) = −s1u[1− F1(u)]− s1
∫ u
0
y1f1(y1)dy1 − s2v[1− F2(v)]
−s2
∫ v
0
y2f2(y2)dy2 + [1− F1(u)][1− F2(v)][wD − h(x+ u+ v −D)]
{+[1− F2(v)]
∫ D−x−v
0
[w(x+ y1 + v)− gb(D − x− y1 − v)]f1(y1)dy1
+
∫ u
D−x−v
[wD − h(x+ y1 + v −D)]f1(y1)dy1}+ [1− F1(u)]{
∫ D−x−u
0
[w(x+ u+ y2)− gb(D − x− u− y2)]f2(y2)dy2 +
∫ v
D−x−u
[wD − h(x
+u+ y2 −D)]f2(y2)dy2}+
∫ D−x−v
0
[
∫ v
0
[w(x+ y1 + y2)− gb(D − x
−y1 − y2)]f2(y2)]f1(y1)dy1 +
∫ u
D−x−v
[
∫ D−x−y1
0
[w(x+ y1 + y2)
−gb(D − x− y1 − y2)]f2(y2)dy2 +
∫ v
D−x−y1
[wD − h(x+ y1
+y2)]f2(y2)dy2]f1(y1)dy1 (5.23)
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The first derivatives of (5.23), with respect to the orders, u and v, are given by:
∂piB(x, u, v)
∂u
= [1− F1(u)][(w + gb + h)F2(D − x− u)− s1 − h], (5.24)
∂piB(x, u, v)
∂v
= [1− F2(v)][(w + gb + h)F1(D − x− v)− s2 − h]. (5.25)
Solving (5.24) and (5.25) simultaneously for u and v, we have (u∗, v∗) = (D −
x− V,D− x−U). It is optimal only when x+ u∗ + v∗ ≥ D, that is, x ≤ D−U − V .
When x > D − U − V , the constraint x + u + v ≥ D is binding. That is,
x+ u+ v = D or v = D− x− u. Thus, we have the buyer’s expected profit function
as follows:
piB(x, u,D − x− u) = −s1u[1− F1(u)]− s1
∫ u
0
y1f1(y1)dy1 − s2(D − x− u)[1
−F2(D − x− u)]− s2
∫ D−x−u
0
y2f2(y2)dy2 + [1− F1(u)]∫ D−x−u
0
[w(x+ u+ y2)− gb(D − x− u− y2)]f2(y2)dy2
+[1− F2(D − x− u)]
∫ u
0
[w(D − u+ y1)− gb(u
−y1)]f1(y1)dy1 +
∫ u
0
∫ D−x−u
0
[w(x+ y1 + y2)− gb(D − x
−y1 − y2)]f2(y2)dy2f1(y1)dy1 + [1− F1(u)][1− F2(D − x
−u)]wD. (5.26)
The first-order and second-order conditions of (5.26), with respect to the order
u are given by:
∂piB(x, u, v)
∂u
= (w + gb − s2)F2(D − x− u)− (w + gb − s1)F1(u)− s1 + s2,
(5.27)
∂pi2(x, u, v)
∂u2
= −(w + gb − s2)f2(D − x− u)− (w + gb − s1)f1(u) ≤ 0.
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Set (5.27) equal to 0 and denote the root as u∗∗. Since s1 ≤ s2, u∗∗ > D − x if
x > D − F−11
(
s2 − s1
w + gb − s1
)
.
In this case, the optimal order quantity is D− x. In addition, it is easy to check that
1. If x < D, x+ u ≥ D, x+ v ≤ D, then the optimal order pair is (D − x, 0);
2. If x < D, x+ u ≤ D, x+ v ≥ D, then the optimal order pair is (0, D − x);
3. If x < D, x + u + v ≤ D, then the optimal order pair always satisfies that
u∗ + v∗ = D;
4. If x ≥ D, then the optimal order pair is (0, 0). ¥
Proposition 16 shows that the buyer should adjust her ordering policy according
to the initial stock level. When the initial stock level is lower than D − U − V , the
buyer should place orders with both suppliers, and her total order-up-to level will
be larger than the market demand. However, since both suppliers are unstable, the
buyer’s orders may not be fulfilled completely. When the initial stock level is larger
than D−U−V while less than D−W , the buyer’s total order-up-to level should equal
the market demand. If the initial stock level is larger than D −W but smaller than
D, the buyer should order from supplier 1 only since he provides cheaper products.
If the initial stock level is larger than D, no order should be placed.
V.4. Summary
In this chapter, we study a simple setting that includes considerations of power struc-
ture, supply uncertainty, and competition between two suppliers. We show that the
optimal quality level is higher when the supplier is the follower of the channel than
when he is the leader. In this setting, we further examine the case in which a single
buyer is facing one stable supplier and one unstable supplier. We also study the case
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in which a single buyer is facing two unstable suppliers. We provide optimal ordering
policies for the buyer in both cases. Our contributions are highlighted below:
• The design of supply contracts under supply uncertainty and supplier competi-
tion.
• The design of supply contracts under power structure, supply uncertainty, and
supplier competition considerations.
• Exploration of the impact of power structure.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This dissertation investigates supply chain contract design with power structure, in-
formation asymmetry, supply uncertainty, and supplier competition considerations.
Our goals are to develop a supply contract design framework that considers power
structure and information asymmetry issues in supplier- and buyer-driven channels
and to advance practical knowledge of the design of implementable contracts. In
order to achieve our objectives, we investigate four sets of problems: buyer’s impact,
information asymmetry, supply uncertainty, and supplier competition.
In Chapter II, we explicitly examine the buyer’s impact on designing price pro-
tection and returns policies contracts. We show that when the buyer is making pric-
ing or sales effort decisions to influence market demand, price protection or returns
policies alone are not able to coordinate the channel. Additional terms must be intro-
duced into the contracts to achieve channel coordination. Threre, we provide optimal
contracts with pricing, sales effort, and information asymmetry considerations. Our
investigations are highlighted below:
• The design of optimal price protection contracts with retail-pricing decisions
under deterministic and stochastic price-sensitive demand.
• The design of optimal price protection contracts with the consideration of the
buyer’s sales effort.
• The design of optimal price protection contracts and returns policies with the
consideration of information asymmetry.
In Chapter III, we explore the impact of power structure, information asymme-
try, and contract type on joint and individual profits in a two-stage supply chain
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with a single-product. Considering a buyer-driven channel, we derive optimal supply
contracts with the considerations of information asymmetry. We show that the im-
pact of information asymmetry on the buyer’s profit margin is quite different under
different types of contracts. Under a one-part linear contract, information asymmetry
decreases the buyer’s profit margin. Under a two-part linear contract, the impact of
information asymmetry depends on the buyer’s estimation accuracy. Under a two-
part nonlinear contract, information asymmetry increases the buyer’s profit margin.
We also show that, from the system’s perspective, the buyer-driven channel is more
efficient than the supplier-driven channel under the corresponding one-part linear
contract. We confirm the common wisdom that the bargaining power is beneficial for
both the buyer and the supplier and that the value of possessing bargaining power is
higher under more general contract types in full information cases. However, when
information asymmetry exists in the supply chain, the bargaining power is not nec-
essarily beneficial for either party and the common wisdom does not hold. Thus,
it is not always wise for the buyer or the supplier to pursue the bargaining power
when accurate information is not available. In addition, more general types of con-
tracts may not improve the benefit of possessing power when information asymmetry
exists. That is, the value of the bargaining power may be smaller under more gen-
eral contract types. Hence, the party without accurate information may not benefit
from having power even when a two-part nonlinear contract is allowed, which means
that sometimes one can forfeit the bargaining power and still gain higher profit. Our
investigations are highlighted below:
• The design of different types of optimal contracts for a buyer-driven channel
with full information sharing.
• The design of different types of optimal contracts for a buyer-driven channel
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with incomplete information of cost structure.
• The analysis of the impact of power structure and information asymmetry on
supply chain performance under different types of contracts.
In Chapter IV we seek to provide implementable contractual arrangements to
coordinate the channel with the consideration of supply uncertainty. We first de-
velop a general framework that incorporates power structure and supply uncertainty
and show that both are important when designing supply contracts. Based on the
general framework, we further develop supply contracts under conditions of supply
uncertainty and deterministic demand with an infinite planning horizon. The find-
ings reported clearly show that ignoring incentive conflicts and supply information
issues can lead to undesirable behavior. We propose a model for how lot size, quality
level, and transactions should be structured to help reduce supply chain inefficiency
due to individual incentives and private information. In addition, we develop supply
contracts under supply uncertainty and stochastic demand in a single period. We
examine the impact of both supply and demand uncertainty on channel performance
and propose a consignment contract to help coordinate the channel. The problems
investigated in this chapter are summarized below:
• A general framework of supply chain contract design under supply uncertainty
in supplier- and buyer-driven channels.
• An exploration of the impact of the power structure.
• The design of optimal cost-sharing contracts under supply uncertainty and con-
tinuous deterministic demand.
• The design of optimal cost-sharing contracts under supply uncertainty and
stochastic single-period demand.
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• An exploration of the value of supply uncertainty information.
Finally, in Chapter V, we first develop a general framework with power struc-
ture, supply uncertainty, and supplier competition considerations. We show that the
optimal quality level is higher when the supplier is the follower of the channel than
when he is the leader. Under this framework, we further examine the case in which
a single buyer is facing one stable supplier and one unstable supplier. In addition,
we study the case in which a single buyer is facing two unstable suppliers. We pro-
vide optimal ordering policies for the buyer in both cases. Our investigations are
highlighted below:
• The design of supply contracts under supply uncertainty and supplier competi-
tion.
• The design of supply contracts under power structure, supply uncertainty, and
supplier competition considerations.
• Exploration of the impact of the power structure.
This research has roots in applied probability, optimization, inventory theory,
game theory, and economics. We develop optimization models aimed at minimizing
entity/system costs or maximizing entity/system profits for the purpose of optimal
contract design. Our focus is on probabilistic demand problems. From the method-
ology perspective, our optimization models are all stochastic modeling problems that
require unconstrained/constrained dynamic or nonlinear optimization techniques, de-
pending on the factors considered.
As previously indicated, current supply chain contract practice, as well as the
supply chain literature, will be enriched by this research on power shifting, information
asymmetry, supply uncertainty, and competition considerations. This dissertation is
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unique in that we explore the impact of both power shifting and information asym-
metry while designing optimal supply chain contracts under supply uncertainty and
competition. Hence, this research will advance practical knowledge about designing
implementable contracts, and such knowledge is crucial for optimizing supply chain
performance in the real world. This dissertation also sheds light on the significance
of supply uncertainty information and the role of suppliers’ and buyer’s competition
in the design of supply chain contracts. These are two important practical issues
previously neglected in the literature.
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